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Dissertation

GOD AND HISTORY IN THE THOUGHT OF PAUL TILLICH

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter Page

I. INTRODUCTION

- A. Statement of the Problem 1
- B. Sources of Data 1
  - 1. Chief Sources in Tillich's Writings 1
  - 2. Tillich's Lectures at Harvard University . . 2
  - 3. General Works in the Philosophy of History . 2
  - 4. Work Previously Done by Others in this Area of Research 3
- C. Method of Procedure and Organization 4

II. HISTORY AND KNOWLEDGE

- A. The Nature of Knowledge 7
  - 1. The Nature of the Cognitive Subject and Object 8
  - 2. The Nature of the Cognitive Union 11
- B. The Nature of Historical Knowledge 38
  - 1. The Relation Between Facts and Interpretation in Historical Knowledge . . . 38
  - 2. The Nature of Explanation in History 42
  - 3. The Problem of "True" Historical Explanation 52
- C. Reflective Summary 64

Chapter Page

III. HISTORY AND BEING

A. The Descriptive Task of Ontology 69

1. Descriptive Ontology as the "Problem" . . . 70

2. Summary 79

B. The Answering Nature of Ontology 80

1. Is "Being-itself" Meaningless? 81

2. Is "Being-itself" a Static Concept? 86

C. Reflective Summary 114

IV. HISTORY AND THE HUMAN CONDITION

A. Tillich's Critique of Freud's View of Man . . . 122

1. Freud's Failure to See the Multidimensional Aspects of Man 123

2. Freud's Failure to Understand Man's Social Nature 126

3. Freud's Failure to See Man's Relation to Ontologically Grounded Values 131

4. Freud's Failure to Describe Man's Essential Freedom 137

5. The Bearing of Tillich's View of Man On his Own Philosophy of History 158

B. Tillich's Critique of Marx's View of Man 160

1. Five Areas of Agreement Between Tillich and Marx 161

2. Marx's Failure to See the Extent of Man's Estrangement 166

3. Marx's Failure to Provide an Adequate Answer to Man's Estrangement 169

C. Reflective Summary 175

Chapter Page

V. THE KINGDOM OF GOD WITHIN HISTORY

A. Contrasting Interpretations of History 183

1. Non-historical Interpretations of History . . 184

2. Historical but Inadequate Interpretations of History 188

B. History and the Kingdom of God 195

1. The Kingdom of God as Political 196

2. The Kingdom of God as Social 197

3. The Kingdom of God as Personal 197

4. The Kingdom of God as Universal 198

5. The Kingdom of God as Immanent and Transcendent 199

C. The Problem of Ambiguity in Historical Groups . . 200

1. The Ambiguities of Historical Self-Integration: Empire and Particular Centralization 201

2. The Ambiguities of Historical Self-Creativity: Revolution and Reaction 205

3. The Ambiguities of Historical Self-Transcendence: The "Third" Stage as Given and Expected 207

D. How the Kingdom of God is Manifested in History in General 208

1. What it Does Not Mean to Say that God is Manifested in History 211

2. What it Means to Say that God Is Manifested in History 214

E. How the Kingdom of God is Manifested in the Ambiguities of Historical Groups 234

Chapter V (continued) Page

1. The Kingdom of God and the Ambiguity of Political Power 235

2. The Kingdom of God and the Ambiguity of Social Growth 238

3. The Kingdom of God and the Ambiguity of Self-Transcendence 239

F. How the Kingdom of God is Actualized in History: The Church and the Call to Action 241

1. The Meaning of the Church as "Spiritual Community" 241

2. The Message of the Church 243

3. The Mission of the Church 246

G. Reflective Summary 252

VI. THE KINGDOM OF GOD BEYOND HISTORY

A. Introduction of the Problem 261

B. The Nature of Historical Time 263

1. Time as the Central Category of Finitude . . 263

2. Time as Duration 264

3. Time as Chronological Order 265

4. Time as Irreversible 265

5. Time as the Emergence of Novelty 265

6. Time as Purposive 266

7. Time as Free 266

8. Time as Relative 267

9. Time as Ambiguous 267

C. The Nature of Eternal Life 268

Chapter Page

1. Eternal Life as a Living Unity 269

2. Eternal Life as a Unique Complex Unity . . . 271

3. Eternal Life as Unbegun and Unending Unity . 274

4. Eternal Life as Creative Unity 274

5. Eternal Life as a Unity of Divine Love . . . 277

6. Eternal Life as a Fully Differentiated Unity 278

7. Eternal Life as a State of Blessed Unity . . 278

8. Conclusions concerning Tillich's View of Time and Eternal Life. 280

D. The Nature of Man's Eternal Destiny 289

1. What the Eternal Destiny of Man Does Not Mean 289

2. What the Eternal Destiny of Man Does Mean . 293

3. An Interpretative Summary of the Relation Between Time and Eternity 299

E. Reflective Summary 305

VII. SUMMARY OF INTERPRETATION AND EVALUATIONS

A. The Emerging Picture 309

1. The Axioms of Transcendence and Harmony . . 309

2. The Part-Whole Model 311

3. The Unifying Themes in Tillich's View of the Human Condition 315

4. The Unifying Themes as Seen in God's Immanence in History 320

5. The Unifying Themes as Seen in Transhistorical Fulfillment 327

B. Some Distinctive Contributions in Tillich's Philosophy of History 329

Chapter Page

1. Tillich's Epistemology 330
2. Tillich's Ontology 330
3. Tillich's View of the Human Condition . . . 331
4. Tillich's View of God in History 332
5. Tillich's View of Transhistorical Fulfillment 333

C. Some Difficulties in Tillich's Philosophy of History 333

1. Difficulties with the Part-Whole Model . . . 334
2. Difficulties with the Axioms of Transcendence and Harmony 339

D. Areas of Further Study 345

BIBLIOGRAPHY 348

ABSTRACT 356

AUTOBIOGRAPHY 359

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

A. Statement of the Problem

It is the aim of this dissertation to elucidate and evaluate Paul Tillich's philosophy of history with special reference to his most recent and direct treatment of the ground and goal of history. This aim is pursued by raising some fundamental epistemological and metaphysical issues as they are reflected in his view of history, by expounding Tillich's approach to them, and by presenting an appraisal.

B. Sources of Data

1. Chief Sources in Tillich's Writings

The most important source for this study is the third volume of Tillich's Systematic Theology (1963), especially the fifth part of his theological system entitled, "History and the Quest for the Kingdom of God." Since history is a dimension of life and is actualized only in the realm of the spirit, Part Five may be viewed as a further development of Part Four which is called "Life and the Spirit." Therefore, all of Volume Three is particularly relevant to this study. Since Tillich's Systematic Theology is an organic whole, the other two volumes could not be omitted (1951, 1957).

Another important source, The Kingdom of God and History, edited by H. G. Wood (1938), contains a chapter by Tillich, bearing the same title as the book, in which he outlines his philosophy of history.

Other relevant sources by Tillich are: The Interpretation of History (1936), The Protestant Era (1948), Love, Power, and Justice (1954), Biblical Religion and the Search for Ultimate Reality (1955), The Religious Situation (1956), Dynamics of Faith (1957), Theology of Culture (1959), The Courage To Be (1959), Christianity and the Encounter of the World Religions (1963), Morality and Beyond (1963), and The Future of Religions (1966). Tillich's relevant contributions in scholarly journals also provided important data.

2. Tillich's Lectures at Harvard University

Personal contact with Tillich in eight of his courses and a dozen or more conversations during 1960 through 1962 at Harvard provided resources for this study. His course entitled "History and the Kingdom of God" was particularly helpful since it dealt with the subject of this study and took place while Tillich was writing Part Five of Volume Three. Although Tillich's lectures provided helpful material for interpreting his system, only his written works will be taken as primary data for crucial areas of exposition.

3. General Works in the Philosophy of History

Since the topic of this dissertation falls within the area of philosophy of history, texts within this field, together with numerous articles in scholarly journals, have been found most helpful. A complete bibliography of sources cited and used is included at the end of this study.

4. Work Previously Done by Others in this Area of Research

Numerous studies have been made of Tillich's thought. Although Tillich began his intellectual career by concerning himself with historical-political issues, and then ended his *Systematic Theology* by returning to this early concern with history, relatively little research has concentrated on Tillich's philosophy of history *per se*.

There is an article entitled "Tillich's Interpretation of History" by James Luther Adams in *The Theology of Paul Tillich*, edited by Kegley and Bretall (1961).

The work that comes nearest to the area of concentration here is a doctoral dissertation entitled, *Paul Tillich's Interpretation of History*, written in 1959 by William Wright Paul. The present study differs by concentrating more in the area of metaphysics, while Paul's emphasis is in social philosophy. One of Paul's criticisms, for example, is that Tillich viewed the church as a fighting church for social justice and yet failed to provide detailed plans of social action for current problems. This is not the focus of investigation or concern here. Moreover, Paul's dissertation was written before Tillich's latest and direct treatment of philosophy of history in the third volume of *Systematic Theology*.

George H. Tavard has a chapter entitled "Christology and History" in his *Paul Tillich and the Christian Message* (1962). In *Paul Tillich: An Appraisal*, J. Heywood Thomas has a chapter called, "History and the Kingdom of God" (1963). Both Tavard and Thomas wrote before the appearance of Tillich's third volume.

A thirty-two page chapter entitled "History and the Kingdom of God" is included in Alexander J. McKelway's The Systematic Theology of Paul Tillich (1964). This book contains a brief analysis and review of all parts of Tillich's three volumes of Systematic Theology. Karl Barth wrote the introduction to the book, and the critical focus of the entire work is on Tillich's christology.

Since no work has yet approached Tillich's view of history with the benefit of his third volume and with focus in metaphysics, it is in the realm of Tillich's understanding of the ground and aim of history that this inquiry seeks to make a contribution.

C. Method of Procedure and Organization

The procedure of this study will be to organize the analysis of Tillich's philosophy under appropriate headings. This can be done conveniently in six succeeding chapters.

In Chapter Two, "History and Knowledge," some basic concepts in Tillich's epistemology are examined, and applied to problems pertaining to the nature of historical knowledge and explanation.

Since Tillich's understanding of the ground and aim of history rests upon his ontology, Chapter Three, "History and Being," contains an examination of Tillich's understanding of the nature of ontology, and of the model he employs in his own ontology. Attention is given to whether Tillich's notion of "being-itself" is meaningless or meaningful, static or dynamic, and consistent or inconsistent.

Chapter Four is an inquiry into Tillich's view of man, and is designated "History and the Human Condition." Since history deals primarily with man, a full understanding of Tillich's philosophy of history involves a study of his estimate of the human condition. The views of Sigmund Freud and Karl Marx provide a helpful background for highlighting Tillich's understanding of man as a historical agent. Tillich's account of human estrangement and human freedom are central problems in this chapter.

The focus of Chapter Five, "The Kingdom of God Within History," is on the relation between the ontological ground as analyzed in Chapter Three, and human activity as seen in Chapter Four. The meanings of God as incarnate, creator, and redeemer are analyzed and evaluated. Special attention is given to the kinds of problems encountered by historical groups as the bearers of history, and to the solution of these problems as found in the symbol "The Kingdom of God."

Since the ultimate meaning of God's manifestation within history is only understood fully by the outcome of history, Chapter Six, "The Kingdom of God Beyond History," contains an examination of Tillich's eschatology of fulfillment. A critical understanding of Tillich's solution to the cosmic significance and ultimate destiny of values realized in the historical process is provided by outlining first Tillich's estimate of the basic characteristics of the occurrences in historical time, and then by analyzing the meaning of Eternal Life in relation to time. The chapter concludes with an application of the relation between time and eternity to the problem of personal immortality.

A final chapter, "Summary of Interpretation and Evaluations," contains an attempt to bring together the interpretation of Tillich's understanding of history that has emerged from this study, to assess both the contributions and the difficulties in his account of history, and to indicate areas in which further analysis is needed.

CHAPTER II

HISTORY AND KNOWLEDGE

Paul Tillich's philosophy of history is an application of his general philosophy to the historical dimension of reality. It is therefore advisable to inquire first into the nature of his epistemology and ontology with special emphasis on the aspects that are especially relevant to the critical and speculative problems of philosophy of history.

This chapter attempts to unpack some of the basic concepts in Tillich's epistemology, and then within this context, to expound his approach to some current epistemological issues in the philosophy of history. Therefore Tillich's view of the nature and criteria of knowledge of knowledge is analyzed with special reference to the way in which objects in nature, other persons, and God are known. This is followed by an exposition of Tillich's approach to epistemological issues in the area of philosophy of history.

A. The Nature of Knowledge

What is knowledge? How do we Know? What are the component parts involved in the knowing situation? What relationships exist between the parts? How do we know that we know, that is, what is the criterion of knowledge. Both the answer and problem may be approached by considering Tillich's definition of knowledge.

> Knowing is a form of union. In every act of knowledge the knower and that which is known are united; the gap between subject and object is overcome. The subject 'grasps' the object, adapts it to itself, and, at the same time, adapts itself to the object. But the union of knowledge is a peculiar one; it is a union through separation. Detachment is the condition of cognitive union. . . .

Cognitive distance is the presupposition of cognitive union.[1]

In this quotation Tillich distinguished between the "subject" and the "object" in the knowing situation, and defines knowledge as a "form of union" between them which involves both grasping and adapting (shaping) functions. This "union," moreover, is not an amalgamation, since it presupposes a cognitive distance or detachment between subject and object. What, more exactly, do these terms and phrases mean and how are they used in the knowledge of natural objects, persons, and God?

1. The Nature of the Cognitive Subject and Object

The subject and object are related to each other by way of reason. But what does Tillich mean by reason? He distinguishes between technical reason and ontological reason. Technical reason is intellectual (cognitive) reflection concentrating on logical and methodological problems. It is a part of man thinking within the subject-object differentiation and reflecting on "means" rather than on "ends" or ideal values of life.[2] Technical reason is the intellectual as distinguished from the intuitive and emotional aspects of man. Technical reason is illustrated, for example, in the scientist's ability to learn the secrets of atomic energy without consideration of the ends for which this energy should be used. Technical reason treats its subject matter purely as an object or thing, as an instance of a law instead of its unique particularity. Tillich acknowledges the importance of this kind of reason. He has none of the disdain for this kind of intellectual capacity that is frequently encountered in existentialist literature. The scientist achieves more than a nominalistic imposition of his own thought forms on the actual world, although he achieves less than the Platonic realist's quest for permanent, unchanging forms. The scientist can capture in his laws the relatively permanent and objective structures of energy. But if technical reason is used alone it dehumanizes man. Technical reason must be supplemented with ontological reason.

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[1] Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1951), I, 94. Further references to this three volume work will be indicated by listing only the volume number and pages.

[2] Cf. Vol. I, p. 73.

Ontological reason refers to the "structure of the mind which enables it to grasp and to shape reality."[1] It is the whole man thinking about the structures and ideal values (meanings) of life. Both intellect and emotions are involved. Ontological reason is divided into subjective and objective reason. Tillich "presupposes" a common Logos or Reason between the subjective act of thinking and the objective nature of that which is given or posited. This is a kind of assumption which Tillich substantiates only by indicating what would be the case if subject and object were not united in reason. "Wherever the self-world correlation is cut, no reunion is possible."[2] As Tillich sees it, one must side with Hegel against a Kantian Ding an sich. Without a common Logos the cognitive subject cannot be a "structure of centeredness" and the cognitive object cannot be known as a "structured whole."[3] However, Tillich does not think of the common ground of the epistemological subject and object in terms of monistic identity as did Spinoza and Schelling. "What precedes is not identity but polarity . . ."[4]
Idealists like Fichte tried to derive the object from the subject. Mate-

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[1] Ibid., p. 75. [2] Vol. I, p. 191. [3] Ibid.

[4] Paul Tillich, "Participation and Knowledge," Frankfurter Beitraege zur Soziologie, Band 1, Sociologica, Frankfurt am Main: Institut fuer Sozialforschung, 1955, p. 202.

rialists like Hobbes tried to explain the subject in terms of the object. But both types of identity are inadequate because they involve an "irrational leap."[1] This means that consciousness cannot be derived from nonconsciousness, and vice versa. The knowledge situation involves a distinct and irreducible subject and object in a polar relationship.

But what does "polar" relationship involve? For Tillich it means that epistemology rests upon his ontology. In fact, he believes every epistemology is dependent upon some basic speculative vision or intuition. This is what he means when he says every philosopher is a hidden (or acknowledged) theologian. The questions which the philosopher asks about ultimate reality are actually the result of a prior answer. In the terminology of Heidegger, philosophy (or poetry and art) is a person's response to the favor of being for unrevealing itself. The question of reality cannot even be asked without an apprehension (revelation) of reality. In other words, in order to doubt the doubter must be in polar union with that about which it doubts.[2] Thus Tillich adopts some principles of idealism to the extent that the subject and object of knowledge both possess correspondingly rational structures, but he avoids subjectism in idealism by maintaining that the object is absolutely given as something other and irreducible.

Not only are subject and object distinct and irreducible, although in polar relationship, they are both dynamic and active. Here an evolutionary motif is seen in Tillich's epistemology. "Both the rational structure of reality and the rational structure of the mind possess duration within change and change in duration."[1] Every knowledge situation involves a relatively static element of rational structure (form), and a dynamic element of reason. Both mind and reality are active and creative. "Reality itself creates structural possibilities within itself."[2] Reality has a certain amount of indeterminateness. Here Tillich could point to Heisenberg's principle of indeterminancy of the atom, or to the emergence and disappearance of new species in the evolutionary process. He even envisages the possibility of mankind changing his structure in the future to some post-historical being similar to the way in which man emerged from prehistorical man.[3]

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[1] Vol. I, p. 171.

[2] This ontological conditioning of his epistemology means that this chapter and the following one on his ontology are interdependent and complement each other. Still the problems in both are distinct enough to merit separate analysis. It may be that his epistemological demands condition his ontology as well as vice versa.

It has been shown so far that Tillich interprets the knowing situation to be composed of an irreducible subject and object, and that both are active. We now focus attention on the nature of "knowing as a form of union."

2. The Nature of the Cognitive Union

There are three major types of relationships that emerge in Tillich's writings concerning cognitive union. Tillich refers to two of them in the original definition of knowledge given previously. The subject "grasps" the object and "adapts" both itself and the object. The third kind of relationship involves the "depth of Reason," a discussion of which can be postponed until we come to his view of the knowledge of God. Tillich's meaning of "grasping" and "adapting" is illuminated by analyzing them in terms of his emphasis on the polarity of individualization and participation in all knowledge.[1]

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[1] Vol. I, p. 78

[2] *Ibid.*

[3] Vol. III, pp. 306-08. The question arises at this point whether or not Tillich has any notion of an ultimate structure that permits relatively permanent structures to change. This problem involves the problem of the nature of being-itself which is treated in the following chapter.

"Individualization" refers to the particularity and self-centered identity of the knowing subject. "Participation" is Tillich's rather ambiguous term for all kinds of cognitive relations depending upon the nature of the subjects to be known. But it always presupposes and points to the otherness of the object of knowledge. Hence knowledge of all kinds involves a polar correlation of individualization and participation. Or, in terms of the original definition of knowledge given above, knowledge involves a "union through separation." An understanding of the cognitive union involved in knowledge for Tillich is tantamount to unpacking his meaning of individuation in terms of various objects of knowledge. Accordingly we shall look at what he means by knowing an object in nature, another person, and finally God.

a) What it means to "know" an Object of Nature.

Tillich is more concerned with knowledge as the phenomenological descriptions of the categorial structures of the subject and object presupposed in all cognitive acts than he is in analyzing the nature of empirical and perceptual knowledge. He does not focus his descriptions exclusively on either the cognitive subject or object, but rather on the point where they meet. This is the function of ontological reason. When these structures are "grasped," they provide the "ends" by which technical reason can "shape" and direct the actual world. Thus technical reason is a "companion" of ontological reason. The functions of grasping and shaping are ideally (essentially) one in polar harmony. Reason is not divided, but is one. When in actuality one pole is stressed to the neglect of the other, and the ideal harmony is broken, Tillich uses the Hegelian term "estrangment" as a description of this situation. Reason in actuality is estranged, or "fallen" in theological terminology. Whatever forces work to reunite reason to its polar harmony are called "healing" forces. In theological terms, reason is reconciled. Within this framework what does it mean to know an object in nature?

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[1] Cf. Tillich, "Participation and Knowledge," op. cit.

Tillich's approach to perceptual knowledge can be understood in contrast to Kant's approach. Kant believed that the knowing subject receives sense data which the mind actively organizes through its own subjective categorial structures. What is "behind" the sense data as their source is the Ding an sich and can never be reached as it is in itself unaffected by the knowing mind. The mind is imprisoned by its own categories and can never grasp the really real, the noumenal world. Although Kant's approach showed how perceptual knowledge is possible, he posed the problem of metaphysical skepticism for his philosophical successors. The development of classical German philosophy can be viewed as an attempt to avoid the imprisonment of the knowing subject in its own inherent and subjective structures.

Tillich belongs to this tradition of classical German philosophy, and shares the post-Kantian task of avoiding metaphysical skepticism. He agrees with Kant that there are structures or categories of finitude, but he pushes in the direction of Fichte and Hegel in making the categories objective as well as subjective. The categories are forms which determine content, but they are "ontological, and therefore they are in everything."[1] The categories are the structures that can be phenomenologically described at the point at which the subject and object meet, and they are therefore as much forms for the object as they are for the subject. Tillich selects the categories of causality, substance, time, and space for his theological purposes.[1] Causality, for example, is not just a subjective form of the mind. Causality belongs to the object as well as the subject. It is a description of what takes place when subject and object meet in conscious experience. What Tillich is saying here is that if ever the subject and object are separated, as Kant separated them, there is no way to get them back together. This is the problem of epistemological dualism. Instead of starting this way, then, it must be presupposed that what "seems" separated is really not. The subject and object are in polar relationship, which means that it is not possible to have one without the other. Ontological knowledge becomes possible once a polar relationship between what seems to be separated is postulated.

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[1] Vol. I, p. 192.

One further difference between Kant and Tillich is fundamental. Kant assumed that his analysis of the categories was a permanent contribution. The categories do not change. For Tillich a description of the structures of the knowledge situation can never be complete. Since both the subject and object of knowledge are dynamic in nature, no description of their structures is lasting. Tillich speaks of the necessity of relative rather than absolute _a priori_ structures,[2] and acknowledges that the analysis of different realms of being as well as the categories are by their very nature never completed and are "open to an indefinite process of reformulation."[3] Thus, by diverging from Kant in two basic ways, Tillich shows how perceptual knowledge of objects in nature is possible.

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[1] Vol. I, p. 192

[2] Vol. I, p. 168.

[3] Vol. III, p. 315.

Although Tillich's conceptual apparatus needed for empirical knowledge is now clear, his distinctive emphasis remains to be seen. In accord with Schelling's Romanticism, Tillich is concerned with an "existential" knowledge of the inward power and subjectivity of objects. Here the polarity between individualization and participation becomes apparent. Scientific knowledge is primarily "controlling" knowledge which could be called in Buber's terms an "I-It" relationship. Here the pole of individualization is predominant. The subject is aloof from the object and selects and interprets what is given in terms of pragmatic interests. The mind "adapts" what is given as a tool. The cognitive attitude is one of objectivity. Now, although this pole of knowledge is a necessary ingredient in any cognitive relationship, it becomes excessive if not balanced with the other pole of participation. The problem is not with the self-world distinction, but with its lack of balance. In actual existence there is a lack of polar balance. Reason is estranged from its ideal polar unity, is fallen. The emphasis on science in the modern world neglects the importance of "participating" in terms of an existential knowledge, that is a "receiving knowledge" that "takes the object into itself, into union with the subject."[1] The "strangeness" or sense of complete otherness between subject and object needs to be overcome. No object of nature is a mere object. Even a piece of metal is "interesting," and has "elements of subjectivity and self-relatedness."[2] Things are always in the subject's world as the other pole, and because of the polar relationship between subject and object nothing is completely strange. It is the exclusive emphasis on man's intellectual capacities as seen in technical reason that makes experience lose its sense of immediacy. Even language tends to objectify its referent and miss the unique feeling aspects of the object. Words can even be substituted for the reality of the objective content. Language, like science, is geared toward the universal. It deals with classes which are defined by their common properties.

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[1] Vol. I, p. 98.

[2] Ibid.

Tillich's concern is to restore a cognitive balance between man's intellectual and emotional capacities, between intellection and conation. This is what he means when he talks about being "open" to the cognitive object, to its inner life. The mind must "adapt itself to the object." This is possible through phenomenological intuition. To know an object in this sense, to be open, means to take in what is given through the senses thoroughly, to grasp its inner-relatedness without thought of controlling or using it. Such an attitude does not contradict technical reason as represented by the scientific method, since science itself contains an element of knowledge for its own sake, that is, a purely theoretical urge to know.[1]

In other words, Tillich believes that to know a tree, for example, we can know its physical properties through technical reason by means of empirical laws in a relatively objective manner. Ontological reason through phenomenological intuition can describe the categories presupposed by such empirical knowledge. But in addition ontological reason can "grasp" the inner life processes of objects stressed by Romanticists like Schelling and philosophers of life like Bergson. There is no contradiction between these two kinds of reason. In fact, genuine knowledge or "understanding" of the natural world involves a polar balance of empirical and phenomenological methods, controlling and grasping, objective and existential, technical and ontological reason. To the extent the poles between controlling and receiving knowledge are not interrelated, there is no true understanding. Reason remains "fallen." To the degree that both poles of knowledge operate together, reason is "healed." A further understanding of Tillich's theory of knowledge can be gained by considering what it means to know another human being.

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[1] Cf. Tillich, "Participation and Knowledge," p. 205.

b) What it means to "know" another person.

The focus of attention now turns first to what it means to know another person, and then to the problem of the criterion of truth with reference to both objects of nature and other persons.

(1) How do we know other persons?--The meaning of knowing another human being for Tillich can be seen by extending what has already been said with reference to the knowledge of objects. Tillich does not believe that in order to know other people, we must first know ourselves and then "infer" the existence of other people. Rather, "the primary phenomenon is the understanding of the situation of encounter in which both oneself and others participate, but not as separated subject and object."[1] In other words, we cannot begin with either the subject or the object, but with the situation which involves both. This is consistent with his insistence that it is impossible to derive the object from the subject.

As in the case with the knowledge of objects of nature, it is possible to know other persons predominantly through the pole of individuation and controlling scientific knowledge, or through the pole of participation and receiving (existential) knowledge. The scientist can be objective in his attitude and give a battery of psychological and physical tests. This results in quantitatively measurable traits and characteristics. It is formal, universal knowledge. But this kind of technical reason misses the particularity, the inner subjectivity of the person. Detached knowledge needs to be supplemented with existential knowledge that penetrates into the unique subjectivity of the other person. Receiving knowledge in ontological reason is involved knowledge and comes through phenomenological intuition. It goes beyond a superficial knowledge of another person and involves discovering "his real, true personality structure, the essence and power of his being. . ."[1] The relationship between controlling knowledge and receiving knowledge is a complementary one, and their unity consists in "understanding."[2] In Kantian terminology, we should never know another person as "means only," but also as an "end-in-himself."

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[1] Tillich, "Participation and Knowledge," op. cit., p. 206.

One final observation concerning the cognitive goal conceived as a union through separation can be made. Tillich expresses the cognitive goal in terms of identity with his ethical criterion.

> True knowledge of the other person is possible only to the degree in which the relation to him is neither blinding passion nor beautifying wish nor distorting hate but rather a criticizing and accepting which is detached and involved at the same time.[3]

Understanding another person involves the drive to reunion with him (eros), but at the same time keeps the distancing effect of respect for his essential particularity (agape) which preserves a sense of limit and separation. The drive for relatedness must be balanced by a recognition of the limits of controlling knowledge in encountering other persons.

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[1] Vol. I, p. 101.

[2] Ibid., p. 98.

[3] Tillich, "Participation and Knowledge," op. cit., p. 206.

It is one thing to know what knowledge means, but it is essential to know how we know. When is knowledge reliable and dependable? What is the criterion of knowledge? On the empirical level involved in knowing both objects of nature and persons Tillich suggests a doctrine of verification for receiving and controlling knowledge which our discussion up to this point will help to illuminate.

(2) How do we know that we know in controlling and receiving Knowledge?—The object of knowledge is truth. Tillich seeks to combine the scientist's concern with controlling knowledge with the interest in receiving knowledge evidenced in Romanticism and Existentialism. There is a type of verification that can be associated with both of these emphases; namely, the experimental method and the experiential method. Truth in either case, for Tillich, involves truth both as a property of a proposition when it corresponds with an objective structure, and truth as a quality of the objective referent of knowledge when its actual structure has been grasped. Tillich stresses this type of epistemological realism in the following way:

> The truth of something is that level of its being the knowledge of which prevents wrong expectations and consequent disappointments. Truth, therefore, is the essence of things as well as the cognitive act in which their essence is grasped. The term "truth" is, like the term "reason," subjective-objective. A judgment is true because it grasps and expresses true being; and the really real becomes truth if it is grasped and expressed in a true judgment.[1]

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[1] Vol. I, p. 102.

Tillich's meaning can become somewhat clearer by briefly noting how he applies this concept of truth to both controlling (technical) and receiving (ontological) knowledge.

Any kind of cognitive knowledge needs to be verified. Verification refers to "a method of deciding the truth or falsehood of a judgment."[1] Controlling knowledge refers to the technical use of reason as demonstrated by science and verified by the scientific method. Thus the inductive and hypothetical procedures of the scientific method are relatively precise and are judged by their ability to predict (and hence control). Science can capture the essential structures of the physical universe in laws. To the degree of probability by which this is done, to that degree the theoretical judgments of science are "true," and the objective structure of the physical universe becomes truth. Logical positivism is correct in spelling out the details of such a method of verification. But Tillich believes such a method applies only to the sense data of the empirical world. Positivism is wrong when it restricts all knowledge to repeatable and calculable sense data, and relegates any other possible fields of knowledge to the limbo of meaningless statements, emotional self-expression, or tautologies. He believes there is another kind of verification applicable to receiving knowledge.

The verification for receiving knowledge is called "experiential."[2] Verification here can decide the truth or falsehood of a judgment by participating intuitively in particular life-processes. "Life processes have the character of totality, spontaneity, and individuality."[3] Verification here is possible when our judgments become "inexhaustible in meaning and creative in power."[1] As in the case of science, probability is all that can be hoped for here. Tillich admits that verification here is not precise and is difficult to apply. But he believes it is an improvement on traditional rationalism and pragmatism. Rationalism sought the certainty of self-evidence based on a mathematical model. But systems of philosophy and philosophical principles of being and thought cannot achieve necessity and universality.[2] Pragmatism, on the other hand, is too closely tied to controlling knowledge and offers no criterion of what it means to succeed.

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[1] Vol. I, p. 102.

[2] _Ibid._

[3] _Ibid._, p. 103.

Tillich believes that "somehow"[3] his method combines the desirable aspects of rationalism and pragmatism, without succumbing to their defects. Tillich is not clear on just what this "somehow" means. He would seem to mean, however, that truth is a matter of correspondence between the subject and the object's relatively permanent structure. The pragmatists were correct in stressing the importance of time and change, and the rationalists were right in their belief that some kind of structure was "out there" to be grasped. But the pragmatist erred by abandoning a realistic basis for knowledge in the relatively permanent structures to be grasped. The rationalist erred in failing to note the temporal and dynamic character of the structures of life and consequently imposed a logical and mathematical model on an irreducible and distinct empirical content.

It should be observed that the relationship between verification as experimental and experiential is a complementary one. As receiving and controlling knowledge form a polarity, so their respective methods of verification are polar and interdependent. But when both are complementary, they are not complete. Experimental verification does not deal with the ends of life, and even experiential verification is threatened "by the possibility of final meaninglessness."[1] Tillich states the problem as follows: "controlling knowledge is safe but not ultimately significant, while receiving knowledge can be ultimately significant, but it cannot give certainty."[2] The goal of knowledge for Tillich concerns that which is both certain and ultimately significant. This is revelation, the knowledge of God.

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 105.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 104.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 105.

Up to this point we have considered what Tillich means by knowledge in general, and by receiving and controlling knowledge in particular as applied to objects in nature and persons. The method of verification in both kinds of knowledge has been distinguished, and their complementary relationship observed. Probability is the outcome in both kinds of verification. Tillich finds something missing. At this point Tillich's epistemological goal of certainty in matters of ultimate significance comes to the fore. An essential element in the knowledge situation has been "bracketed" until now, namely, religious knowledge, revelation, the awareness of what is ultimately important and significant. This essential aspect of Tillich's epistemology is the subject of the next section.

c) What it means to "know" God.

Tillich's doctrine of revelation, the knowledge of God, can be analyzed briefly by noting first what he is fighting, and then by considering three fundamental assertions about the knowledge of God: first, that the knowledge of God is immediate and certain; second, that the knowledge of God is cognitively empty of empirical knowledge; and third, that the knowledge of God is positively related to empirical knowledge.

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[1] Vol. I, p. 105.

[2] Vol. I, p. 105.

(1) What Tillich Opposes.--A favorite trilogy of terms appears throughout Tillich's thought. The terms are autonomy, heteronomy, and theonomy. Tillich supports theonomous knowledge in opposition to autonomous and heteronomous knowledge. Tillich's view of revelatory and theonomous knowledge can best be explained by observing what he has against autonomy and heteronomy. "Autonomy means the obedience of the individual to the law of reason, which he finds in himself as a rational being."[1] Autonomous knowledge is knowledge in the domain of subjective and objective reason. Tillich is not opposed to autonomy for what it is, but for what it lacks. He is fully in sympathy with the use of autonomous knowledge in science and philosophy, but he does not believe it is an adequate tool for knowing God. Within the context of religious knowledge, which deals with what is taken to be of greatest value (ultimate concern) for Tillich, autonomy is associated with natural theology. The approach of natural theology is from man to God inductively. God becomes the referent of a hypothesis, a referent which may or may not exist. Such an approach, along with the knowledge of nature and persons, yields only probability. Tillich associates this method with the Thomistic approach, and comments that

> the rational way to God is not immediate, but mediated. It is a way of inference which, although correct, does not give unconditional certainty; therefore, it must be completed by the way of authority.[2]

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[1] Vol. I, p. 84.

[2] Paul Tillich, Theology of Culture (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), p. 16. Tillich's statement that probable knowledge "must" be completed by authority overstates the case. Although this was the case for Aquinas, there seems to be a live option between Tillich's option

Tillich here rejects autonomous reason as illustrated in natural theology because it does not produce certainty. The need to supplement natural theology with authority suggests the problem involved in heteronomy.

The problem with heteronomy is that it forces autonomous knowledge to submit to an external authority. The issue here concerns the nature of religious authority. Tillich is opposed to all forms of authoritarianism, secular or religious. Heteronomy is represented by a totalitarian state, as well as by a church which claims to be a depository of religious truth in either its hierarchical organization or in its infallible religious book. The assumption which Tillich does not share with these groups is that revelation has to do primarily with an inspired imparting of infallible information. He is opposed to this because it is "demonic,"[1] by which he means that it is inevitably destructive and detrimental to mankind to elevate doctrines and creeds to the status of eternal truths. Such an elevation is divisive. It has led to doctrinal splits and even wars which divide mankind, pitting group against group. The belief in revelation as revealed doctrines is also responsible for the controversy between science and religion as seen, for example, in the areas of natural evolution and historical research. Thus while autonomous knowledge about God fails to give certainty, heteronomous knowledge gives a false and divisive certainty. Tillich's concept of theonomous knowledge is an attempt to avoid both of these pitfalls.

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between either certainty or a skepticism which demands authority to complement it. The philosophy of Peter A. Bertocci is an instance of probability in religious knowledge which does not appeal to any authority outside of empirical coherence. See his "An Impasse in Philosophical Theology," International Philosophical Quarterly, V, Sept., 1965, pp. 379-96.

[1] Vol. I, p. 114.

Theonomous reason is "autonomous reason united with its own depth." This is revelation. With this concept Tillich seeks to provide a certainty not provided by autonomous reason, and yet avoid the dogmatic and destructive consequences of the false certainty found in heteronomous reason. Three fundamental assertions should make clear how Tillich seeks to achieve such a goal.

(2) Revelation is Immediate and Certain.--In contrast to the natural theology of autonomous reason, in theonomous reason God is revealed with certainty and immediacy, without the aid of inferential knowledge. An immediate relationship with the Ultimate lies at the core of Tillich's entire system. Tillich states this relationship as an ontological principle as follows:

> Man is immediately aware of something unconditional which is the prius of the separation and interaction of subject and object, theoretically as well as practically."[2]

Here the ultimate epistemological goal in Tillich's system is clear; immediacy and unconditional certainty. There is no use in trying to prove the existence of God by reason, for reason presupposes God. The question presupposes the answer. Tillich uses the term "aware" to avoid the connotation of probability associated with the term "knowledge." "Knowledge" is reserved by Tillich for technical and ontological reason that is still involved in the split between subject and object. To be related to God, however, is a relationship with the "prius," with that which precedes the subject-object split. But Tillich's meaning could be captured by calling awareness "true" knowledge. Or revelation could be designated as knowledge of the first order, while empirical and philosophical knowledge is only

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[1] Vol. I, p. 85.

[2] Tillich, Theology of Culture, p. 22.

"probable" knowledge of the second order.

What kind of experience does Tillich have in mind when he refers to the immediate awareness of something unconditional, that is, God in religious language? His distinction between "theoretical" and "practical" in the definition on the preceding page points to two somewhat different ways of experiencing the unconditional. On the theoretical or cognitive side, man is immediately aware of the unconditional quality of truth. Here he follows Augustine's argument "that in the situation of doubt the truth from which one feels separated is present in so far as in every doubt the formal affirmation of truth as truth is presupposed."[1] Serious doubt is only possible when one is immediately aware of the reality of truth, and recognizes that doubt is the means for discovering truth. Truth is presupposed in every scientific and philosophical argument. Reason is needed to refute the claims of reason. The immediate awareness of the demand to follow truth wherever it leads is an experience that transcends the subject-object relationship. Man's whole being is grasped. The unconditional is existentially apprehended. God is present within human experience.

On the other hand, God is present "practically" in man in what Kant called the "categorical imperative," the sense of ought. Tillich thinks that in Kant's practical reason he left a window open through which man might look for the noumenal, and Fichte went a step further by considering the quality of oughtness as an existential break-through of the noumenal, that is, the unconditional. The subject-object relationship is transcended. The quality of oughtness is not a sense object, nor is it some external subject imposing a law. Rather the experience of moral obligation is an existential apprehension of the unconditional, or in other words, the revelation of being-itself that cannot be expressed in the subject-object structure of all finite things.

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[1] Vol. III, p. 228.

God is immediately known also to those who are unconditionally serious in their despair about the meaning of life. "In the seriousness of their existential despair, God is present to them."[1] As truth is present when one doubts, so meaning is found in the seriousness of those who experience meaninglessness. This meaning cannot be given specific content while in despair, but an unconditional quality of meaning is apprehended according to Tillich in the passionate concern with which people express their meaningless. The subject-object relationship is again transcended.

In both the theoretical and practical areas of life, a quality of unqualified seriousness can be immediately apprehended. In addition to technical and ontological reason there is the depth of reason. Although ontological reason in both its subjective and objective nature cannot grasp the nature of unconditional since it transcends the subjective and objective polarity, still ontological reason can immediately apprehend that which transcends it in power and meaning. It is this capacity of reason to be existentially in unity with being-itself, the unconditional. Thus reason cannot grasp being-itself, but it can be essentially related to it. "The depth of reason is the expression of something that is not reason but which precedes reason and is manifest through it."[2] In Platonic terms, the depth of reason refers to those "moments" in time in which man breaks out of the cave of the subject-object relationship and intuits the "Good." The depth of reason does not establish the existence a Supreme Being who as subject apprehends man as an object, nor who man as subject can grasp as an object. Rather the prius of the subject-object, self-world polarity manifested through ontological reason transcends the subject-object relation, and thus transcends reason. Reason can only assume a point of identity. It cannot establish the existence of anything unconditioned. In this sense the depth of reason raises a question for ontological reason, but cannot answer the question.

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Vol. I, p. 79.

The epistemological problem in Tillich's account of the knowledge of God, or depth reason, is to ascertain just what Tillich means by an "immediate and certain" knowledge of the unconditional. In traditional philosophy epistemological monism is the view that the knower and the known are one at the moment of knowing without differentiation. This view makes knowledge a matter of certainty, but it does not explain the fact of error. Epistemological dualism, on the other hand, maintains there is always a distinction between subject and object. This view explains the possibility of error, but has the problem of overcoming an apparent scepticism. In the knowledge of objects in nature and other persons Tillich tries to synthesize both positions but is closer to epistemological dualism. His emphasis on participating in and grasping reality is always in polar contrast to individuation which accomodates the selective and interpretative aspects of knowledge that acknowledges an irreducible distinction between the epistemological subject and object. Knowledge involves the separation of subject and object, as well as their union. But now the question arises, does he move from the notion of polarity to a type of metaphysical identity in religious knowledge?

The fact that Tillich prefers the term "knowledge" for that within the subject-object polarity and "awareness" for that which is "immediate, and not mediated by inferential process"[1] suggests that Tillich moves in the direction of epistemological monism in religious knowledge. And yet it is not the traditional type of epistemological monism which was restricted more to the subject-object relationship. The immediate awareness of the unconditional for Tillich is of something that is beyond the subject-object split. It cannot be fully articulated since words tend to "thingify" what they are talking about. Tillich's certainty is not one about any particular fact in nature or history, and certainly not one about God conceived of as the hightest object. It is the certainty of "an element, a power, a demand."[2] He finds no risk here. The pole of participation predominates. It is self-evident.

(3) Revelation is Cognitively Empty.--The second basic statement concerning Tillich's doctrine of revelation is that it is cognitively empty of any specific knowledge within the subject-object split. Revelation does not "add anything directly to totality of our ordinary knowledge about the subject-object structure of reality."[3] This is the way he seeks to avoid the "demonic" elements of heteronomy. Religious knowledge in no way interferes with autonomous knowledge. The fight between religion and science is the fault of the erroneous claims of religion to have infallible factual knowledge about either nature or history.

If revelation is factually empty, then his "certainty" appears on the surface to be a rather spurious one. Is revelation a certainty with no content, no direction? In fighting against the belief of many in inspired information on empirical matters, Tillich tends to overstate his case.

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[1] Tillich, Theology and Culture, p. 23.

[2] Ibid., p. 23.

[3] Vol. I, p. 109.

If his claim that there are no revealed doctrines[1] is taken without qualification, then it is indeed a faith without belief, a power without direction. Tillich's attack on revealed knowledge, however, should always be seen in terms of the heteronomy he is opposing. Revelation gives no "ordinary" knowledge of the structures of nature, history, and man. On these matters intellectual honesty demands that scientific methods of research and verification must be applied. But there appears to be a non-scientific cognitive core in revelation for Tillich. In revelatory moments in concrete situations in time there is a kind of knowledge revealed, at least one can back away from the "moments" through individuation and become aware of their content.[2] There is a propositional revelation of a kind different from ordinary knowledge. This is a knowledge connected with the content of one's ultimate concern. Tillich speaks of the "knowledge of revelation" and states that it, "like ordinary knowledge, must be judged by its own implicit criteria."[3] Thus there is some kind of non-scientific, self-evident, cognitive claim in revelation, and the criteria of truth are germane to the revelatory event and need only to be made explicit.

It should clearly be understood, however, that Tillich does not claim the universality and necessity of traditional rationalism for these criteria since they can only appeal to those who existentially participate in a similar revelatory situation.[1] It is this confessional or existential stance that makes it difficult for an interpreter of Tillich to find any "external" grounds for Tillich's leading ideas. The premises and criteria of truth in Tillich's system appear to be the result of his own highly value-charged, pre-reflective encounter with reality conditioned by his involvement in both the Christian tradition and classical German philosophy. His system is an explicating of his own primordial vision which he shares with his reader but cannot possibly, he believes, prove. It is because of this fact that this study of Tillich's philosophy of history is preceded by an expository account of the central themes in his epistemology and ontology.

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[1] Ibid., p. 125.

[2] Tillich distinguishes between "perceptive moments" of participation and "cognitive moments" of separation in religious knowledge. He does not fully admit, however, as this writer thinks he should, that in the separated cognitive moments of separation and reflection elements of selectivity and interpretation enter the picture and a dualistic gap appears. It is one thing to have an immediate ecstatic experience, but it is another to interpret its meaning. Tillich tends to slip in the interpretative elements without acknowledging them as such. Cf. Tillich, "Participation and Knowledge," p. 209.

[3] Ibid., p. 131.

(4) Revelation as Related to Reason.--What is revelation and its function in human life? Although revelation is immediately certain and is not an esoteric knowledge of either scientific knowledge or divine objects, it is not yet clear just what it is. The positive cognitive element of revelation can be seen in its positive relationship to human reason. Tillich speaks about nature and persons becoming "transparent" to the ground of being, or about being-itself "shining through" the conditional. What does this mean?

Revelation is received in the subject in terms of "ecstacy" and its correlate in the object is called "miracle." Note first Tillich's meaning of ecstacy and its effect on reason. In ecstacy the mind immediately encounters a power that elevates it beyond the subject-object relationship without destroying it. Concerning this Tillich says that the notion of ecstacy "points to the experience of the holy as transcending ordinary experience without removing it."[2] In revelation the holy is experienced as an immediate unity with God that transcends the subject-object relationship. This is how Tillich interprets the meaning of Otto's characterization of the holy as "numinous."

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[1] Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 129.

[2] Vol. II, p. 8.

> When Otto calls the experience of the holy "numinous," he interprets the holy as the presence of the divine. When he points to the mysterious character of holiness, he indicates that the holy transcends the subject-object structure of reality.[1]

This means that the ecstatic experience of God characterized as numinous is an immediate experience of the ground of the self-world polarity. As such revelation is given to man's reason, but cannot be derived from it because reason operates only within the subject-object schema.

The meaning of ecstacy is the clue to one kind of "healing" effected in revelation. Revelation is salvation. Revelation is the manifestation of the ground of being.[2] The ground of being supports the subject-object relationship by saving or healing it by which Tillich means making it healthy or whole.[3] The epistemological significance of this is that in genuine ecstacy an enabling power is given to human consciousness that makes for harmony between receiving and controlling knowledge. The lack of equilibrium in the polarity of individualization and participation is overcome for the moment. Revelation works to "unite the conflicting poles of existential reason."[4] Essential reason is reason as it ought to be in polar unity. Existential reason as it actually is with the poles of knowledge disrupted, or what Tillich calls "estranged." In ecstacy technical and ontological reason are united. Scientific knowledge with its penchant for individuation is balanced by an existential participation championed by Romanticism, the philosophers of life, and existentialism. A unity of the scientific "I-It" relationship and the existential "I-Thou" relation is made possible, if only in a fragmentary or incomplete manner.[1]

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[1] Vol. I, p. 215-216.

[2] Cf. Vol. I, p. 117.

[3] Vol. I, p. 146.

[4] Vol. I, p. 150.

Ecstacy in the subject has its correlate in "miracle" in the object. Something happens objectively as well as subjectively in the experience of mystery. As ecstacy does not contradict the reason of the subject, neither does miracle contradict the objective Logos of things. A miracle for Tillich is not some happening that contradicts the laws of nature.[2] There are objective events which become signs of the manifestation of revelation. An astonishing, unusual, and shaking event may be received in an ecstatic experience that points to the mystery of being. This is what Tillich means by a miracle. This objective reference of a miracle is identified with the self-transcending character of reality.[3] As such the term "miracle" points to the ecstatic, self-transcending, abysmal character of reality that infinitely transcends that of which it is a ground. In revelation God not only stands for the world as ground, God stands against the world as more than the totality of things. The "healing" effect of revelation experienced as miraculous or self-transcending for Tillich is that epistemologically it carries with it the conviction that human reason can never reach the unconditioned truth. Concrete or specific beliefs can never be absolute. Nothing finite can ever be identified with that which infinitely transcends the finite. Such a conviction, Tillich believes, is the permanent contribution of mysticism.[1] No finite perspective attained through human reason can ever reach an absolute standpoint.

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[1] It is unfortunate that Tillich does not better describe the nature of the polar unity involved. His synthesis of technical and ontological reason is not free from the charge of mere juxtaposition. Just where is the "ideal" unity of polarity in the knowledge of objects and persons? How many degrees of each? The ideal we shall find is in being-itself, but then this may also prove to be a juxtaposition rather than a true synthesis.

[2] Cf. Vol. I, p. 115.

[3] Vol. II, p. 8.

It is important to note how Tillich selects the notions of ultimate reality as both ground and transcendent and uses them as criteria of truth by which he evaluates other perspectives of thought. These criteria constitute the basic cognitive content of Tillich's ultimate concern. Here is a definite cognitive, propositional core identified with revelation which curiously represent for him a kind of absolute standpoint by which he denounces all other claims to such a favored position. The false claims of heteronomous reason, for example, are judged "false" because of his self-evident criterion of God as transcendent. The experience of the unapproachable holy breaks through every finite belief or system of thought and judges it as incomplete and destructive (demonic) if taken to be ultimate. It is this conviction of the transcendent quality of reality taken as a criterion of truth that forms the backbone of Tillich's "Protestant Principle" which he uses as a tool of criticism against both secular and religious authoritarianism (idolatry).

The transcendent quality of reality is also the criterion he uses against autonomous reason. Autonomous reason lacks the depth of reason, a sense of the infinite distance between reason and ultimate reality. Autonomous reason fails to achieve the certainty received in revelation of the self-transcending character of reality, and needs "healed" from this defect. Although Tillich uses this criterion of transcendence negatively as a tool for criticism, the conviction that man can never know absolute truth constitutes a positive modification of human self-consciousness and of man's self-understanding of his situation.

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[1] Vol. I, p. 140.

In a similar way Tillich uses the view of God as "ground" as a criterion of truth by which to evaluate the knowledge situation. His conviction that there is an ontological power making for harmony between scientific and existential knowledge is the standard by which he decides what "healing" means in the cognitive situation. Whatever works toward the unity of these two kinds of knowledge is a "healing" force, and whatever works to dissociate them is a "demonic" force.

The two criteria of God as self-transcending and ground also provides the ammunition for his attack on naturalism and supranaturalism. Supranaturalism means for Tillich popular image of God "up there," the man upstairs. The disbelief in this concept of God is a type of atheism he encourages. Such a view sees God as neither ground nor transcendent because it places God within the subject-object relationship of finitude. Supranaturalism "transforms the infinite of God into a finiteness which is merely an extension of the categories of finitude."[1] Naturalism, on the other hand, fails the inspection of Tillich's criteria. "The main argument against naturalism in whatever form is that it denies the infinite distance between the whole of finite things and their infinite ground . . ."[2] Naturalism does not understand nor account for the experience of the holy. In terms stronger than Tillich uses, but quite compatible with his line of thought, it could be said that from Tillich's perspective both supranaturalism and naturalism are two forms of cognitive estrangement. Supranaturalism, on the one hand, represents a type of intellectual regression by worshipping an idolatrous extention of the forms of finitude, while naturalism, on the other hand, is a type of intellectual narcissism that tries to conform reality to its own standards and fails to accept reality as it is in its "depth."

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[1] Vol. II, p. 6.

[2] Ibid.

It should be observed that these two criteria of God as ground and self-transcending form the abstract principles for which Tillich's understanding of the Christ-event supply the concrete manifestation. It is not necessary for our purpose to enter into a full discussion of Tillich's christology. It is sufficient to note that his understanding of the Christ-event substantiates the previous discussion of the two-fold criteria of truth and the two-fold healing effect of revelation. Tillich believes that the two criteria given in revelation are the two outstanding characteristics of the Biblical account of Jesus. They are "his maintenance of unity with God and his sacrifice of everything he could have gained for himself from this unity."[1] Jesus' "unity with God" can be explicated in terms of his criterion of reality as ground of being that makes for polar harmony. Jesus is "transparent" to the ground of being. The element of "sacrifice" of everything Jesus could gain for himself stands for the recognition of the abysmal character of reality and Jesus refusal to idolatrize himself. Tillich interprets the cross and the resurrection as the two central symbols of Christianity.[2] The cross can be identified with Jesus "sacrifice of everything," and the resurrection symbolizes his' unity with God which enabled him to conquer human estrangement. The cross in this context represents lack of idolatry of anything finite, including **Jesus** himself, and can be associated with Tillich's criterion of the abysmal nature of reality that infinitely transcends anything finite.[1] The resurrection represents the healing forces of the ground of being that makes for polar unity and overcomes human estrangement (including reason).

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[1] Vol. I, p. 135.

[2] Vol II, p. 153.

In summary, how can it be said that revelation is related to human reason? Revelation for Tillich is the experience of an ontological power given to man that qualifies or "heals" his self-understanding by making him aware of the infinite distance between man and reality, and by uniting his technical and ontological reason. Revelation is paradoxically a quality of human awareness that prods man to the truth, but judges any claim to absolute truth. It is, we believe, this two-fold function of revelation manifested as an inexhaustible power working for polar harmony that constitutes what Tillich takes to be "both certain and of ultimate concern," and although revelation makes no particular demands on ordinary knowledge, it does provide the framework of ultimate meaning by which Tillich views history and which provides him with what he takes to be "a truth which includes and accepts the risk and uncertainty of every significant cognitive act, yet transcends it in accepting it."[2] The depth of reason asks the question of God. Revelation gives the answer.[3]

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[1] It may be critically observed that Tillich's account of revelation both conditions his interpretation of historical facts and rests upon at least one historical fact. Tillich tends to "select" reports in the Biblical account of the Christ that fit his axioms, and ignores others. He ignores, for example, that the Jews were enraged against Jesus for his alleged "blasphemy" or strong claims for himself. Moreover, Tillich's ultimate concern rests on "ordinary" knowledge when he argues that Jesus actually existed (or some actual person) and actually demonstrated the Christian message.

[2] Vol. I, p. 105.

[3] It seems to this writer that although one may have experiences of a numinous power and of moments in which receiving and controlling knowledge are in unity, that to affirm that the source of this power is "beyond" man, that it has ontological status, is an "interpretative" statement and hence subject to the possibility of error. If this is the case, then the promised certainty in Tillich's doctrine of revelation is

Now that some of Tillich's basic epistemological concepts have been examined, a foundation has been laid to understand better his approach to some current critical problems in the philosophy of history concerning the nature of historical knowledge.

B. The Nature of Historical Knowledge

Some central problems involved in the nature of historical knowledge concern the relation between fact and interpretation, the nature of explanation in the interpretation of history, and the problem of the truth of an explanation. The following divisions will be devoted to these problems and Tillich's approach to them.

1. The Relation Between Facts and Interpretation in Historical Knowledge

Tillich frequently assumes he can capture "the" meaning of a word by tracing its etymology. This is the case with the word "history" which comes from the Greek word *historia* and "means primarily inquiry, information, report, and only secondarily the events inquired about and reported. . ."[1] This means for Tillich that the subjective pole (historical consciousness) of history which he associates with inquiry and reporting precedes the objective pole of events and happenings.[2] "Precedes" does not mean that the subjective pole temporally comes before the objec-

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not delivered. If the cognitive certainty in his own doctrine of revelation is taken as absolute and infallible, then it too becomes a candidate for the charge of idolatry. Moreover, to the degree that Tillich's doctrine of the symbolic knowledge of God meets this criticism, to that degree it fails to produce the certainty he claims for revelation.

[1] Vol. III, p. 300.

[2] The term "subjective" does not have the connotation of arbitrary or false, but rather points to the necessary interpretative factors in history. The adequacy or inadequacy of particular interpretative frameworks is considered later in the chapter.

tive pole, but rather that it is the subjective aspect that constitutes the necessary condition for transforming mere happenings into historical events. The necessity of the subjective pole, however, does not mean that the objective pole of history is a mere invention. The objective pole of factual occurrences cannot be reduced to mere inventions of the human mind. Tillich's emphasis on the necessity of both the subjective and objective poles of history reflects his general epistemological position that the subject and object of knowledge are distinct. One side cannot be reduced to the other. History has a subjective-objective structure. It is with the subjective pole of history however, that Tillich is primarily concerned.

The subjective pole of history for Tillich is not to be identified with mere "reporting." The subjective pole refers to the "interpretative" element of the human mind. "There is no history without factual occurrences, and there is no history without the reception and interpretation of factual occurrences by historical consciousness."[1] The ongoing historical process of facts (hereafter referred to as "Hf") only becomes lived history or history proper (hereafter designated as "Hp"), that is, historical "events," when they become interpreted by a person's "historical consciousness." Historical events are thus the joint product of Hf and Hp. This is tantamount to saying that there is no chronicle conceived as a mere reporting of Hf. Hp is always present.

Why does Tillich hold that interpretation is inevitable? Because of the inescapable influence of a person's historical consciousness or tradition. "Nobody writes history on a 'place above all places.'"[2]

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[1] Vol. III, p. 302.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 301.

Hp as either written (historiography) and/or understood proceeds by interpretation of evidence, but no interpretation of Hf is written from a vantage point outside Hp. Hp, as Tillich sees it, is an accumulation of symbolized meanings carried by tradition through time. Man is what he is through his power of language. Through the medium of language the past can accumulate and carry with it the criteria by which Hf can be singled out within a tradition as "significant." The influence of tradition may be either conscious or unconscious. Hp is thus not confined to a mere remembering of past Hf. Hp provides the framework for understanding present Hf as well, and even for anticipating future Hf. Such an approach to the meaning of Hp is embodied in the phrase "historical consciousness."

> Historical consciousness expresses itself in a tradition, i.e., in a set of memories which are delivered from one generation to the other. Tradition is not a causal collection of remembered events but the recollection of those events which have gained significance for the bearers and receivers of the tradition.[1]

Historical consciousness supplies the criteria of importance for the selecting and interpreting of Hf, and as such exists whether or not books were ever written. It is part of the meaning of human existence.

This analysis of Hp helps to expand the latent meanings in Tillich's earlier definition of history. Tillich seldom changes his mind, but he does amplify and reformulate his language. Observe his former definition of history. "History is the totality of remembered events, which are determined by free human activity and are important for the life of human groups."[2] Here "history" means Hp as the subjective pole carried by memory by means of language with the group supplying the criteria of what is important. "Events" indicate the objective pole of Hf. Since there are no remembered events that are not remembered by a person in a particular tradition from his perspective, remembered events are inevitably interpreted events considered as "important for the life of human groups."[1] No individual can be abstracted from the group or tradition to which he belongs. The values of the group penetrate the individual by a kind of social osmosis.[2] Hence the group provides the basis for determining what is significant in Hf.

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[1] Vol. III, p. 300.

[2] Paul Tillich, "The Kingdom of God and History," in The Kingdom of God and History, ed. H. G. Wood, et. al. (Chicago: Willett Clark, 1938), p. 110.

The upshot of this analysis of the subjective-objective character of historical existence is that Hf is never lived nor written without interpretation, and that interpretation is always conditioned by a perspective which is received from some tradition.[3] Hf is always viewed through the lens of a Marxist, a Freudian, a humanist, a Catholic, a Protestant, a Moslem, or a Hindu, that is, in terms of some value orientation.

If Hp involves a distinction between fact and interpretation, and there are different interpretations, the question arises, which interpretation is best? Is there any one way of interpreting Hf that is any better than another? But before this question can be answered, a prior question must be raised. What is going on in any "interpretation?" Interpretations appear to be attempts to "explain." Just what constitutes an explanation in history?

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[1] The problem of "free human activity" is so basic in Tillich's understanding of man that an analysis of his doctrine of freedom will be given careful consideration in a following chapter. It is not germane to an understanding of the problem at hand.

[2] Tillich does not use this metaphor, but it illustrates his meaning.

[3] Pieter Geyl accused Arnold Toynbee of forcing the facts arbitrarily into his interpretative framework. Toynbee replied that he believed his structures did somewhat capture the movement of history. Then he added, and this agrees with Tillich's emphasis on the inevitability of interpretation, that for history some kind of interpretative framework is inevitable and that those who would deny it are "simply ignorant of the workings of their own minds, and such willful ignorance is, isn't it, really unpardonable?" Arnold J. Toynbee and Pieter Geyl, "Can We Know the Pattern of the Past?—a Debate," in Patrick Gardiner, Theories of History (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1959), p. 318.

2. The Nature of Explanation in History

An explanation is an attempt to give some kind of knowledge. Tillich described knowledge in general as a polarity between individuation and participation. Both poles have respective methods of verification, that is, ways of explaining.

a) The Pole of Individualization demands Experimental Verification.

Turning first to the pole of individualization, perspective can be gained by first quoting Tillich at length, and then expounding his meaning.

> Verification in the realm of historical knowledge also unites an experimental with an experiential element. The factual side of historical research is based on sources, traditions, and documents which test one another in a way comparable to experimental methods (although no historical event can be repeated). The selective and interpretative side, however, without which no historiography ever has been written, is based on participation in terms of understanding and explanation. . . Verification in this respect means to illuminate, to make understandable, to give a meaningful and consistent picture. The historian's task is to "make alive" what has "passed away." The test of his cognitive success, of the truth of his picture, is whether or not he is able to do this. This test is not final, and every historical work is a risk. But it is a test, an experiential, though not an experimental, verification.[1]

The pole of individualization represents the "self" side of the general self-world polarity, and in the cognitive relation stands for the ability of the knower to stand apart from the object of knowledge and view it rather objectively. Tillich associates this pole with "controlling knowledge" which he identifies primarily with objective methods of scientific research. The pole of individualization represents the cognitive attitude of detachment and disinterestedness. Positivistic historiography championed this goal to the extent that they believed it is possible first to gather the "naked facts" and then frame laws.[1] Ranke's protest against moralizing history and his exhortation to the historian to simply show how it really was ("wie es eigentlich gewesen") illustrates this position.

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[1] Vol. I, pp. 103-04.

An able contemporary proponent of the pole of individualization is Carl G. Hempel. His position is that all scientific explanations have a common form which is deduction. A scientific explanation can explain either particular facts or general laws. Explanation of individual happenings include (a) statements of other prior or simultaneous occurrences, and (b) general laws established by empirical evidence. To explain a general law involves a different general law from which the former is logically derived. Human history fits into this pattern. History is not a unique science and should be thus treated as a branch of natural history.[2]

Now Tillich is not opposed, of course, to the pole of individualization in history. He would also recognize that historians do depend on empirically based generalizations and even natural laws in their explanations.[3] He would want the historian to be as objective and disinterested as possible. But he would not accept Hempel's reduction of history to another branch of natural science. History is distinct from other dimensions. It is qualitatively different because it is "essentially related to meanings or values."[1] History deals with "purpose" and "freedom" in a way that is uniquely different from, say, astronomy or biology.[2] It is true that a historian may have to appeal in part to empirical generalizations or laws, for example, to explain the fact that Caesar crossed the Rubicon. Laws concerning meteorology and the engineering and physics involved in boat building may well have a place in an historical explanation. The historian would in fact do well to replace his hunches with empirical generalizations. But the unique focus of the historian is on "causes" of Caesar crossing conceived in terms of the values or "end in view" as well as the possible alternatives Caesar had. Historical explanation is distinctively teleological.

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[1] Cf. R. G. Collingwood, The Idea of History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), pp. 126-27.

[2] See Carl G. Hempel, "The Function of General Laws in History," in Patrick Gardiner, Theories of History, pp. 344-356.

[3] Historian Edward Hallett Carr states that the "historian constantly uses generalizations to test his evidence." What is History? (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1964), p. 80.

In a word, the historian needs the pole of individualization with its cognitive attitude of detachment. Historical research should be based on evidence gained from various "sources, traditions, and documents" in a manner comparable to the "experimental" methods of natural science. But its distinctive teleological nature demands the pole of participation.

b) The Pole of Participation demands Experiential Verification.

The pole of participation is an instance of the "world" side of the dialectical self-world polarity, and represents a number of kinds of relations between the self and the world. Participation can mean "sharing," "having in common," or "becoming a part," of something like a political movement.[3] Tillich identifies this kind of knowledge as "existential knowledge;" it is characterized by "involvement" in contrast to "detachment." The pole of participation acknowledges the need for the historian to enter empathetically into his subject matter and make what has passed away "live" by giving a "meaningful and consistent picture." For Tillich this means a kind of explanation that is distinct from the experimental methods of natural science. This means that history cannot be treated as a branch of natural science.

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[1] Vol. III, p. 303.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 305.

[3] Tillich, "Participation and Knowledge," p. 201.

The Idealistic wing of historiography has strongly supported the belief that history cannot emulate methods employed by the natural sciences. Philosophers like Dilthey, Croce, and Collingwood have sought to vindicate the autonomy of history as a distinct science. William Dray is a contemporary who takes sharp issue with Hempel's neglect of the unique features of historical science. Although not agreeing in detail, Dray agrees with Collingwood that the historian must get "inside" the historical event. That is to say, the historian must probe the dispositional complex of an historical agent and see things from his point of view. Dray defends what he calls "rational explanation" in history. "Explanation which tries to establish a connection between beliefs, motives, and actions of the indicated sort I shall call 'rational explanation.'"[1] Dray believes that the deductive explanation of Hempel, which he calls "covering laws," neglects the unique aspects of freedom and individuality found in history. Covering laws force the novelty of history into a Procrustean bed. The historian is not concerned with general laws. He rather tries to participate in the historical agent, that is, he sets out to know what the agent believed to be the facts of the situation, his understanding of the possibilities open to him, and his own goals and motives. The historian "understands" when he can see how what the individual did appeared to him as reasonable and appropriate, and how the agent's action is socially significant. This approach is in agreement with Tillich's stress on participation.

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[1] William Dray, "The Historical Explanation of Actions Reconsidered," in Philosophy and History ed. Sidney Hook, (New York: New York University Press, 1963), p. 108.

Why does Tillich believe there is a need for the pole of participation in historiography? Why is there a need for "experiential" verification in the life processes of the historical agent? Tillich regards the positivistic neglect of, or opposition to, this pole as an instance of "methodological imperialism."[1] The historian must get inside the event, that is, he must gain access to the historical agent's ideas, motives, and feelings.[2]

Is is clear that we need a closer analysis of "participation." When Tillich speaks of "participation" in another person or in a period of history he does not mean that the historian must agree with or approve what he is studying. The historian, however, cannot know another person or period of time, present or past, if he is filled with "blinding passion" or "beautifying wish" or "distorting hate."[3] To participate means to be cognitively "open," to be interested and drawn to the subject (*eros*) but to respect the evidence and to know for the sake of knowing (*agape*), without trying to grind an axe.

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[1] Tillich, "Participation and Knowledge," p. 208.

[2] Tillich would give more attention to man's irrational nature than Dray seems to indicate. Tillich's study of depth psychology provides a theory of motivation that he would advocate using in trying to understand irrational behavior. The task of the historian is frequently similar to that of the psycho-analyst who seeks some rational plan behind apparently irrational actions. Walsh criticizes Collingwood for slighting this non-rational aspect of man. (See Walsh, An Introduction to Philosophy of History, pp. 52-59). But his criticism is based on a misleading reading of Collingwood's position. In reality Collingwood agrees with Hegel's emphasis on man as both a passionate and rational creature, and that man's passionate or irrational nature provides both the dynamics for history as well as the content which reason attempts to understand. The irrational elements of man for both Hegel and Collingwood provide "the proximate environment in which our reason lives . . ." See Collingwood, The Idea of History, p. 231, and also pp. 115-16.

[3] Tillich, "Participation and Knowledge," p. 206.

Participation as cognitive openness means, for example, that if a person is repelled by the superstition of the Middle Ages he will probably miss the inner meaning of that age, or, if a fundamentalist Christian studies the Age of Enlightenment, it will be difficult for him to grasp the appeal of autonomous reason over authoritarian religious dogma. The historian or philologist must seek a genuine encounter with a document from the past "as an integral part of the present in the interpreting mind, be it in terms of rejection or of acceptance."[1] The historian can thus participate in a period of history or a historical figure "in terms of rejection or acceptance." To be "open" to a subject means to portray a "criticizing and accepting *ἀγάπη* which is detached and involved at the same time."[2] Here ethics and epistemology coincide. A man's disposition or character influences what he can know.

Participation, to put the matter differently, is "existential" knowledge of an I/Thou kind. It can be verified, however, only to a degree. Through creative empathy and insight (not necessarily sympathy) the historian can "give a meaningful and consistent picture." He can try to make it "live." This cannot be done with the precision of controlling reason because the events are not repeatable for further testing. But a consistent portrait can be given of a period of history so that things fit together and make sense as a whole. The historian, then, must, in Collingwood's terminology, re-enact in thought what has gone on in the mind of his dramatis personae. A good re-enactment is one that is "alive," imaginative, and yet factually grounded.

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 207.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 206.

However, Tillich's account or explanation is not complete without still another essential ingredient. An attempt should be made to grasp or imaginatively understand a person's or period's "ultimate concern." To understand a period of history one should penetrate to the religious "situation," by which he means the basic presuppositions of value which are taken as self-evident. Religion means that which is taken to be of unsurpassed value and is

> a basic fact which lies at a deeper level than do all the visible tendencies, something which is invisible to those who live within it but which is, for that reason, all the more effective. It refers to an unconscious, self-evident faith which lies at a deeper level that the apparent antithesis of the belief and unbelief which both arise out of it and are both equally rooted in it. This unconscious faith which is not assailed because it is the presupposition of life and is lived rather than thought of, this all-determining, final source of meaning constitutes the actual religious situation of a period. We must attempt to penetrate through to this faith.[1]

In order to lay bare this religious dimension of ultimate concern, Tillich analyses the styles of creative artists, political structure, and ethical value as illustrations of an underlying metaphysical presupposition. This is not dissimilar to the kind of analysis Pitirim A. Sorokin attempts when he seeks the "basic principle and value," the "major premise and foundation" of a civilization such as in the "ideational" Middle Ages, the "idealistic" thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, and the "sensate" modern period beginning with the sixteenth century.[2] If a historian can penetrate to the religious or depth dimension of a culture, he is much more likely to understand the way people both thought and felt. It should help make history live and make sense. Hempel's and Dray's analysis of historical explanation completely omit this dimension of explanation. Do any working historians actually write history in the manner indicated by Tillich?

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[1] Paul Tillich, The Religious Situation (New York: Henry Holt and Co., Inc., 1932), pp. 39-40.

[2] Pitirim A. Sorokin, The Crisis of Our Age (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1941), especially pages 13-29.

A contemporary historian whose understanding of explanation in history appears to be quite similar to Tillich's is Albert Hofstadter of Columbia. Hofstadter says that Dray correctly tries to avoid the natural science model in history advocated by Hempel, but is too superficial and thin in historical explanation. Teleological facts appear in history that are unique and irreducible. There is in particular a unique kind of motivation which Tillich would call the dimension of ultimate concern and which Hofstadter calls a single basic aim at unity with the life-processes. It is a striving for a basic theme of life which is reflected in root levels of philosophy, art, and religion. The historian must grasp this form of life as well as the particular interests of the individual. As Hofstadter says:

> It is a fundamental hypothesis of the view I am here putting forward—a hypothesis about the facts of life—that the individual human person is motivated in everything he does by the basic aim of attaining what to him is a valid structure of life, that is, a valid mode of carrying on the dynamic interchange between himself and his world that constitutes the process of his living. The hypothesis is that the basic aim is single, and that it is an aim of an ultimate singleness of unity of the life-process that I designate under the heading of "valid life process" or "valid mode of interaction of self and the world."[1]

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[1] Albert Hofstadter, "The Philosophy of History," ed. Hook, Philosophy and History, p. 237. Hofstadter is also in basic agreement with Tillich in four other areas. First, that the individual is important in history only in relation to some group, and that a group is more than the sum of its individuals but not a reified entity. Second, he speaks of a "drive" or "creative impulse" that is essential to a group that is comparable to Tillich's "vocational consciousness." Third, Hofstadter agrees with Tillich that history is unique and unrepeatable, and finally, he is similar to

In our pluralistic society such an analysis would seem to be much more difficult than in the past. Hofstadter maintains that historians must penetrate to this level of "ultimate significance," the style of striving, both for the individual and groups. Tillich applies his analysis more to groups. In either case, however, today it is possible for many basic styles of life to be found in close proximity, and it is even possible that an individual may change his ultimate concern. This condition should at least warn the historian to proceed with caution, but it still adds a dimension of integration, when carefully approached, that should increase understanding and add to the historian's "explanation."

What then may we say in view of these different emphases? In summary of our discussion on historical explanation, Tillich would say "yes" to Hempel in terms of the dependence of historians on sociological laws in explaining events, but "no" to making history a branch of natural science. He would say "yes" to Dray's attempt to explain teleological factors in history and to his concern for acknowledging contingency in history, but "no" to the neglect of relevant social laws in explaining historical events. Tillich's ideal model for the meaning of historical explanation comprises both the experimental methods of natural science and the experiential method which acknowledges an empathetic or intuitive approach to the "inside" of historical events. These two methods have a polar relationship. In addition to attempting to combine the experimental and experiential methods, Tillich adds in a vein similar to what can be found in the thought of Sorokin and Hofstadter, the need for the historian to understand the depth level of religious motivation operating in all indi-

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Tillich when he speaks of the "shaping" activity of man's deep-lying attitude which makes historical interpretation more than merely subjective.

viduals and groups.[1]

The element of "ultimate concern" or "symbolic vision" is not only something the historian investigates. It is something the historian himself possesses, and according to Tillich, that provides a significant part of the interpretative framework with which even the most scholarly historian operates. The historian is a member of a group and has received the "memories" of that group, their historical consciousness. Historiography reveals this in the *selection* of facts out of the myriad of occurrences possible, as well as in the *evaluation* the relative weight or significance of the facts.[2]

Now that we have seen what *historical* explanation means for Tillich, the question can be asked, what constitutes a "true" explanation? This is a reformulation of the question; What constitutes a true interpretation? Interpretations seek to explain. If every explanation is slanted by the historian's value orientation, then the question arises whether or not any kind of historical objectivity is possible. If one ultimate concern is as good as another, then does that mean that what is offered as scholarly historical analysis is really only propaganda? The scientific ideal requires impartiality, detachment, that is, objectivity. Does Tillich provide for any kind of historical objectivity, or does he end with historical relativism or skepticism?

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[1] The question arises how Tillich avoids merely juxtaposing the experimental and experiential methods rather than really synthesizing them. One of the functions of Tillich's view of being-itself or God, which is the content of Tillich's own ultimate concern, is to provide the "unity" needed for polar harmony. Unfortunately Tillich does not fully work out the details nor gives adequate examples of how being-itself really unifies the two methods of knowledge.

[2] Vol. III, p. 301.

3. The Problem of "True" Historical Explanation

Tillich, it has been just noted, maintained that historical thinking proceeds by a combination of experimental (scientific) and experiential (phenomenological) methods. The assumption has been that history is a proper subject of scientific enquiry, although the subject matter of history must determine the method of explanation. Yet before this assumption is granted it must be shown that there is some meaning to the scienfific ideal of objectivity in the writing and understanding of history. The degree of the scientific ideal of impartiality does not have to be the same in history as it is in physics, since the subject matter of history deals with events in the past which are unrepeatable and not subject to laboratory conditions. Yet if something answering to the rational demand for an impartial handling of evidence is not possible in historical thinking, then there is no meaning for the term "truth" in historical inquiry. Without some relevancy of "truth" to historical inquiry, historical interpretation is reduced to propaganda and mere "emoting." To equate history with propaganda is one way of defining Historical Skepticism. But Tillich is not such a skeptic.

Tillich's approach to the nature of historical truth can be described as a "confessional" approach. That is to say, an approach to history based upon a self-conscious awareness of a perspective conditioned by a particular tradition. This is the basic thrust of his writings. Yet Tillich can be shown to be striving toward a more objective and universal stance. There is in his thought a dialectical tension between a particular perspective and a striving toward a more universal one. This tension can be understood by dividing Tillich's answer to the problem of historical truth into two levels. The first level is his confessional level. The second level is his aspiration toward a universal historical consciousness.

a) Tillich's Historical Interpretation as Confessional.

Every historian inevitably interprets history from his own conditioned point of view. The historian gains his criteria for evaluating history, as we have seen, by participating in history through his group or tradition. Every historical group has a "vocational consciousness" which provides the content of the historian's historical consciousness. The "vocational consciousness" of a historical group refers to the group's understanding of its aim and destiny in history. The Romans, for example, saw their contribution to history in the superiority of Roman law, or the people of the United States understand themselves as a new beginning that overcomes the curses of the Old World and as called to help spread democracy.[1] The matrix of one's particular historical destiny provides a moral and metaphysical point of view by which historians view history. This metaphysical conditioning is in addition to whatever individual bias and prejudices the historian might have personally.

One is reminded here of Bacon's idols of the tribe and cave. Every historian should be sophisticated enough to be aware of his own historical involvement and not write or teach history in the guise of pure objectivity. Now this approach to history appears on the surface to be historical skepticism, pure and simple. If every historical interpretation is confessional, that is, conditioned by his own particular point of view, then there seems to be no possible way to answer the question about the truth of a particular point of view. In Tillich's terminology, everyone is caught in his own "theological circle."[1] To criticize another persons confessional perspective on history, be it Marxist or Buddhist, is to presuppose one's own. Tillich is quick to acknowledge that his interpretation of history is conditioned by the Christian confession or vocational consciousness. Does such a position eliminate the possibility of all kinds of objectivity?

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[1] Cf. Vol. III, p. 310. Also see Paul Tillich, The Future of Religions (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1965), p. 59.

Tillich believes that within different points of view there can be degrees of objectivity. Given a confessional point of view, historical work can be done more or less well according to its adherence to the ideals of historical explanation as treated in the preceding section.[2] Histories can be written with different degrees of competence in experimental and experiential methods. Tillich strongly advocates the use of critical historical research. There is the implicit assumption here that historians with different "ultimate concerns," such as Marxism and Christianity, can acknowledge common research procedures. "Bad" history would be history written without supporting conclusions by evidence, without making possible connections, suppressing evidence, and failure to conform to logical demands for consistency. "Good" history would be history written in accord with commonly held procedures of research. To the degree that one's interpretation dictates what is taken to be evidence, however, there appears to be nothing left to say.

We might further describe the confessional approach to history with due regards for scholarly standards of historical research by employing E. S. Brightman's phrase "empirical coherence."[1] Tillich's harmony of experimental and experiential methods of procedure is a recommendation for gathering evidence and organizing it as completely and systematically as possible. This can be called empirical coherence. Tillich's confessional approach to history can now be sharpened by saying, "Empirical coherence is a function of a given set of presuppositions." This means that, in contrast to Brightman, coherence is a servant of a given set of presuppositions, a "theological circle." But as already suggested Tillich's confessional approach is dialectically related to a more universal one which modifies his confessional approach considerably.

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[1] Cf. Vol. III, p. 349.

[2] What is herein called a "confessional" approach is comparable to what Walsh calls the "Perspective Theory" of history. See Introduction to Philosophy of History, pp. 112-116.

Up to this point in our analysis there has been no consideration of any possibility of judging the truth of different points of view. The degree of objectivity achieved is a weak one, that is, one that works only from within a particular point of view. This strand of thinking represents the explicit thrust of Tillich's position. But it is irrelevant, for example, to cross-cultural issues or to the problem of choosing between Christianity and Marxism. Tillich does not appear to be satisfied to stop at this point.

There is another element in Tillich's thought which is more difficult to perceive, but which is there nevertheless, if only implicitly. Although Tillich is admittedly confessional in his approach, he is striving toward universality.

b) Tillich's search for a Universal Historical Consciousness.

Historians appear to go beyond criticizing different accounts of history merely from within. They criticize and evaluate different points of view. Such criticism can be done from lack of philosophical sophistication. But could it be that some positions are more dependable than others? Are some points of view more illuminating than others? In a similar way Tillich does not hesitate to evaluate different points of view. He rejects supranaturalism, naturalism, and the Eastern non-historical approach to reality. Such evaluation is either arbitrary, or there are arguments and reasons for this. He appears to assume the latter. What are some of the arguments?

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[1] See Edgar S. Brightman, Person and Reality (New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1958), pp. 344-45.

It has been shown that Tillich employs two criteria which result from his "awareness" of God or the unconditioned. One is that reality is abysmal and inexhaustible in power and meaning. For brevity's sake this criterion will be referred to as his "Axiom of Transcendence." The second criterion is his conviction that the revelatory awareness of God has a healing quality, that it works for the healing of the estranged cognitive poles of individuation (controlling, experimental knowledge) and participation (receiving, experiential knowledge). This criterion will herein be designated as his "Axiom of Harmony." These two criteria point the way in which Tillich seeks a break-through beyond the relativism of a purely confessional approach to history.[1]

Before elucidating the nature of these axioms within the context of Tillich's search for a universal historical consciousness, it should be clear what is intended by the term "axiom." Some logicians and mathematicians distinguish between axioms and postulates.[2] Whenever a distinction is made, the difference usually lies in the attitude of the proposer of the statement. The term "axiom" connotes some degree of self-evidence, while the term "postulate" is used more pragmatically as a recommendation of a statement for the purpose of argument. Although Tillich denies that any scientific or historical knowledge is guaranteed by revelation, it has been previously shown that a propositional content can be discovered in Tillich's doctrine of revelation. The axioms of transcendence and harmony are the formulations by this writer of the cognitive content of Tillich's theory of religious knowledge. They are called "axioms" because, for Tillich, they are pervasive and practically self-evident assumptions of his entire systematic thought. What is the origin of these axioms, and their relation to the empirical data of human experience?

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[1] The meaning of these axioms will be expanded and made more concrete throughout the dissertation.

[2] See Troy Wilson Organ, The Art of Critical Thinking (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1965), pp. 113-17.

The axioms of transcendence and harmony have their source in religious experience. They are, for Tillich, virtually self-evident truths born in an immediate awareness of the holy. The axiom of transcendence is a metaphysical statement about the kind of power that could account for the creative or self-transcending qualities of all life processes. The axiom of harmony is a metaphysical statement concerning the aim of all creative processes to preserve their identity and individuality. The two axioms are, thus, formulations of Tillich's understanding of the ground and aim of all realms of being.

The advantages of formulating these axioms in the manner developed in this study are twofold. First, the axioms provide a pervasive background that throws light on Tillich's argument in many contexts; they are suppressed or hidden premises which seem clearly to guide his thinking. Second, his basic assumptions or presuppositions are easier to evaluate if they are made explicit rather than permitted to be latent (largely).

A basic function of philosophy is to make the latent logical intent of ideas explicit. How do these two axioms contribute to an understanding of Tillich's quest for a universal historical consciousness?

The axiom of transcendence works as a limiting concept. The full meaning of this axiom cannot be grasped until Tillich's ontology is investigated. Yet the meaning, in this context, is clear. Every point of view is a limited point of view. Man is finite, and the axiom of transcendence bids one to accept his finitude. Concerning finitude Tillich says: "The temptation not to accept it, to lift one's self to the level of the Unconditioned, the Divine, runs through all history."[1] The argument for universality here is that if man, say the historian, first recognizes the limits of all points of view, including his own, this is the first step beyond exclusive points of view. In freudian terms, if man would accept his own finitude and not try to regress and return to this womb of false security of provincialism, and thus "conquer anxiety toward that which lies on the other side"[2] of his frontier, then an expanding historical consciousness is possible. Recognizing the limits of his own position, the historian can then seek to go beyond his own class, national, or cultural boundaries. The positive effect of the axiom of transcendence is to draw a person out of his destructive (demonic) narrowness into a more comprehensive, expanding consciousness.

The second axiom, the axiom of harmony, supports the first one. It involves the belief that there are sources within man and being which work toward rational harmony. Tillich believes there are perfecting forces to which men can open themselves and be at least partially healed of their prejudices and provincialisms. Reason with the existential awareness of transcendence and the healing forces in being is "theonomous" reason. It overcomes the rift between the intellectual side of knowledge and the affective side, the mind and the emotions, technical and existential knowledge. It answers the debate between absolutism and relativism by providing self-evident criteria which acknowledge the need for the expansion of all points of view coupled with the awareness of forces working in the direction of an expanding historical consciousness.[1]

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[1] Tillich, The Future of Religions, p. 62.

[2] Ibid., p. 61. It could be argued that Tillich's requirement of "certainty" with reference to religious knowledge, rather than hypothetical possibility, is a kind of return to the womb that refuses to accept fully the insecurity of the human situation.

A basic interest in Tillich's last few years also provides evidence of his belief in the possibility of a more universal historical consciousness. He became increasingly interested in dialogue with Eastern religions. He believed that healing forces operate in all religions and that a depth or penetrating study of concrete religions might well reveal something universally acceptable.[2]

One remaining point should be made as evidence of Tillich's attempt to escape a purely confessional approach to history. It is his attempt to give an account of the universal structures of being (ontology) and man. In his attempt he seeks a universal "telos" of all being, the intrinsic aim of all existence. He believes that if an account of the essential traits of being (including man) can be given, this will provide the "ends" toward which history ought to aim. If such an account is convincing, in the sense of being commonly accepted, then the basis for a universal historical consciousness would have been laid. Tillich's ontology and anthropology are thus "arguments" against historical relativism. If he could have written another theology he would have emphasized "religious historical studies."[1] This is indeed the direction he thought future theology should take.

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[1] Cf. Vol. I, pp. 147-153.

[2] Tillich, The Future of Religions, p. 94.

- In the study of religions there "may" be a central event that makes possible a "theology that has universalistic significance."[2] Tillich believed that such a central event may possibly be found in the Cross.[3] Tillich associates the cross with the rejection of any claims by Jesus for himself, and it parallels what has been called in this analysis the "axiom of transcendence." Jesus on the cross is the concrete embodiment of this axiom. In his positive attitude toward world religions and the possibility of finding something with universal significance, as well as in his belief in the criterion of the cross as possibly having universal significance, we have another example of Tillich's search for the universal through the particular. He is not willing to stop with the particular, the relative. But what does Tillich quest for the universal presuppose?

A more precise way of formulating what is implied in Tillich's search for a universal historical consciousness can be stated in the following manner: "Presuppositions are a function of empirical coherence." The fact that Tillich does evaluate other points of view, and that he gives "arguments" against them and for his own point of view, implies that some sets of presuppositions or axioms are better than others. It is possible that perhaps a set of axioms can be found which all historians might be prepared to accept, one based on an accurate ontology and science of man which tells the structures of what "is" and also indicates what "ought" to be. In his critical estimates of other points of view Tillich is assuming something he does not adequately acknowledge, something which perhaps even contradicts what he says about the inevitability of the "theological circle." He is assuming that some points of view are sounder than others, that coherence can be used as a criterion of truth among different points of view as well as within them, and that there is thus some way of controlling presuppositions. He is assuming that some positions help one to see history more steadily and more completely systematically, while other views either suppress or straight-jacket the facts into a narrow framework or fail to account for many events which are left dangling as "negative instances."[1]

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[1] Ibid., p. 81.

[2] Ibid., p. 91.

[3] Ibid., p. 89.

The application of the criterion of empirical coherence to history would mean that the historian who could integrate the most facts and responsible monographs into the most inclusive wholes, would be "most" true. The ultimate goal of total systematic knowledge may never be achieved, but a standard of objectivity is nevertheless clear and applicable. Such a consideration lessens the gap between science and history. Both scientist and historian can be viewed as advancing from less comprehensive (more fragmentary) hypotheses to more inclusive ones. Moreover, both provisionally isolate their facts at the beginning by initial hypotheses concerning what is relevant,[1] and both are involved in various traditions within their respective discipline, and both can burst out of their traditions with new insights. The interpretative side is more apparent in history, but the factual side is not ignored. The factual side of science is more apparent, but the interpretative side is by no means omitted. In Tillich's terms, the subject-object character of history is at work in science too. The difference is one of degrees within a continuum between two sides of the polarity of facts and interpretation. Interpretation conditions facts, but facts either expand or negate interpretations. This is coherence in action and Tillich implicitly uses it to support his axioms, and in this way bolsters up his symbolic interpretation of history.

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[1] Professor John H. Lavely offers the following definition of historical truth which supports the possibility of going beyond a confessional toward a more universal approach to history. "History, as the active process in the past experience of man, is known truth when this process is accurately described under the condition of the empirical method to arrive at historical facts and when these facts are meaningfully and coherently interpreted to achieve historical truth." "Prolegomena to Philosophy of History," Ph.D. Dissertation, Boston University, 1950, pp. 114-15. In addition to a historical survey of the development of philosophy of history, this study presents a helpful systematic treatment of the basic epistemological and metaphysical issues in philosophy of history.

As has been indicated, Tillich uses coherence in the support of his philosophy of history by providing both an ontology and a doctrine of man which purportedly captures the universal structures and aim of all being. An understanding of Tillich's philosophy of history presupposes both his ontology and view of man. It is for this reason that the next two chapters will deal with some basic concepts in his ontology and anthropology. The next chapter treats those aspects of Tillich's ontology that most directly illuminate and support the speculative elements of his interpretation of history.

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[1] The historian, Leo Gershoy, shows how in writing a biography of Bertrand Barere, a little known Frenchman in the eighteenth century, he needed some tentative hypothesis about the man to serve as a criterion of relevance. He had to select some facts and ignore others to get started. The point of his article, however, is to show that hew in the process of writing he was forced to modify his tentative hypothesis by further evidence. Although he still saw his subject through his own prism of filter, the evidence accumulated had given him somewhat more objectivity. His image of the man had been forced away from his tentative hypothesis about him as a cowardly opportunist to the view that he was a moderate reformer. The facts "fit" better in his modified hypothesis. This account serves to show the similar approach used by historian and scientist. Both use a preliminary, usually implicit, theory to ascertain "relevant" facts. See Leo Gershoy, "Some Problems of a Working Historian," ed. Hook, Philosophy and History, pp. 59-75.

C. Reflective Summary

In this chapter we have looked into Tillich's general theory of epistemology and at its application to historical knowledge. Knowledge was found to be a form of union through separation. Separation implies a distinct and irreducible subject and object both of which are dynamic in nature. The cognitive union of technical reason is best illustrated in the scientific method and achieves probability. The cognitive union of ontological reason comes through a phenomenological description of the structures of experience at the point where subject and object meet, as well as an existential understanding of the unique subjectivity and inner-relatedness of both objects and persons. Essential reason refers to the ideal of polar unity between technical and ontological reason. Existential reason indicates the lack of unity or estrangement between these two forms of cognitive union in actual existence. Revelation is needed to overcome the estrangement of existential reason.

Revelation deals with Tillich's theory of religious knowledge. Revelation does not mean the reception of any infallible knowledge on the levels of technical and ontological reason. On these levels revelation is cognitively empty. But revelation is also immediate and certain in terms of an awareness of a reality that transcends the subject-object relationship. This immediate awareness of revelation is received ecstatically and points to power given to man from beyond man which Tillich interprets as an inexhaustible, abysmal reality that, epistemologically, works to harmonize the polarity between technical and ontological reason.

Implicit within revelation are two criteria of truth taken to be self-evident which serve as the propositional core of Tillich's theory of revelation. They are, one; that reality is inexhaustible in power and meaning, and two; that reality is a force that makes for rational harmony between receiving and controlling knowledge. These criteria serve to define the propositional content of Tillich's ultimate concern and are used by him to evaluate other metaphysical positions.

Tillich's treatment of revelation points to the epistemological goal of certainty. But since everything within the subject-object scheme of things yields probability only, he is driven to postulate a reality that transcends the subject-object dichotomy. His epistemological requirement of certainty appears to condition his ontology, which he does not indicate, as well as his ontology conditions his epistemology, which he does acknowledge. Had his epistemological goal been different, it is conceivable that he would have developed a different kind of metaphysics.

But it is not clear just what kind of certainty Tillich thinks is achieved by revelation. If it is a prereflective certainty of a phenomenological description of certain kinds of experience which he calls escatic and finds conducive to the knowledge situation, then the problem is a descriptive one of whether or not such kinds of experience are found in human experience. It would seem that they are. But these kinds of experience are part of what is "given" in human experience and in themselves are cognitively innocent. The metaphysical (Tillich prefers the term ontological) problem is: What kind of a reality can best account for the kinds of happenings that are going on in human experience.

Tillich's ontology is one among other interpretations about the "real" source of what is actual. Tillich does not make clear adequately the interpretative elements that comprise his own account of what is taken to be ultimate. Sometimes he acknowledges his own conditioning within the theological circle, and yet at other times he wields his revelational criteria as undeniable certainties revealed on Mount Sinai. Once the element of interpretation is acknowledged in Tillich's account of ontology, then the possibility of error is present. Thus the goal of certainty seems to be no more achieved in revelation than it is in reason. It would seem that to acknowledge clearly the interpretative and thus uncertain character of metaphysics is a more accurate account of the metaphysical enterprise than to conceal it in religious terms like "revelation" and offer a certainty which cannot be delivered.

A hypothetical approach to metaphysical truth would seem to be a more consistent application of Tillich's own criterion of transcendence. If no metaphysical standpoint can be absolute, then this should hold for Tillich's as well. On the other hand, if no standpoint is absolute, then the position that no standpoint is absolute cannot be taken absolutely. If reality is unknowable now, there is no certainty that some day it might not be knowable. If this critical response to Tillich's epistemology is the voice of autonomous reason, then it is the voice of a kind of reason that neither ignores or disagrees with the kinds of experience Tillich designates as "ecstatic." If this response is one of heteronomous reason, then it is one that acknowledges no authority other than the most coherent and synoptic view of reality.

Tillich is to be commended for his attempt to wed the objective and intellectual side of human experience with the involved and existential dimensions of experience. Both traditional positivism and much of contemporary existentialism seem to ignore the rightful place of one or the other. Yet when Tillich defines these different kinds of cognitive endeavors in terms of a polarity, his description of their "ideal" harmony appears to be as much a juxtaposition of the two as it is a synthesis. At least a description of what would constitute a synthesis in regards to knowing objects in nature and persons warrants a clearer analysis.

Moving now to the application of his epistemology to the problem of historical knowledge, Tillich applies the subject-object character of all finitude to man's understanding of the historical process. Hp involves both subjective interpretation and objective facts. Hp proceeds inevitably through interpretation of Hf because of the unavoidable influence of some tradition which provides the criteria of significance. Since interpretations intend to "explain," the problem arises concerning what constitutes an explanation in history.

An explanation in history for Tillich involves both experimental verification as stressed in the objective methods of the natural sciences, and experiential verification which seeks empathetically to get into the "inside" of a historical event by gaining access to the historical agent's ideas, motives, and feelings. To both of these types of explanations stressed by positivists and idealists respectively, Tillich adds the dimension of enquiry into the "ultimate concern" of a person or period of history. If an explanation is given but is unavoidably affected by a tradition-conditioned interpretation, is there any possibility for an objectively "true" interpretative explanation?

There is a dialectical tension between two ways in which Tillich gives meaning to historical objectivity. On the one hand, although every historian interprets history from his particular perspective, yet within each point of view there are different degrees of competence in experimental and experiential methods. A "good" historical explanation is one written in accord with commonly held procedures of critical and creative research. On the other hand, Tillich searches for a more universal historical consciousness as evidenced in his axioms, his search for something universally acceptable in world religions, in his own essentialistic phenomenological descriptions of being and man, and in the cross of Christ.

In his search for a more objective standpoint from which to view history and to evaluate other interpretations of history, Tillich seems to be opposing what he says about the inevitability of the "theological circle." He is in fact appealing to the criterion of empirical coherence as a means of evaluating different historical perspectives and theological circles. To the extent this approach is carried through, the gap between science and history is lessened, since both proceed from less comprehensive hypotheses to more inclusive and systematic ones.

CHAPTER III

HISTORY AND BEING

Does a distinct world-view emerge from Tillich's writings? Yes. A synoptic vision guides his understanding of the meaning of history. This chapter will accordingly lay a foundation for understanding Tillich's view of the ultimate meaning of history by outlining his approach to the general nature of ontology and the nature of his own ontology in particular.

A. The Descriptive Task of Ontology

Tillich's entire systematic thought proceeds by correlating descriptive problems (philosophy) with revelatory answers (theology).[1] The present task is to present as concisely as possible the general framework of Tillich's systematic thought as a basis for applying this framework in the following chapters to his understanding of man and history.

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[1] Tillich's "method of correlation" is usually criticized on the grounds that either his descriptions condition his answers, or that his answers condition his descriptions. Bernard Martin writes from a Jewish perspective and calls attention to the Christian conditioning of Tillich's description of the human situation. See The Existentialist Theology of Paul Tillich (New York: Bookman Associates, 1963), p. 33. Tillich's answer to both kinds of criticisms is basically that while one should strive for objectivity, the interconnection between problem and answer is an inevitable result of some "theological circle" in which all thinkers, including his critics, are involved because of their historical conditioning.

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1. Descriptive Ontology as the "Problem".

Tillich believes that it is possible to describe phenomenologically both the "essential" nature of being (essentialism), that is, being as it ought to be, as well as being as it actually is (existentialism). The endeavor to describe both the essential structures of finitude and the predicament of actual existence define what Tillich means by philosophy.[1] A phenomenological description of both "structures" and "predicament" means "one which points to a reality as it is given, before one goes to a theoretical explanation or derivation."[2]

a) A Description of "Essential" Structures

Tillich believes that phenomenological descriptions of the essential structures of finitude can operate on two basic levels, universal and particular. On the level of universality, in opposition to Kant who confined his description of structures or categories to the subjective mind and the phenomenal world, Tillich believes with Hegel that a description of the universal structures underlying both subject and object is possible. Hence in Volume One he presented a phenomenological description of the essential structures of finitude as such. How does Tillich go about describing the structure of all finite things?

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[1] Tillich classifies philosophers by the predominance of either essentialism or existentialism, although both can be found in every major philosophy. Among the essentialists he includes philosophers like Anaxagoras, Democritus, Aristotle, the Epicureans, Descartes, Leibnitz, Locke, Hume, Kant and Hegel. Among those leaning toward existentialism he mentions Heraclitus, Socrates, Plato, the Stoics, Neoplatonists, Cusanus, Pico, Boehme, Pascal, Schelling, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and Heidegger. See Vol. III, p. 203.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 17. It should be noted that Tillich's definition of philosophy as phenomenological description is more of a "prescriptive" definition than a "descriptive" one of what philosophers actually have done. Philosophers have as a matter of fact also offered answers as well as problems. Tillich makes the "answers" a matter of theology by definition because they deal with the philosopher's speculative vision. Such a distinction between philosophy and theology tends to blur the distinction between a theology that intends to be particular (conditioned by a religious organization) and one that intends to be universal (striving for objectivity through reason).

Tillich's procedure in phenomenology is to analyze the structures of man as a finite being and then argue analogically to all realms of being. In Heidegger's terminology, Dasein is the clue to Sein. The key to a description of the universal structures of finitude is man. How does Tillich justify such a procedure? He believes that it is man alone who "asks the ontological question and in whose self-awareness the ontological answer can be found."[1] This means that there is really nowhere else to look. Moreover such a human centered approach has been used in traditional philosophy and is used in modern times by "Philosophers of Life" and "Existentialists." A more empirically grounded justification for making man the key to ontology is suggested in Volume Three. Man has developed from the evolutionary process and what was only potential in the preceding stages of evolution becomes actual and hence more apparent in man. All the dimensions of life are present in human life.[2] Thus man mirrors the whole evolutionary process. He is a microcosm, a miniature of the whole. What picture emerges from this anthropological approach?

There are two chief elements in his universal, descriptive ontology: the self-world structure and the three ontological elements.

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[1] Vol. I, p. 168.

[2] Vol. III, p. 111.

The basic characteristic of essential finitude is the distinction between the self and the world. The self-world structure is the "basic articulation of being."[1] This structure is a priori in the sense that it is a structural requirement of all experience. Nothing can be experienced without an experiencer and a content experienced. This fundamental structure is conceived in terms of polarity. The self pole requires a world pole. "Both sides of the polarity are lost if either side is lost."[2]

Several reasons for Tillich's use of the model of polarity have been mentioned in the discussion of his epistemology in Chapter Two. It can be added here that the kind of human experience that illustrates what Tillich is saying about polarity rather than separation between subject and object could be found in the experience of a baby and the development of its ego awareness. It would appear that in a baby's experience there is no initial distinction between a "me" and a "not me." There is rather a primordial unity in which the mother, for example, is just an ingredient of the baby's immediate experience. The subject-object relationship slowly emerges from distinctions "within" experience, and the child finally says "I" and "separates" himself from his environment. Tillich is saying that we cannot start an analysis of finitude with either subject or object as "separated." This results in either an epistemological and metaphysical dualism, or some form of idealistic or materialistic reductionism. We must start as the baby does with a primordial unity. Other approaches lead to insoluable problems. Thus, he begins with both subject and object in a polar relationship. But Tillich's analysis does not stop here.

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[1] Vol. I, p. 164.

[2] Ibid., p. 171.

The "ontological elements" represent three more definitive principles of all being subsumed under the basic self-world polarity. On the self side of the self-world polarity are individualization, dynamics, and freedom. On the world side, correspondingly, are participation, form and destiny. These ontological polarities will be given concrete meaning in his view of man and philosophy of history. It is important here only to note that in all his descriptions of essential structures including man, life, and history this scheme of self-world polarity with the three ontological polarities is presupposed and used.[1] This consideration suggests the second level of Tillich's essentialistic descriptions.

The second level of essential structures is concerned with particular realms of being. As the first level of discovering the universal traits of finitude through man is undoubtedly influenced by Heidegger,[2] so Tillich's interest in describing different regions of being as they appear in consciousness with their qualitatively different kinds of categories is traceable to Edmund Husserl.[1] This interest of Tillich in describing particular regions of being is seen chiefly in Volume Three in which he distinguishes among different realms and dimensions of being and offers a brief description of how the categories of substance, causality, time, and space appear within different dimensions.[2] The area of history will be selected in following chapters as an illustration of a particular dimension of being in which Tillich employs his basic polar scheme. It is sufficient for our purpose to observe simply that the description of particular regions of being is one of the tasks of philosophy.

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[1] Tillich's interest, however, is not limited to a description of finitude in general. In man these three polarities are called individualization—participation, vitality—intentionality, freedom—destiny. In all life processes "self-integration" is explained by the polarity of person—communion; "self-creation" by the polarity of dynamics and form; "self-transcendence" by the polarity of freedom and destiny. In history there is correspondingly empire—centralization, revolution—reaction, and the "third stage" as given and expected. See Vol. I, pp. 178-186; Vol. III, pp. 32, 339-346.

[2] Note Heidegger's titles to one of his sections in Being and Time: "The Ontological Analytic of Dasein as Laying Bare the Horizon for an Interpretation of the Meaning of Being in General." Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Bloomsbury St., London: SCM Press Ltd., 1962), p. 36.

To sum up, the job of philosophy, as Tillich sees it, is to attempt an objective description of both the essential structures of finitude in general and the structures of sections of being in particular. It is at these levels that what "ought" to be can be discovered, and thus the "aim" or *telos* of being(s). The other area of philosophical endeavor is concerned with describing things as they are. This is the existentialistic element in all philosophy.

b) A Description of "Estranged" Actualities

Tillich distinguishes between "essence" and "existence." Essences may be thought of in Aristotlean terms as "potentiality," and existence as "actuality." There is a "gap" between the potential and the actual. Things are not what they ought to be. It is the task of existentialism to describe the unfulfilled and distorted aspects of existence, that is, to describe actual "estrangement." Three basic statements can be made concerning Tillich's understanding of existentialism as a description of estrangement.

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[1] For an example of Husserl's attempt to describe with metaphysical innocence the data that appeared to the "intending" nature of consciousness, and to expound the phenomenological meaning of such primitive ideas as cause and event, see his *Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology*, trans. Boyce Gibson (New York: Macmillan Co., 1931), Vol. I, pp. 82-88.

[2] Vol. III, pp. 15-21, 313-326.

(1) Existentialism presupposes essentialism.--Tillich believes that a description of "estrangement" necessarily implies the distinction between essence and existence. He holds that the claim to be a "pure" existentialist will always be accompanied by a surreptitious appeal to the notion of essence, even if the notion of essence is denied. Usually either existence is thought of as deriving from essence (Spinoza), or essence is derived from existence (Sartre). But in any case the duality of essence and existence is seen in all ontologies.[1] Tillich argues that any existentialist who denies the idea, for example, of an essential human nature inconsistently employs it. Sartre, accordingly, makes freedom normative for man and estrangement or alienation becomes a matter of losing freedom, while Heidegger talks as though man had no essential nature or norms, and then proceeds to distinguish between "authentic" and "unauthentic" existence.[2] Tillich's argument here is that these men could make no recommendations for freedom or authenticity if they did not have some idea of what the healing (making whole) of human nature meant. The very awareness of the concept of estranged existence thus presupposes some notion of what

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[1] Vol. I, p. 165.

[2] Cf. Tillich, Theology of Culture, p. 121.

"ought" to be.

(2) Polarity is the key to estrangement.--The second statement concerning Tillich's view of existentialism follows from the first. Since the idea of estrangement presupposes some notion of a normative essence, it follows that Tillich's analysis of estrangement can be understood in relation to his description of essential structures. The notion of "polarity" is the key to Tillich's analysis of estrangement. If polar unity defines what is essential, polar disruption describes what is wrong. But what does polar disruption mean?

Observe, for example, how Tillich employs the concepts of polarity and its existential disequilibrium in the polar elements of individualization and participation. In essential unity individualization stands for solitude, and participation represents self-relatedness or communion. One requires the other. The more fully a person is developed as a centered self, that is, as self-conscious, the greater his capacity for social participation. "Only he who is able to have solitude is able to have communion."[1] But when the scales tip to either solitude or communion, a person is estranged. If he is shut off from social participation, then he becomes lonely. Loneliness is intolerable, so he submerges himself in the group. But when he is submerged in the group there is also a loss of solitude, the loss of self in the collective.[2] Here Tillich considers both lonely isolation and conforming submergence to a group as marks of

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[1] Vol. II, p. 71.

[2] Vol. I, p. 199.

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estrangement. A well-adjusted man unites these two poles in a harmonious way.[1]

(3) Estrangement is total.--The concept of polarity leads to the third statement pertaining to Tillich's understanding of existentialism as a description of estrangement. Estrangement for Tillich means total estrangement. On the level of the basic self-world structure, if there is estrangement on either side there is estrangement on both. "Total" in this context does not mean that there are no essential norms to discover. It means rather that human existence as a whole is a question, a problem, and that no answer is apparent from an analysis of his predicament. "Man's estrangement from his essential being is the universal character of existence."[2] "Total" estrangement means it is not possible for just one side of the polarity to be estranged. If one is, both are. This means macroscopically that there is no hope within the subject-object, self-world scheme of things. If only the self-side were estranged, then it would be possible to find healing forces on the world side (in nature). While if only the world or social side were estranged, then adequate healing or uniting forces might be found in the self side (humanism). Tillich rejects both of

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[1] It is noteworthy to observe that the model of polar balance can be employed for both static and dynamic concepts. On the static side, for example, if a substance susceptible to magnetic attraction were placed at a mathematical point between the north and south magnetic poles it would remain at this point. Theoretically, the same static condition would apply for a mathematical point between two gravitational centers. On the dynamic side, the balance of forces within an organism making for homeostasis makes life possible. Also, if the anabolic and the catabolic forces in metabolism were kept in perfect balance an organism could live forever.

[2] Vol. II, p. 74.

these possibilities. No kind of salvation is possible from the self or from nature. Finitude is not self-sufficient. Why?

Tillich's concept of total estrangement follows consistently from his analysis of the polar nature of essential being. The ideal relationship between the basic self-world structure is harmony. As polar in nature, the self-world distinction is not considered to be a separation. On the contrary, the notion of polarity makes everything related. "Since everything that is participates in the self-world structure of being, elements of self-relatedness are universal. This makes union with everything possible. Nothing is absolutely strange."[1] Although nothing is totally disconnected, yet estrangement is total in the sense that both poles are adversely affected by any disequilibrium. This same notion of polarity in the context of estrangement thus becomes an argument for the thesis that if a particular thing is estranged, then the self-relatedness of all being means that all things are estranged. This appears to be Tillich's way of formulating a doctrine of internal relations within the self-world structure. Therefore, if the totality of finitude is considered to be estranged, it can hardly be the source of the answer to finitude. Finitude _per_ _se_ cannot be the answer to estrangement. It is rather the problem.

This concept of total estrangement is the principal reason why Tillich permits nothing within the subject-object relationship to be the source of healing. Belief in total estrangement is the basis, for example, for his rejection of any kind of theism which makes God into an absolute Subject who considers man as an object. If man as the object is estranged, then God as subject must become estranged too, that is, God falls within the subject-object schema and becomes part of the total estrangement.

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[1] Vol. I, p. 97.

The concept of total estrangement is also used by Tillich as a critique of naturalism. If it is not merely man's consciousness that is estranged, but rather man-in-his-world, then a naturalism that operates solely within the subject-object polarity cannot provide an answer to the human condition.

Hence, it appears that Tillich's epistemological concern to make knowledge possible by employing the notion of "polarity" ends up by driving him to a metaphysical ultimate that transcends the self-world polarity. The principle of polarity not only makes "union" possible but also, paradoxically, makes estrangement (the lack of union) total. The drive for certainty leads Tillich "beyond" the subject-object schema of things. His epistemology leads him to a particular kind of metaphysics. What kind emerges?

2. Summary

Before proceeding to Tillich's metaphysics, let us summarize his understanding of the task of philosophy (descriptive ontology). The task is twofold; namely, to describe the essential nature of finitude and particular dimensions of finitude, and to describe the estranged nature of finite existence. Finitude means "limited," something that has being and yet is not all being, that is, a combination of being and nonbeing.[1]

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[1] Paul Tillich, Love Power, and Justice (New York: Oxford University Press, A Galaxy Book, 1960), p. 38 f.

The following account of Tillich's metaphysics will select those features that contribute most to an understanding of his synoptic view of history.

B. The Answering Nature of Ontology

The answering function of Tillich's ontology (metaphysics) is twofold. The first function is to explain the "source" of essential finitude. The metaphysical question about finitude is, what kind of reality could account for the origin and continuation of essential finitude? His answer is: Being-itself conceived of as the power of being overcoming nonbeing. The second function of his metaphysics is to inquire into the possible source of healing or reconciliation between essential being and estranged existence. The metaphysical question here is: What kind of reality could account for the actual occurrences of overcoming existential estrangement? His answer is, being-itself conceived as New Being making for polar harmony of being. The central problem is thus to analyze what Tillich means by being-itself.

Since being-itself is Tillich's central metaphysical concept, two basic questions can be raised as an expository device concerning the nature of being-itself. Is being-itself meaningless or static? To the degree that a distinct world-view can be seen to emerge from Tillich's writings the notion of being-itself can be shown to have meaning. To the extent that being-itself can be shown to have a dynamic intent or meaning for Tillich, the charge of a static metaphysical ontology will not stand. Conversely, the failure to find a distinct world-view and a dynamic intent will confirm both the linguistic charge of meaninglessness and the charge of a static metaphysics (in contrast, say, to process philosophy).

1. Is "Being-itself" Meaningless?

The source of the charge of metaphysical meaninglessness stems from what we have designated as Tillich's axiom of transcendence, namely, that ultimate reality is abysmal and inexhaustible in power and meaning. Tillich's insistence on God's transcendence of the subject-object relationship is clearly seen in his reply to Harthshorne's contention that creaturely contingency conditions God in some respects and makes him literally finite in some ways.

> My resistance against this doctrine (not against the positing of the finite in God) is rooted in the overwhelming impression of the divine majesty as witnessed by classical religion. This makes any structural dependence of God on something contingent impossible for me to accept.[1]

Tillich evidently means by "the divine majesty as witnessed by classical religion" the Augustinian-Franciscan emphasis on the immediate awareness of God in contrast to the more Aristotlean-Thomistic discursive approach to God. At least, for Tillich the Augustinian-Franciscan tradition "is more fundamental for the understanding of our knowledge of God."[2] This means for Tillich that God's majesty is beyond rational argumentation, that God conceived as absolutely perfect, self-sufficient, flawless, the unconditional ground and inexhaustible abyss of all things, is beyond finite reason. The problem here is not with "the divine majesty." The question is what model does Tillich use to express it? Or is there no model?

The notion of God's transcendent perfection is the usual orthodox position in Christian theology. Tillich gets into difficulty because of the way in which he expresses it. He claims that all our knowledge of God is symbolic. To avoid the criticism of a kind of pansymbolism that has no referential meaning, he says that the term "being-itself" is the only non-symbolic statement about God.[1] "Being-itself" does not point beyond itself to another term. An infinite regress is supposedly stopped. The difficulty here, however, is that Tillich permits no literal content to be associated with being-itself. Anything we say about it is symbolic. Thus if being-itself has no meaningful content or guiding model until it becomes symbolic, then the term "being-itself" per se may be non-symbolic but it is also void of any particular meaning.

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[1] Charles W. Kegley, Robert W. Bretall, The Theology of Paul Tillich. (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1961), p. 340.

[2] O'Meara, Paul Tillich in Catholic Thought, p. 307.

Could it be that "being-itself" is a name for the whole, which is otherwise nameless, beyond symbol? Throughout this chapter, it will be shown that insight into Tillich's position can be gained by considering the relation of God and finitude in terms of a part-whole relationship. Finitude is part of the divine life. The relationship between finitude and God are "inner relations of the divine life."[2] If a part-whole model is not assumed in Tillich's system, then it is difficult to see how Tillich avoids the charge of meaningless with reference to "being-itself."

Tillich seems to submit to the cogency of the charge of meaninglessness in Volume Two. He appears in his second volume to place even the term "being-itself" in the same category as "infinite" and "unconditional" and claims that these terms are both non-symbolic and symbolic at the same time. The only purely non-symbolic statement now that can be made about God, and still preserve his ecstatic-transcendent character, is "that everything we say about God is symbolic."[1] In reality, however, Tillich fails to observe that this is only a metalinguistic statement regarding statements about God, and not about God *per se*. Now if everything said about God is symbolic, what does he mean when he says that there is a point "at which both the symbolic and the non-symbolic coincide," or that we can speak "rationally and ecstatically at the same time?"[2] If we identify the "whole" with the rational and non-symbolic which is otherwise ecstatic and symbolic, then at least a modicum of meaning can be found here. But to understand more fully what Tillich means we must look closely at what he means by "symbolic."

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[1] Vol. I, p. 238.

[2] Vol. I, p. 271.

Tillich identifies his doctrine of the symbolic knowledge of God with the Thomistic view of the analogical knowledge of God. The Thomistic position is an attempt to avoid, on the one hand, a univocal literalism that reduces the concept of God to a crude anthropomorphism, and yet, on the other hand, seeks to avoid equivocal or ambiguous predications that provide no rational control or meaning.

Tillich seeks to avoid the horns of this dilemma by means of his formulation of *analogia entis*. Tillich, in reply to Gustave Weigel, claims to accept the doctrine of the analogy of proportion as found in

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[1] Vol. II, p. 9.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 10

Thomistic thought.

> Every model--if it is an adequate and not demonic symbol--says something positively true about God. He is not the ineffable simply and unconditionally; but on the basis of his ineffability much can and must be said about him. It is not true that in the finite-infinite proportion there is no difference between the kinds of the finite which enter into this proportion. There is a profound difference between the proportion: stone--the infinite, and the proportion: man--the infinite. This difference is the basis of the possibility whereby God is manifest according to his innermost nature in man but not in a stone.[1]

This statement clearly identifies Tillich's doctrine of the symbolic knowledge of God with the doctrine of analogy of proportion, but only after an initial negation that stems from his axiom of transcendence; namely, no symbol is adequate. The reason that the proportion in man is greater than in a stone is that in man (a part) more potentialities of the whole have been actualized than in the stone. But still man as a part cannot be demonically identified with the whole.[2]

Although Tillich intends to make positive statements about being-itself (the whole), still when he is pressed he acknowledges that the emphasis of his formulation of the doctrine of the analogy of proportion is tilted more on the side of equivocation than the Thomist's. He admits as much to Father Weigel, and gives his reason for it.

> Nevertheless, I believe you are right when you say that my understanding of analogia is more negative-protesting than positive-affirming. I am more worried about the idolic character

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[1] O'Meara (ed.), Paul Tillich in Catholic Thought, pp. 23-24.

[2] It should be recognized that symbols are analogical only when predication is intended. Tillich uses symbols for other purposes as well. See his Dynamics of Faith.

> of traditional theology and popular beliefs about God than you are.[1]

Tillich should be understood in terms of what he is guarding against. He is opposed to applying any language to God that reduces the concept of God's perfection to the incompleteness and contingency found within the subject-split, that is, within a finite part. Also since estrangement is a function of parts, he guards against applying any qualities of estrangement to the whole. If the whole were estranged too there would be no way out of estrangement, that is, no way to make God more than a part.

Yet he does indicate that the "essential" characteristics of finitude express the _Logos_ of being, and this means for Tillich that some positive statements about being-itself are possible. Hence the phrase "only a symbol" should be avoided.[2] Tillich's intent to make positive statements about being-itself is clear. The axioms of transcendence and harmony are illustrations of such positive statements. Unfortunately, however, his support for making positive statements about ultimate reality is far from clear. Tillich's thought can avoid the charge of meaninglessness with reference to being-itself, it would appear, only if one explicitly recognizes a part-whole model underlying his formulations. Otherwise "being-itself" has no rational control. Being-itself is the whole which can never be fully defined in terms of the parts. Yet the parts tell something about the whole.

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[1] O'Meara (ed.), _Paul Tillich . . ._, p. 24. Tillich also admits a preponderance of the _via negativa_ in his doctrine of God, radically rejects the phrase "objective knowledge of God," and claims that this reaction is rooted in the nature of the present situation of man. See pp. 306-08.

[2] Vol. I, p. 131.

In summary, Tillich opens himself to the charge of making meaningless statements about God because of his concern not to bring God into the estrangement and limitations which he in reality defines into the subject-object level. He is always on guard against applying any characteristics to God that are "imperfect." This stems from his axiom of transcendence. Yet he makes clear his "intent" to make some positive statements about the nature of being-itself. His intention, however, is not sufficiently supported in his writings. His intention to speak positively about being-itself presupposes an unacknowledged part-whole model. Being-itself is the whole which is otherwise nameless as such. Since the whole contains the parts, the parts can indicate some properties contained in the whole although they can never characterize the whole as it is in itself.

Once it is granted that Tillich does intend his statements to say something positive about God, the question still remains: Do his statements imply a dynamic or static view of the reality to which the term "God" refers?

2. Is "Being-itself" a Static Concept?

The central problems in Tillich's metaphysics, we have said, are to account for the origin and continuation of finitude, and for the actual occurrences of overcoming existential estrangement. His answers are expressed in terms of "being-itself" and "new being." What do these terms mean? Tillich, it has just been observed, does intend to offer positive meanings to terms referring to ultimate reality. The problem is whether or not the positive meanings involved in Tillich's basic metaphysical intuition indicate a static, unchanging, perfect Absolute Being presumably associated with ancient Greek metaphysics, or a concept of God in terms of more dynamic categories.

The view that seems the most defensible is that Tillich "intends" to portray the metaphysically real as dynamic. But the source of confusion and misunderstanding of Tillich's position arises from Tillich's preference for the traditional term "being-itself." Although "being-itself" may have static connotations for some,[1] it does not for Tillich. To get inside Tillich's understanding of the term "being-itself," it is necessary first to see what Tillich "means" by this term, and then to search for a more concrete example of the model behind his rather abstract formulations. This can be accomplished by analyzing the relation of being-itself to terms like the power of being, love, and life.

a) Being-itself as the Power of being in all Things

In reply to critics who associate the term "being-itself" with a high order static abstraction Tillich says in Volume Two what he meant in Volume One, namely, that being-itself can be described "as the power of being which resists non-being" and as "the power of being or the power of conquer non-being."[1] This emphasis on the "power of being" is not lacking in Volume One, for there also he spoke of God as "the power of being infinitely resisting non-being, giving the power of being to everything that is."[2] These statements should serve to substantiate the claim that "being-itself" means for Tillich the "power of being," and hence is intended to say something positively true about God. But what?

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[1] Tillich's concept of God as being-itself is accused of being static and lifeless by Frederick Stonag. See "Ontological Possibility and the Nature of God: A Reply to Tillich," The Journal of Religion, XXXVI, October, 1956, pp. 234-240. Shubert M. Ogden refers to Tillich's view of being-itself as "unchanging and timeless." See "Beyond Supernaturalism," Religion is Life, XXXIII, Winter, 1963-64, p. 13. Guyton B. Hammond finds no substance to the charge that Tillich's view of being-itself is static and lifeless. See "Tillich on the Personal God," The Journal of Religion, Vol. XLIV, October, 1964, p. 292. See also Hammond's Man in Estrangement (Nashville, Tennessee: Vanderbilt University Press, 1965.

To identify the "power of being" with "being-itself" seems to be a fancy way of saying that God is the whole. The whole "resists non-being" because it refuses to be a part. To say that the power of being gives "the power of being to everything that is" means that the power of being is thus really being-itself in everything, or rather everything in being-itself. The part-whole model thus illuminates what Tillich says concerning the power of being. It remains to be seen, however, just what the "dynamic" quality of the "power of being" connotes. An analysis of non-being in connection with concept of the power of being is helpful in understanding the dynamic quality of being-itself.

Tillich distinguishes two different meanings for non-being.[3]

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[1] Vol. II, p. 11. The confusion in Volume One occurs when he makes being-itself the only non-symbolic statement about God. Cf. p. 238. This seems to imply a superior meaning to "being-itself," one not contained in the symbolic expression "power of being." But since the non-symbolic term apparently takes on meaning only when it is given symbolic expression, he is forced to modify his position in Volume Two and, as it has already been indicated, resorts to a non-symbolic metalinguistic statement. Cf. p. 9.

[2] Vol. I, pp. 250-51.

[3] Cf. Vol. I, p. 188.

One meaning suggests an absolute non-being which has no relation at all to being, a mere logical complementary class to being. The second meaning of non-being has a dialectical relation to being. It is the second kind of non-being, according to Tillich, that Plato associated with matter in the *Timaeus*. Here matter is pictured as recalcitrantly resisting union with the realm of Ideas.[1] Augustine associated sin with Platonic "non-being," and thus identified it with a power to resist God. It is with this kind of dialectical non-being that Tillich is primarily concerned.

Why is non-being so important for Tillich? Because without dialectical non-being no world is possible. The reason for this is that the world of finite things is one of limitation. Non-being is thus Tillich's term for expressing dissatisfaction with parts. Finite things both are, and are not yet. They are not complete. They are not the whole. That is to say, there is potentiality in the finite world of parts both positively for greater actualization and negatively for ceasing to be. This two-fold potentiality for greater being or for cessation of being accounts for Tillich's ambivalent attitude toward non-being. In terms of the part-whole model, a part either joins the whole and is fulfilled or separates and dies. On the positive side of joining the whole, the world of finitude can be experienced as one of unlimited possibilities for expansion and growth since the whole is inexhaustible according to the axiom of transcendence. If the parts were complete, without non-being, there would be no category of possibility and hence no finitude, since possibility is a finite category. But on the negative side, non-being represents the shock of ceasing to be, of separating from the whole. One must die. Non-being tends to swallow being.

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[1] The question arises concerning whether or not matter is some kind of force for Plato. In the *Timaeus* the efficient cause is ostensibly attributed to the demiurge who moulds matter according to the pattern of rational Ideas. In his lectures in the history of philosophy at Harvard in 1961 Tillich treated the demiurge in the Timaeus as a "myth" and proceeded to demythologize it by identifying force with matter rather than with a supernatural agent. It was always fascinating when Tillich lectured in the history of philosophy to observe how many of his own ideas he found among the ancients. His "interpretation" was usually evident.

The awareness of both the positive and negative sides of non-being is what Tillich means by anxiety.[1] It is in such anxiety that man asks the ontological question, the question of the source of power for the positive side of actualizing potentiality, and on the negative side, for the source of power to **resist courageously** the triumph of non-being. In Freudian terms, what is the source of the life urge that resists the death urge?

It is in answering the question dealing with the element of non-being (parts) in finitude that Tillich employs the concept of being-itself (whole). But he indicates that "instead of" the term being-itself, we could speak rather of "the power inherent in everything, the power of resisting non-being."[2] If being-itself is to be dynamically conceived as the power of being, then being-itself must be related someway to whatever resists its power, that is, to non-being.

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[1] Cf. Tillich, The Courage To Be, p. 35.

[2] Vol. I, p. 236.

According to Tillich,

> Being has non-being "within" itself as that which is eternally present and eternally overcome in the process of the divine life. The ground of everything that is is not a dead identity without movement and becoming; it is living creativity. Creatively it affirms itself, eternally conquering its own non-being. As such it is the pattern of the self-affirmation of every finite being and the source of the courage to be.[1]

Tillich seems to be saying here that the whole (being) has the parts (non-being) within itself, and that furthermore the whole is a creative process which conquers the recalcitrant parts through the whole's self-affirmation.[2] Hence, if God is to be more than a dead entity, if history is to have any significance to God, and if the twofold problem involved in the relation of non-being with finitude is to be answered; then non-being must be placed "within" being-itself as the catalysis of creativity. But is this to imply that God has the same kind of struggle with non-being that finitude has?

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[1] Tillich, The Courage To Be, p. 34. Tillich also associates his concept of placing non-being within God with Hegel's "antithesis," Böhme's "ungrund," Schelling's "first potency," Berdyaev's "menoic freedom," and with the concept of the "given" in God in recent theism. Cf. Vol. I, p. 189.

[2] Several critical issues in Tillich's thought appear at this point. First, Tillich seems to be arguing from the dynamic and creative character of the parts to the dynamic character of the whole. But how do we know that the whole resembles the parts? Tillich's assumption throughout is that the whole contains "at least" as much as the parts. Moreover, his argument is really not inductive (from the parts to the whole), but rather deductive from his axiom of transcendence as developed in Chapter Two. Secondly, can being-itself (the whole) really be said to conquer or overcome non-being? Such a notion suggests that the whole has some kind of process and struggle, and the idea of a struggle suggests the finite category of potentiality. But such a view of the whole is inconsistent with the axiom of transcendence. The classical view of God's self-sufficient perfection as expressed in the axiom of transcendence is not compatible with his attempt to speak of God in terms of "process" or "resistance" to an internalized non-being.

Being-itself (whole) conceived as the power of being in everything is believed by Tillich to conquer eternally non-being (parts). Non-being never triumphs in being-itself, that is, the parts never resist (profanization) nor affirm their own self-sufficiency (idolatry) as they do in estranged finitude. Within the divine life the element of non-being is included, but perfectly overcome. This means that on the positive side of non-being, the realm of possibility, "the divine life inescapably unites possibility with fulfillment." Concerning non-being conceived negatively as the threat of death, Tillich affirms that "God cannot cease to be God."[1] Within the divine life there is no distinction between possibility and fulfillment, potentiality and actuality. This means that God is perfect, since perfection is defined as the full actualization of potentialities.[2]

How does Tillich know that God is perfect or has perfect control of non-being? It appears to follow from the criteria or axioms of transcendence and harmony which have already been shown to comprise the cognitive core of his doctrine of revelation. The inexhaustible, abysmal or transcendent nature of God appears to mean that God is the reservoir of all the power there is (no power outside the whole), and since this power is conceived as one making for harmony and polar balance (overcoming estrangement), this implies that God as the power of being is self-sufficient and perfectly fulfilled or harmonious. Tillich never argues this point. It just follows for him as a self-evident truth implied in revelatory experiences, that is, God's perfection is an immediate certainty flowing from man's ontological awareness of unity with being-itself.

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[1] Vol. I, p. 247.

[2] Cf. Vol. III, p. 36.

Our argument has shown that in Tillich's thought finitude includes non-being and is threatened by it, and that a dynamically conceived God involves the necessity of placing non-being within God. If non-being is a necessary ingredient of finitude, and if non-being is within God, then finitude is within God. Hence, the relationship between finitude and being-itself is conceived in terms of a part-whole model. Tillich says as much, although the part-whole model is not explicitly acknowledged as such.

> God is infinite because he has the finite (and with it that element of non-being which belongs to finitude) within himself united with his infinite. One of the functions of the symbol "divine life" is to point to this situation.[1]

The relation between God and finitude is thus a part-whole relationship. The relationship between finitude and God are "inner relations of the divine life."[2] But this can be so only insofar as finitude is fulfilled, because if estranged finitude were within the divine life then a part of the divine life would be unfulfilled and hence not perfect. In other words, finitude in its essential nature is ontologically within the divine life as a part is included in the whole.

The understanding of the part-whole relationship between finitude and God conceived as the power of being is the context in which God considered as the "depth" dimension of finitude becomes clear. In fact, Tillich's whole emphasis on "depth" and dimensional unity presupposes the part-whole model. In substitution for the crude anthropomorphism of the masses who conceive of God as "up there" or "out there" somewhere on a higher "level," Tillich speaks of God as the "depth dimension" of finitude.[1] Tillich's inspiration for his view of the depth dimension comes primarily from the principle of the "coincidence of opposites" formulated by Cardinal Nicolaus Cusanus. This is the idea of the mutual immanence of the infinite and the finite. Tillich's actual model here is that of a geometrical cube.[2] A cube is preferred to a circle because it has three dimensions. Imagine a center in a cube with an indefinite number of lines radiating outward. These lines represent dimensions in which there is no mutual interference. The center is the "depth" in which all lines meet. Here they cross without disturbing each other. The depth is referred to as the "dimension of the ultimate" or of "the eternal" and is not to be confused merely with one dimension in a series.[3] The depth center of the cube is where the dimensions are rooted, the source of all power and the unifying aim of all being.[4] In other words, when the part is fulfilled the nature of the whole is present conceived dynamically as the power which overcomes non-being. The relationship between essential or fulfilled finitude and being-itself is one of ontological identity.

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[1] Vol. I, p. 252.

[2] Vol. I, p. 271.

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[1] Tillich does not escape anthropomorphism, since both the more sophisticated notion of depth as well as the part-whole model are anthropomorphic, that is, human forms of thought attributed to God.

[2] Tillich does not mention the notion of a cube in his Systematic Theology, but in lectures and in private conversation when he taught at Harvard in 1961 he told this writer that this is the model that comes before his mind. Although this work is based on Tillich's written works, liberty is frequently taken to elucidate a text by Tillich's lectures at Harvard given during 1960-62. Any crucial interpretation, however, will be based on his written works.

[3] Cf. Vol. III, p. 113.

[4] The cube model is not intended to illustrate any dynamic quality as such, but only to illustrate the location of power within the whole.

But at this point the question inevitably arises concerning the relation between "estranged" finitude and being-itself. Only essential finitude is within being-itself. If God is perfect, then what kind of relation exists between perfection and imperfection? Is there some kind of "external" relation between being-itself and estranged finitude? This is a crucial question for this study. It includes the whole question of the relation of God to history (which includes imperfection and ambiguity). Before attempting to answer this question in the following chapter on man, our analysis needs a more concrete model to tie together some of Tillich's rather abstract formulations. In a previous quotation Tillich indicated the direction that needs to be taken, namely, the symbol "divine life." A requisite for this symbol, however, as will be shown, is an understanding of Tillich's analysis of love.

b) The Power of all being as Divine Love

The focal point of Tillich's ontological vision has many similarities with Hegel's early works. Tillich believes that Hegel's dialectical method rests on his previous analysis of "life" as seen, for example, in his _Early Theological Writings_ and _Phenomenology of Mind_.[1] Moreover, Hegel's account of life is modelled after his early fragmentary statements about love to the extent that "it can be said without exaggeration that Hegel's dialectical scheme is an abstraction from his concrete intuition into the nature of love as separation and reunion."[1] It is the contention here that what Tillich said about Hegel can also be applied to Tillich. Tillich's "concrete intuition" of the nature of love, viewed largely in Hegelian terms, lies at the heart of Tillich's metaphysics. What then does love mean for Tillich?

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[1] Vol. I, p. 234.

Tillich gives a concise summary of his analysis of love.

> In spite of the many kinds of love, which in Greek are designated as philia (friendship), eros (aspiration toward value), and epithymia (desire), in addition to agape, which is the creation of the Spirit, there is one point of identity in all these qualities of love which justifies the translation of them all by "love;" and that identity is the "urge toward the reunion of the separated," which is the inner dynamics of life.[2]

It is not necessary to explicate the rich shades of meaning Tillich gives to the various kinds of love. The important thing for understanding the nature of his ontological model is that the root meaning of love is the Hegelian conclusion that its common meaning is the "urge toward the reunion of the separated" and that he connects this meaning with the dynamics of life. Love is the form life takes.[3]

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[1] Paul Tillich, Love, Power, and Justice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1954), p. 22.

[2] Vol. III, p. 137.

[3] Two observations are relevant at this point. One is that love for Tillich is a symbol, as are all descriptions of God, and does not exhaust the nature of the whole. Yet since the whole contains the parts and the parts are structured by love, the whole contains love. Moreover it was shown in Chapter Two that the axiom of harmony is a cognitive intuitive certainty in Tillich's system. This axiom can be expressed in terms of love as a force (will) working toward polar harmony among the parts. Love thus has positive content. The second observation is that when Tillich writes of love in terms of the reunion of the "separated," he does not mean "separated" in an onto-

The image or metaphor behind this ontological treatment of love is one of being-itself with two movements. The first creative movement is of God conceived as a primordial, abysmal unity driven by his (its) own love toward individualization within himself because love needs an object of love, even if the object is a distinct part of being-itself. The subject-object split occurs within God because of God's nature of love. Here we could say that God creates the Platonic heaven of Ideas conceived as Aristotelian powers or potentialities which comprise the rational structures necessary for a possible universe. Tillich's doctrine of creation is an attempt to steer between the theories of emanation and dualism. The creative movement of separation is not driven by mathematical necessity, as in the doctrine of emanation; but by non-being conceived as the "urge" (will) of love. He avoids dualism by placing non-being "within" the divine life and by denying any co-eternal stuff or Platonic matter outside of God. The created rational structures thus represent "essential" finitude, finitude as it ought to be, subsisting "within" God's nature. God's love of essential finitude is in reality God's love of himself made possible through individualization, that is, an individualization *within* the whole.[1]

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logical sense. One would do well to substitute "estranged" for "separated." If the term "separated" were emphasized, then God would be forced logically into the subject-object relationship. That is, God would be an object for separated subjects, and vice versa. Such a relationship is clearly at odds with the tenor of Tillich's thought.

[1] Vol. I, p. 282. A difficulty arises as Tillich apparently tries to harmonize two different concepts of God. According to his axiom of transcendence, God is perfect and complete beyond all distinctions of potentiality and actuality. But his description of God as divine love rests upon conceiving being-itself as a power which "lacks" and hence needs to fulfill his love by creating a world to

But something else occurs in this creative movement toward individualization. God gives these potentialities the power to exist, that is, the power to "stand out" of potentiality (although not out of the whole). Existence is also a fact, not a logical deduction. There is no logical structure which requires an actual universe. Existence is not a deduction from essence. Potentialities become living actualities by means of the power given them from the creative ground (the whole).[1] It is at this point, Tillich holds, that something ultimately unexplainable occurs.[2] In the transition from essence to existence within the divine life the act of self-estrangement (the fall) takes place.[3]

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love. Tillich rejects the idea of God as "becoming," yet his descriptions of God suggest the categories of process philosophy. If God must go out from himself because of a "lack" of some kind, then is not God estranged too? Or at least, contingent in some qualities?

[1] Vol. III, p. 31.

[2] *Ibid*., p. 284.

[3] Perhaps one reason why the "fall" is so mysterious for Tillich is that it appears to be utterly inexplicable in terms of the part-whole model he presupposes. What does it mean to say that a part falls away from the whole but is still within it? He offers no concrete model to explicate his meaning. If he would use a logical or mathematical model, the idea of logical inference suggests no meaning as to how an inference can "fall" from its inferential relationship. If he uses a mystical model, then it cannot be expressed and has no philosophic import. He could hardly use the model of a democratic society as the whole, since the members of a democracy appear to have more ontological separation from each other than he seems to give them. Moreover, if he would use some kind of organic model, then it is not clear how a part of an organism "falls" from the organism. One might possibly explicate his notion of the fall by an organic model in terms of how a cancerous cell(s) tends to run its own course regardless of the well-being of the organism. But even the organic model will not work for two basic reasons: it does not give the parts the degree of relative freedom Tillich "intends" the parts to have; and the part can affect and even destroy the whole. This latter difficulty con-

In existence there appears both lack of fulfillment and the threat of death. There is resistance to essentiality. Nowhere does Tillich say that existence _per se_ is synonymous with estrangement. Estrangement is identified only with the unfulfilled and recalcitrant aspects of existence. Existence and the fall "coincide," but they are not identical.[1]

After God's creative forces go out from the primordial unity to essential finitude to estranged existence, there is a return movement of love.

> The divine life is the divine self-love. Through separation _within_ himself God loves himself. And through separation _from_ himself (in creaturely freedom) God fulfills his love of himself--primarily because he loves that which is estranged from himself.[2]

The return movement, which may be called the redemptive movement, is characterized by Tillich as _agape_ love, which is "the creation of the Spirit." _Agape_ love is the love with which God loves estranged existence. _Agape_ accepts the other in spite of resistance. It suffers and

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flicts with Tillich's axiom of transcendence. It would appear that a meaningful doctrine of the fall would have to force Tillich to reconsider the part-whole schema on which his whole system rests.

[1] See Vol. I, p. 256. It is at this point that Tillich develops his view of human freedom as the ability to turn away from essentiality. This important aspect of Tillich's thought will be analyzed in the next chapter on the nature of man. We are concerned here only with that overall pattern of Tillich's ontological vision. It can be also noted here that once it is seen that existence as such is not estranged, his doctrine of Christ as essential man in actual existence does not contradict any rational principles. Christ is an exception to the "fact" of estrangement, and not an exception to logic. Christ represents an actual part that is uniquely in harmony or unity with the whole. Of course, this is a faith stance for Tillich and not an objectively proved fact.

[2] Vol. I, p. 282.

forgives. It seeks the personal fulfillment of the other.[1] God not only loves his own rational structure, "within himself," he loves the estranged centers of existence that have turned away "from himself," from their ontological source although they are "some way" still in being-itself. This is a further fulfillment of God's love because "love manifests its greatest power where it overcomes the greatest separation. And the greatest separation is the separation of self from self."[2] It is the completion of the divine love to overcome the greatest form of estrangement, namely, individual persons.[3] When estrangement is overcome "New being" is present.[4] But this is still a form of divine self-love, because it is reuniting love, a love that draws the part back into the uniting whole, a part which only thought it was not in the whole. *Agape* is "New being" when ecstatically received by the part.

In the reuniting love of the divine whole for the estranged part there are two important things to note. One is that when the part reunites with the whole the part returns "creatively enriched by existence," and not as mere essentiality or potentiality.[5] This is important because it lays an ontological foundation for a positive evaluation of existence and history.

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[1] Vol. I, p. 280

[2] Tillich, *Love, Power, and Justice*, p. 25.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 26.

[4] Cf. Vol. II, p. 119.

[5] Cf. Vol. III, pp. 400, 402. It would appear that Tillich has a twofold problem in his account of God's twofold movement. The problem on the one hand is how to reconcile his view of God's perfection conceived as transcending the distinction of potentiality and actuality,

The other consideration is that agape love requires that the individuality of the part not be lost in an undifferentiated unity of the whole. On the human plane agape love means that the individual must be respected as such, must be treated as an "end" and never merely as a means. So it is within the divine life. Agape preserves individuality, even in reunion.[1] Tillich makes this respect for individuality clear, not only by identifying agape as the content of Kant's categorical imperative,[2] but by his claim that Christianity is superior to Eastern religious traditions because it expounds "the highest form of love ..."[3] Tillich's emphasis on individuality is important because it means that the particularity of history cannot be re-absorbed in its divine origin without differentiation. Thus in Tillich's ontological approach to love a distinct vision can be seen to emerge which has implications for his view of history.

In summary, Tillich's intention to present a dynamic view of

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and the apparent "lack" conceived as the urge of non-being (love) to fulfill itself as love in creation. The other related problem is to explain how God's abysmal perfection is really perfect and complete when he admits that existence "enriches" essentiality. Since essential finitude is "within" God, this implies that God is enriched too. But if God as the "whole" is perfect, then how can the "part" as existing add enrichment to the whole? It is no answer to say that love is "symbolically" applied to God, for we have seen that he does intend positive knowledge in his doctrine of symbols. If his positive statements are contradictory, an appeal to symbols or analogy can neither hide nor solve the contradiction involved in maintaining that all potentialities are fulfilled in God. And yet some potentialities are not fulfilled in God.

[1] Tillich is adamant in his emphasis on the importance of individuality. His stress here, however, is better than the ability of his basic part-whole model to support it.

[2] Vol. III, p. 46.

[3] Tillich, Love, Power and Justice, p. 27.

ontological reality is given concrete expression in his account of love as ontologically grounded. His model of God is one viewed as an original unity (abyss) going out as creative rational power (ground) toward individualization in potentiality and actuality because the urge of love needs an object, and then returning to itself in saving love through ecstatic transformation of the estranged parts.[1] Love takes the form of self-identity, self-alteration, and return to one's self. Love is thus dialectical in nature. It proceeds by an affirming "yes" (overcoming non-being) through an estranged "no" to a reuniting "yes", (overcoming estrangement).

This kind of divine love, Tillich holds, "has roots in the innermost core of life itself."[2] It is the "blood" of life. Now that the ontological nature of love has been seen, it is possible to further substantiate our thesis that Tillich conceives of God in dynamic terms. Since love is the core of life, the analysis of love provides the background for a fuller understanding of Tillich's analysis of life and its relationship to being-itself.

c) Divine Love as the Power of Life

If our analysis is accurate, being-itself means for Tillich the power of being in all being, and the inner dynamics of the power of being in love. The "power of being" and "love" are not static concepts. If "life" can be shown to be a further meaning of being-itself, then the thesis that Tillich's synoptic vision of reality is a dynamic one should be established. To accomplish this goal we must see first what Tillich means by life and its development, and then enquire into the relationship between finite life and the divine life.

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[1] This formulation of the combination of creative power, saving love, and ecstatic transformation is substantially what Tillich means by the trinity--Father, Son, Holy Spirit. Cf. Vol. III, p. 283.

[2] Ibid., p. 134.

Tillich defines "life" in Aristotelian terms. Life is the actualization of potentialities.[1] As such, life is a universal category and applies to anything "standing out" from potentiality into existence. Life is not applied then merely to the organic realm. Since anything that exists in time and space is conceived as an actualization of a potentiality, then by definition rocks and stars are also living. The inorganic as well as the organic are both subject to different forms of genesis and decay. Why does Tillich prefer this broad definition of life in contrast to the more usual identification of life with the organic realm?

Tillich's definition of life appears to stem from the purpose of supplying an explanatory principle for the development of evolution. He contends that all life is ontologically one, that there is a "multidimensional unity of life."[2] This is his way of explaining the structures that make evolution possible. The so-called "inorganic" realm comes first, and is thus "the first condition for the actualization of every dimension."[3] But within the inorganic realm the seeds or potentialities of all the succeeding realms such as vegetation, animal, and man, are present as "powers" to become actual like an oak tree in an acorn. Following Hegel, Tillich maintains that since all the succeeding evolutionary dimensions are in the atom, then "under certain conditions, quantity becomes quality."[1] As the first dimension of life, the inorganic, includes all the evolutionary potentialities, so the "highest" dimension of life, as seen in man, has fulfilled the greatest number of potentialities. The criterion Tillich uses for establishing "higher" and "lower" dimensions of being is just this capacity "to include a maximum number of potentialities in one living actuality."[2]

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[1] Cf. Vol. III, p. 12.

[2] _Ibid_., p. 12.

[3] _Ibid_., p. 19.

But Tillich does not stop with a general definition of life as the actualization of potential being, nor with a distinction among different dimensions of life. His major concern is to describe phenomenologically the processes by which potentiality becomes actuality in the evolutionary process. He distinguishes three elements in the process of life: "self-identity, self-alteration, and return to one's self."[3] When described as actual life processes he refers to these three elements as self-integration, self-creation, and self-transcendence."[4] The meaning of these three life processes can be seen in their relation to the divine life conceived as love.

These three processes are immediately seen as similar to

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[1] Ibid., p. 19.

[2] Ibid., p. 17.

[3] Ibid., p. 30.

[4] The systematic character of Tillich's thought is seen in his identification of these three life processes with the three ontological polarities which delineate all being, namely, individualization and participation, dynamics and form, and freedom and destiny.

Tillich's description of the dialectical of love as experienced within the divine life. As God begins as an abysmal center going out in creative fulfillment and returning enriched to himself, so does each living thing begin from a center, go out creatively, and return to its center. But there is one basic difference.

While with God this dialectical process is complete, in living things there is ambiguity, that is, more risk of unfulfillment. This means that in living things there is a basic twofold problem. The finite center, on the one hand, fails or has difficulty in "going out" and increasing its content in self-creativity. This is a kind of Freudian regression or fixation in the process of maturation. The organism, for example, can no longer assimilate its food, or a human being withdraws within himself in loneliness, or cannot become creative intellectually or aesthetically. In Tillich's abstract terms, non-being overcomes being in actuality. The death of unfulfillment becomes a threat.

On the other hand, a living center may go out and not be able to "return" to its original identity. This failure to return can be seen, for example, in an organism when it is invaded by a germ it cannot throw off. "Many diseases, especially infectious ones, can be understood as an organism's inability to return to its self-identity."[1] Or in man, the inability to "return" is illustrated by extreme types of conformism and by an individual who loses himself in either secular or religious authoritarian groups. There is here a kind of Freudian return to the womb, a failure to accept personal responsibilities and anxiety. This too is an instance of what Tillich means by nonbeing overcoming being. The death of losing one's identity becomes a threat.

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[1] *Ibid*., p. 35.

The term Tillich gives to this twofold threat of death, of either failure to go out or to return, is "ambiguity." There is both the lack of fulfilled potentialities and the threat of death. The description of the threefold processes of life together with their twofold ambiguity constitutes the problem which Tillich's metaphysics attempts to answer. To state it more precisely, what can account for the presence of life conceived as the actualization of potentiality and what is the answer to the fact of ambiguity? Now that the nature and problem of finite life is seen, Tillich's metaphysical answer can be understood more fully. Such an understanding involves first an explanation of "life" as applied to God, and then an analysis of the relation between finite life and the divine life.

The dialectical nature of being-itself as love has already been noted. This provides a helpful background for our present analysis since for Tillich life and love are inseparable. The dialectical nature of love can be viewed as the inner nature of life itself.

> The dialectical method attempts to mirror the movement of reality. It is the logical expression of a philosophy of life, for life moves through self-affirmation, going out of itself, and returning to itself.[1]

It is clear that Tillich intends to apply this description of the dialectic of life, as well as love, to God. "Life itself is dialectical. If applied symbolically to the divine life, God as a living

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[1] Vol. I, p. 234.

God must be described in dialectical statements. He has the character of all life, namely, to go beyond himself and to return to himself."[1] The reason why life must be applied "symbolically" to God is that in finite life there is ambiguity and risk, but life in the divine is perfect, that is, "unambiguous."

Life in connection with the dialectical nature of "unambiguous" life means that when being-itself in self-transcendence goes out in creativity and returns to its identity, non-being is completely overcome. That is to say, God completely overcomes any urge not to "go out," and he is fully able to return to his own identity. Non-being within God may cause "tensions," but "only in the estrangement of ambiguous life do the tensions become conflicts."[2] Hence, Tillich's model of God is designed to meet the problem of estrangement or ambiguity. In the nature of God estrangement is completely overcome. The element of risk appears to be eliminated from the dialectical nature of the divine life. Unity with God means that power is given to overcome estranged parts, to provide polar harmony. The other metaphysical task is to provide a reason for the actual occurrence of life.

It appears that the same reason that the divine whole goes out in self-transcendence from his (its) original identity and creates the essential world of potentialities also holds for why life occurs, namely, divine love. If divine love needs differentiation to fulfill his self-love, and if potentialities (essence) are "creatively enriched in existence,"[1] then finite life is a further extention of the divine self-love. God is not only the ground of essential finitude, he is the "ground of life" too.[2] In Volume One this positive nature of existence is not so clear. Creation is easily interpreted as connected only with potentiality, and existence as connected with the "fall." But in Volume Three Tillich makes it clear that existence is also good (positive) in-so-far as it is fulfilled. He also connects the drive toward existential life with the love of God.

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[1] Vol. II, p. 90. Also see Vol. I, the section "God as Living," pp. 241-52.

[2] Vol. III, p. 157.

> The eternal act of creation is driven by a love which finds fulfillment only through the other one who has the freedom to reject and to accept love. God, so to speak, drives toward the actualization and essentialization of everything that has being. For the eternal dimension of what happens in the universe is the Divine life itself. It is the content of the divine blessedness.[3]

Here Tillich is saying that God's love drives toward the most complete separation to fulfill his own nature of love. The most complete separation possible is the freedom of an existing person.

To state the matter differently, in order to love himself fully God could not rest in his abysmal unity, and hence created a possible world. Still driven by love, God created the actual world which is given the capacity for freedom as a means of the divine self-enrichment. Tillich is insistent that the act of actualizing potentiality is viewed as a result of human choice. He says this to protect God against the charge of creating imperfection or estrangement directly. Yet Tillich maintains that freedom is always accompanied by the pole of destiny. Our point here is that since God "drives toward actualization" the primary thrust from essence to existence is provided by the pole of destiny which includes the ontological process resulting from God's love. Hence, God is the metaphysical reason for the actual, living world.

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[1] Vol. III, p. 402.

[2] Vol. I, p. 241.

[3] Vol. III, p. 422.

After it is clear that Tillich attributes life to God as well as the actual world, we are in a position to analyze more fully the relationship between finite life and the divine life. The divine life conceived as unambiguous life has just been shown to be the source or ground of both the potential and actual world. In creating the actual world God gives to finite centers of life the powers of creativity and self-transcendence (freedom). Finite life is thus ontologically dependent on the divine life. But what precisely is the nature of this "dependence?"

It is possible to distinguish between a weak and strong type of ontological dependence. A weak dependence means that finite centers of freedom have not always been. They are created by God and hence are ultimately dependent upon God as their source. But although ultimately dependent upon God, finite centers are distinct and ontologically separated from God. Here the notion of freedom means "ontological otherness."

A strong type of dependence, however, can be defined in terms of the part-whole relationship. Here there is no distinct ontological otherness, although there is differentiation. Tillich's position is difficult to assess because of his use of such terms as "ground" and "participation" which he does not analyze sufficiently to make his meaning clear. The problem here is that Tillich intends or describes the weak type of ontological dependence, but it is not clear how his part-whole type of ontology informs his intention. What does this mean?

Tillich appears to mean that to the degree that finite centers of life are fulfilled and thus overcome non-being, they are individualized parts of the divine life. Just as essential finitude is "within" the divine mind as created potentiality, so life as actualized is also "within" the divine life as the content of divine blessedness. This means that as finite centers of life affirm themselves, create, and express their freedom positively, they are identical with the same acts by which God affirms his life by dialectically going out and returning.

It is in this context of a part-whole relationship that Tillich's statements about prayer, for example, can be understood: "We can only pray to the God who prays to himself through us. Prayer is a possibility only insofar as the subject-object structure is overcome; hence, it is an ecstatic possibility."[1] The subject who prays, and the one spoken to are the same. There is no subject-object distinction, a fragment of the whole has been surrendered to the whole.

In other words, whenever there is fulfillment of finite life, there is enrichment of the divine life. History then has significance to God. It is life returning to the source of life. The power of all life is the power of being-itself. The fulfilling love of man toward man in history is the love with which God loves himself. Whenever finite life affirms itself, it is divine self-affirmation. God can thus be said to express his creativity and freedom through finite creativity and freedom. Or, to use a metaphor, God as the whole pours his life and love into finite forms as parts.

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[1] Vol. III, p. 120.

It is essential to note at this point, however, that the identification of finite life and the divine life holds only for instances of positive fulfillment. Tillich's identification of the divine life with what is fulfilled positively in life and history is stated explicitly. "For God cannot deny himself, and everything positive is an expression of being-itself."[1] This interpretation of the relationship between finite life and the divine life appears to result in pantheism, the view that God is all-in-all. Two important qualifications, however, must be made if Tillich's position is to be clearly understood.

One qualification is that if Tillich could be called a pantheist, he is not to be identified with any Eastern kind that loses individuality in an undifferentiated ontological ooze. His intention at this point was made clear in our analysis of love. The ontological nature of love demands individualization. The drive of being-itself conceived as the power of being in all things aims at differentiation. Agape-love demands the preservation of the individual part as a distinct part within the whole.[1]

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[1] Vol. III, p. 399.

The preservation of individuality can also be seen in other parts of Tillich's system. It is a consequence, for example, of Tillich's doctrine of the "New Being" which is "essential being under the conditions of existence conquering the gap between essence and existence."[2] In terms of our presentation, this means that the power of God as the whole is the "New Being" that drives toward life in the parts, creatively enriching the potential character of essential finitude (conceived parts in the divine mind) by adding existence (actual parts). Hence, new being fulfills, not destroys, the created essential structures of parts in all their particularity.

Furthermore, the previous chapter has shown that "ecstacy" in Tillich's doctrine of revelation fulfills rather than destroys rational structures. This means that distinctions within the whole are preserved. Hence, the doctrines of new being and ecstacy confirms the importance Tillich places on individuality.[3]

The other qualification that must be made with reference simply to calling Tillich a pantheist is that he denies it. Tillich rejects pantheism as he understands it for two reasons. The first reason is connected with his axiom of transcendence, namely, that God transcends the world, is more than the world, in his abysmal nature. Pantheism does not mean for Tillich that God is the world conceived as the totality of spatial objects. He rejects this view of pantheism, however, only because God conceived as the "totality of spatial objects" is not a good image of the whole, but no image or symbol is. Rather pantheism refers to "the creative power and unity of nature, the absolute substance which is present in everything."[1] This kind of pantheism is not totally rejected by Tillich, since being-itself for him contains a pantheistic element (the part-whole model). But although God may be conceived as the creative power in all things, he is more. God is not exhausted by his creation. He has not "poured all his creative power into a system of forms."[2] There is an inexhaustible power and unexpressible meaning in God (the whole) that transcends all forms (parts).[3]

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[1] The problem hare is whether or not the part-whole model really interprets this. What does it mean for a part to be fulfilled and still not be lost in the whole? This question cannot be answered until we examine his eschatology or doctrine of last things in Chapter Six.

[2] Vol. II, p. 119.

[3] It can also be pointed out in advance of a following chapter on Tillich's eschatology, that he speaks approvingly of the term "eschatological pan-en-theism." Panentheism is a form of pantheism which seeks to give a greater place to the individuality of the parts in the divine whole. See Vol. III, p. 421.

The second reason ~~that~~ Tillich rejects pantheism is due to his formulation of the doctrine of finite freedom. Man has been given the capacity to contradict his essential nature in God. The part, as it were, is free to become estranged (not separated) from the whole. The climax of God's love is thus seen in creating something that can resist God. Spinoza's pantheism acknowledges no "freedom in anything finite."[1] The whole problem of pantheism hinges around what kind of ontological reality Tillich gives to estranged existence. Can his part-whole model really inform or support the quality of finite freedom he "intends" to give to finite parts?

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[1] Vol. I, p. 233.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 236.

[3] In reality, however, Tillich's axiom of transcendence is hardly a safeguard against pantheism. Spinoza's doctrine of God, for example, with his "infinite" number of attributes and with only the two Cartesian substances of thought and extension (which are attributes for Spinoza) actually known, seems to contain much of the abysmal quality Tillich demands for being-itself.

It has been maintained up to now that "fulfilled" existence is a part of God. But just what is the ontological status of "estranged" existence? Since this problem centers around the nature of man, we shall expound this important point in the succeeding chapter within the larger context of Tillich's estimate of the human predicament in history.

C. Reflective Summary

To understand Tillich's grasp of the ultimate meaning of life and history it is helpful to know how he conceived the descriptive nature of ontology in general. One of the two major tasks of ontology is to describe phenomenologically the essential structures that make finitude possible. It is at this level that Tillich described the subject-object character of all being, as well as the three ontological polarities that circumscribe everything that has being. This scheme works as a foundation for Tillich's entire systematic thought. In addition to a description of essential finitude as such, Tillich is also concerned with phenomenological descriptions of various realms or of being.

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[1] Vol. I, p. 238.

The second major level of description pertains to estranged existence. A description of existence as estranged from its true essence is what Tillich means by existentialism. Existentialism presupposes some kind of "essential" structure as mentioned above, since according to Tillich, the very idea of estrangement suggests the notion of an ideal pattern from which the subject described is in some way removed. Tillich's particular descriptions of estrangement rest upon the model of an ideal polar harmony of the subject-object relation and the polar elements. The model of polarity was also seen as the reason for his view of estrangement as total.

The preceding two levels of descriptions pose the problems for which Tillich's metaphysical world-view (metaphysical ontology) attempts to give an answer. The problems raised on the two descriptive levels of philosophy are basically twofold in nature. One has to do with the ground or reason for the presence of the essential structures of the world (finitude). The other question is concerned with finding an answer for overcoming the existential disruption or estrangement from the essential and hence normative structures of finitude. The term "being-itself" is Tillich's favorite general term for indicating the kind of reality that can answer the twofold problems of finitude, although the symbol "New Being" is his systematic phrase for dealing with the problem of estrangement.

"Being-itself" has been frequently viewed as either meaningless or static. Tillich intends for the term "being-itself" to have a positive meaning. He identifies the cognitive element of his doctrine of symbolism with the Thomistic view of analogy, although he leans more to the side of equivocation (*via negativa*) than univocal literalism. Tillich insists that his doctrine of *Logos* makes positive statements about God possible, and that consequently the phrase "only a symbol" should be avoided. Tillich does not always make his positive intent clear because of his opposition to crude forms of anthropomorphism, and because his axiom of transcendence precludes any univocal descriptions of the whole. To the degree that he does intend positive meanings and a distinct world-view emerges from his writings, the charge of meaninglessness does not hold.

The other charge against the term "being-itself" is that it suggests a static view of reality. Against this charge it has been argued that Tillich *means* something dynamic when he uses being-itself as a term. This is seen in his frequent identification of "being-itself" with "the power of being in all things." The power of being is the power of overcoming the dialectical kind of non-being. Finitude (which includes non-being) is placed within the nature of being-itself. This means that God is a living God, although in God non-being is always completely overcome.

Tillich's dynamic meaning behind the term "being-itself" can further be seen in his characterization of divine love. Drawing on Hegel, Tillich defines love as "the urge toward the reunion of the separated." Tillich's ontological model becomes more concrete as he speaks of God as a kind of primordial, abysmal unity driven by love creatively toward individualization and differentiation. Hence, God creates the structures of a possible world, that is, essential finitude conceived as a part within the divine whole. But God is also the power of being behind the actualization of potentiality which is defined as life. In actual life, however, there is estrangement and ambiguity. Some potentialities are not fulfilled, and death is a constant threat. This is a result of finite freedom. The "return" movement of the divine to its identity is a movement of *agape* love in which God appears in the depths of the estranged parts in ecstatic moments of fulfillment. It is the outgoing and returning nature of love that provides the inner dynamics of life itself.

Being-itself is also dynamically conceived by Tillich as life. Life has the same dialectical outgoing and returning nature as love. Viewing life as the actualization of potentiality, Tillich distinguished three processes in all occurrences of finite life, namely; self-integration, self-creation, and self-transcendence. All finite life is ambiguous, that is, it encounters non-being which means the difficulty and often failure of both going out in self-creativity, and of returning to its center. Finite life has the same structure as the divine life, with the exception that the divine life is unambiguous and thus perfectly overcomes non-being.

Since life is ascribed to both God and the actual world the question arises concerning the relation between the two. The answer appears to be that to the degree that actual life is fulfilled and overcomes non-being, it is clearly identical with the divine life. Finite affirmation and creativity are divine affirmation and creativity. Human love is the love with which God loves himself. Both potential or essential finitude and fulfilled finitude are within the divine. The finite and the divine are related in terms of a part-whole relationship.

But two qualifications are necessary at this point. First, the ontological nature of love demands that individuality be preserved within the divine life, and not be reabsorbed into an undifferentiated unity. The second qualification is that Tillich insists that the lack of fulfillment in the finite is a result of the autonomous freedom of finite life, especially human life. It is difficult to see how the part-whole model can elucidate the freedom of parts. The question of pantheism revolves around the ontological status of "estranged" or "ambiguous" life. Since this problem is concerned mainly with the nature of man, it will be further analyzed in the following chapter.

The dynamic character of God is increasingly emphasized from Volume One to Volume Three. The static connotation to many concerning "being-itself" is not what the term means for Tillich. His dynamic concept of God is correlated with the twofold problem of arising from both essential and estranged finitude. God as the power of being because of his love created the essential nature of finitude within himself. Essential finitude is because God is. His view of God also speaks to the problem of estrangement by pointing to the power in the depths of the finite available to overcome non-being and fulfill life fragmentarily.

The chief difficulty with Tillich's ontology is not that God or being-itself is either meaningless or static. The problem is whether or not he is consistent. On the one hand God is described as impassible and complete, beyond potentiality and actuality. On the other hand, God is described as the epitome of agape, lacking and desiring, and achieving enrichment through his creation. He still clings to the Greek categories of the Absolute conceived as impassible, unchanging, unconditioned, and complete, although the thrust of his descriptions of God increasingly involve the notions of temporality and conditioning. But these two concepts are not only different, they are inconsistent. God is either suffering love, or he is impassible. He is either unconditioned, or he is conditioned by life and history. Although Tillich describes his own life and thought as "living on the border," and although he tries to synthesize conflicting positions, he does not accomplish an Hegelian "aufgehoben" in his dual ontology. God is conceived primarily as dynamic in Tillich's writings, yet he holds on to the old wine skins of classical ontology which cannot contain the new wine of process ontology. These two ontological schools appear to be more juxtaposed than synthesized.

In Chapter Two it was found that Tillich demanded certainty in knowledge, but failed to acknowledge adequately the interpretative and hence uncertain elements that appeared in his axioms of transcendence and harmony. So now his ideal of perfection in metaphysics is not consistent with his dynamic meaning of being-itself. Possibly the direction necessary to avoid these criticism would be to acknowledge openly the interpretative and hence hypothetical aspects of all human thought, including metaphysics, and to affirm that God is the source of all the power there is, but not to have an unyielding preconception of the nature of this power.

In terms of philosophy of history, three important suggestions which need further analysis arise from this chapter. From Tillich's vision of ultimate meaning one might expect Tillich to say that history has axiological content, that history contains an immanent purpose, and that history has a transhistorical goal.

First, history is a place in which normative values appear and are rationally discoverable. This would seem to follow from Tillich's understanding of philosophy in terms of descriptive ontology. History has dependable or essential values. Yet history also contains disvalue, evil, or what Tillich calls "estrangement." The relationship between normative or ideal values, and human estrangement and freedom is examined in Chapter Four.

The second implication of Tillich's metaphysics is suggested by his view of being-itself conceived in terms of love and life in dialectical process. Although the part-whole model presupposed by Tillich, combined with his axiom of transcendence, precludes any univocal description of the whole, it has been shown that his vision "intends" to portray a dynamic reality unfolding itself within the historical process, and in particular, one working toward wholeness, harmony, and fulfillment. Such a view of immanent teleology is suggested also by Tillich's axiom of harmony. It remains to be seen in Chapter Five just what Tillich means by maintaining that God is manifested in history.

The third element of Tillich's philosophy of history that arises from this chapter is suggested by his view of God's inexhaustible power and agape love. Given such a view of God, it is reasonable to suppose that history has an ultimate goal or purpose, that is, a transhistorical telos. God not only works within history, but also moves toward some ultimate fulfillment. God "wills" fulfillment because of his nature as agape-love, and achieves it through inexhaustible power. If this is so, then just what is this goal? Moreover, does this goal add to or detract from the values that arise within the historical process? In other words, does Tillich's view of the ultimate destiny of history support a positive evaluation of history, or does it result in an other-worldly denial of the importance of what occurs in history. Here is the problem of the relation between time and eternity. Chapter Six treats this issue. Chapter Seven will contain a summary of our interpretation and evaluations of Tillich's philosophy of history.

CHAPTER IV

HISTORY AND THE HUMAN CONDITION

History is concerned with what occurs in human experience. Mankind is the content of history, especially man in groups. But since the group in many ways is the individual writ large, it will be instructive to consider Tillich's account of the distinctive characteristics of man.

Tillich's approach to the human condition can be made clearer by contrasting his view of man with Sigmund Freud and Karl Marx. The approach here should not be confused with any attempt to defend either Tillich's interpretation or criticisms of these men, but only to elucidate his own position. Freud and Marx are thus used as a background against which some of the highlights of Tillich's interpretation of man and his situation can be more clearly distinguished. We begin first with Freud.

A. Tillich's Critique of Freud's View of Man

The last chapter presented Tillich's belief that a description of human estrangement implies a view of what constitutes the healthy and whole man, that is, a theory of what man is essentially or truly. Tillich is indebted to Freud's description of the human predicament, that is, of human estrangement and the death urge.[1]

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[1] Cf. Vol. II, pp. 53-55.

His criticism of Freud, however, is that his analysis of man is one of human estrangement without adequate attention to a model of what man ought to be. Freud lacked a theory of the criteria and ontological resources for healing, that is, a theory of man's essential nature. He is too pessimistic in theory at least.

> Freud did not see that his description of human nature is adequate for man only in his existential predicament but not in his essential nature. The endlessness of libido is a mark of man's estrangement. It contradicts his essential or created goodness.[1]

The impact of this criticism is not so much against the insights Freud had into man's problem. Rather Freud is criticized for what he failed to say. The full meaning of this criticism can be spelled out in four distinct areas of contrast.

1. Freud's Failure to See the Multidimensional Aspects of Man.

Tillich views man as the highest achievement of the evolutionary process. What is potential in evolution becomes actual in man. Man represents a further step in Nature, yet carrying with him all prior dimensions. Since God drives toward individualization, as indicated in Chapter Three, evolution can be seen as an actualization of this aim. Aristotle is right in viewing individual beings as "the *telos*, the inner aim, of the process of actualization."[2] Mankind represents the highest stage of "centeredness." It has already been observed that all life processes begin from an identity, an individual center. Animals are a high form of conscious life. But individualization reaches its climax in man. What is so different about man?

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[1] Vol. II, p. 54. See also, *Theology of Culture*, p. 119.

[2] Vol. I, p. 174.

Some time ago at no identifiable moment through a combination of slow transformation and sudden leap man emerged in the evolutionary process. The psychological self (center of awareness) became a personal self, which Tillich calls the dimension of "spirit." Spirit is defined by Tillich in Hegelian terms as the "unity of power and meaning."[1] This means that man as an active agent (power) is different in that he can discover and create cognitive, aesthetic, moral, and religious meanings (values). The realization of these kinds of values is made possible by the unique kind of "unity" man possesses. An animal may sense, remember, desire, and imagine. But the "unity" in man enables him to be aware of his own immediate experiences and to relate them to ideal values. Man as subject becomes aware of himself as object, and as such becomes aware of his aims and goals. While there can be self-hood (identity) in atoms even, "man is a fully developed and completely centered self. He 'possesses' himself in the form of self-consciousness. He has an ego-self."[2] Self-consciousness, then, is for Tillich the highest form of individualization toward which being-itself aims.

Now that man is seen as an evolutionary product capable of self-consciousness, Tillich's concept of man as a multidimensional unity takes on meaning. The multidimensional unity of life means that "all dimensions of life are potentially or actually present in each dimension," with the result that "happenings under the predominance of one dimension must imply happenings in other dimensions."[1] Tillich illustrated his meaning of man as a multidimensional unity by relating it to the psychosomatic emphasis in medicine with its corresponding stress on the attempt to heal the whole man and not just the body alone.[2] What this emphasis on man's multidimensional unity amounts to with reference to Freud is that Tillich is insisting that man is more than the sum of his physiological needs as found in the pleasure-seeking libido.

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[1] Vol. III, p. 22.

[2] Vol. I, pp. 169-170.

Although Tillich opposed a puritanical and ascetic repression of physical vitality for the sake of the spirit, and even insisted that erotic elements are not absent in the highest expressions of man's mind,[3] he believed contrary to Freud that there are distinctively human needs that arise from the emergence of self-consciousness. Tillich does not formulate a specific list of such non-physiological needs. While a fuller discussion of Tillich's theory of values is forthcoming, it can be pointed out here that his emphasis on man's capacity to reason, to express himself aesthetically, to love with agape-love, and to worship, all point in the direction of distinctive human needs and capacities. Although Freud correctly observed the physical continuity between nature (animals) and man, he did not adequately acknowledge the discontinuity or distinct human needs.

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[1] Vol. III, p. 276. Tillich's view of the multidimensional unity of man has implications for the mind-body problem. His answer to how psychical and physical activities could be related is threefold. First, he denies Cartesian dualism by saying mind and body are related to each other in terms of potentiality and actuality. Since the mind is in the body potentially, they are not so radically different. Secondly, since the subject and object are polarities and are never really separated, as was shown in Chapter Two, mental and physical activities are merely distinguishable processes within a gestalt. Thirdly, since both mind and body have a common ontological source which expresses itself in both subjective and objective reason, there is an identity of rationality between them that makes a psycho-physical interrelation possible.

[2] Ibid., p. 277.

[3] Ibid., p. 240.

In a word, there are psychic and physical needs that are distinguishable but not separable from man's bodily (sexual in the broad sense) needs and capacities. To describe man as dominated by an insatiable quest for pleasure through satisfying the bodily needs for hunger, thirst, and sex is to describe man as estranged from his true multidimensional nature.[1] The libido interpreted in terms of the pleasure-principal is a description of concupiscence or lust. In human relations, for example, Freud described the perverted desire to want one's own pleasure by using or possessing another person, but omitted the possibility of loving another person with respect for the other's individuality and need for fulfillment.

Freud's description of what Tillich calls "concupiscence" suggests another basic difference. Freud viewed other people and society too dualistically and negatively as a threat to the pleasure-seeking demands of the id. Tillich is more dialectical and positive in his attitude toward society.

2. Freud's Failure to Understand Man's Social Nature.

Freud viewed the self and other selves dualistically. There is a radical gap between an individual and society. Although Tillich does not make the comparison, Freud might be compared with Hobbes' atomistic conception of man.[1] Society is therefore viewed negatively as an obstacle to the libidinous id, that is, it represses the individual, sets up blocks to the individual's legitimate self-expression which results in feelings of hostility and aggression.[2] While the individual is afraid to incur the wrath of society by freely expressing his aggressiveness, Freud envisioned man as working cunningly to achieve his own selfish aims through various kinds of control such as repression, substitution, and sublimation.

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[1] Tillich would also criticize Freud's psychological hedonism by maintaining that what man seeks on the physical plane is not pleasure as such, but rather "union with that which fulfils the desire." Tillich, Love, Power, and Justice, p. 29.

In contrast to Freud's negative attitude toward society, Tillich follows the Aristotelian view of man as a political or social animal. Society is not necessarily built on mutual fear or repression. A society may demand too much conformism, excite fear, and neglect the individual, but then something is wrong with the society. Essentially, society is necessary for the realization of human potentiality. An individual becomes a person normatively only in encounter with other persons. Tillich's emphasis on man's social nature, in response to Freud, can be seen in his phenomenological descriptions of essential finitude.

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[1] Norman O. Brown, an interpreter of Freud, acknowledges the dualistic or atomistic tendencies in Freud's though. "One can see Freud's thought inhibited by a conception of Self and Other as mutually exclusive alternatives." LifemAgainst Death (Middletown, Connecticut: Wesleyan University Press, 1959), p. 50.

[2] This is not to say that society is the sole cause of man's difficulties for Freud, since he also finds within the individual a diseased consciousness as seen in the death urge.

Tillich's view of man as social is really an elaboration of his phenomenological description of the polar nature of the basic self-world structure. The object is never a complete stranger. An individual is always a man-in-the-world, and other persons comprise part of the objective world in the subject-object gestalt.

A possible illustration of the social implications of Tillich's phenomenological approach, in which he describes the structures at the point where subject and object meet, can be found in the development of a baby. A baby grows from an undifferentiated unity between his body and his environment, through a gradual ability to make distinctions "within" his experience, to an increased sense of individuality which makes possible the concept of the world or nature as complete, separated, and "out there." A child thus becomes increasingly aware of himself as the subject of his experiences. There is a gradual process of achieving self-awareness and differentiating between "me" and "not me." But what about the last stage of separation? Is it reality or mere appearance?

Tillich appears to call the last stage of complete separation an illusion. When two people encounter each other it does not necessarily involve a sense of separation. They can, for example, be aware of each other and of what happens between them without objectifying each other in a subject-object separation. There is possible a kind of immediacy, one which is prior to the effort of thought to separate. Within the immediacy distinctions are made, just as it is possible to put on one's shoes in the morning without thinking about it, or to eat and read the newspaper without thinking about eating. A person is aware of doing these things, but does not think about them. The immediacy is broken once he reflects about what he is doing or formulates it in words. Observe here that it is not the distinctions between subject and object that are denied by Tillich, since the subject-object distinction per se is called good by creation. The subject-object split is only estranged when through reflection the other person is thought of as completely separated and is not acknowledged as an integral fragment and part of one's immediacy.[1] Now what is the relevance of Tillich's polar description of the subject-object split to man's social nature?

The result of Tillich's emphasis on the polar nature of subject and object is that an individual needs others as a basis for distinguishing his own individuality. The "me" needs the "not me" to break out of his shell of undifferentiated unity. As Narcissus needed the pool (mirror) to see himself, or as Being-itself needs to create a world to fulfill its nature as love, so the ego becomes an "I" only through its encounter with a "Thou" that limits him. This need of the individual for society in order to become a person is stressed, for example, in Tillich's first ontological polarity, individualization and participation. In the dimension of human spirit this polarity is expressed in terms of solitude and communion. One implies the other, and the extinction of one results in the extinction of both. Although self-consciousness (complete centeredness) in man makes solitude possible, yet love as the dynamics of life drives him toward the group. Without the dimension of the ultimate, solitude can become loneliness, and communion can become submergence. Freud saw man's loneliness and subjection. But this is when the polar relation between solitude and communion is disrupted or estranged. But when there is polar harmony the perfection of the individual involves the perfection of society, and vice versa. One requires the other. "Only he who is able to have solitude is able to have communion."[1] And a person is "unable to have communion because he is unable to have solitude."[2] What Freud lacked, according to Tillich, was the distinction between "essential" solitude and communion, and "existential" loneliness and aggressive hostility.[3]

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[1] To be aware of other people as part of one's own nature sounds something like subjectivism or solipsism. Tillich's reply to this, however, was given in effect in the last chapter in which the process of individualization was given an ontological ground in being-itself.

The importance of the "essential" structures in contrast to Freud's description of "estranged" or existential structures is particulary forceful in Tillich's application of the second ontological polarity to man. The polarity of dynamics and form appears in man as the poles ofvvitality and intentionality. A discussion of this polarity involves the relation of man to the realm of values.

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[1] Vol. II, p. 71.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 72.

[3] Another possible contrast between Tillich and Freud can be seen in Tillich's stress on the contribution of groups and society to man's self-understanding. Freud stressed the importance of the family and the father-image. The tenor of Tillich's thought indicates that he would stress rather the importance of the social unity as the primal and determining influence on the family. Family relationships are naturally important, but the pattern of society is expressing itself through the socially prescribed structures of the family. To the degree that the father-image represents the community for Freud, the difference of this point in minimal.

3. Freud Failure to see Man's Relation to Ontologically Grounded Values.

Freud's description of man in terms of an insatiable id striving in any way to become satisfied results in the "drive toward death," "the desire to get rid of himself as man."[1] The id does not relate itself to reason, and is committed to no values but its own craving. Man is thus driven solely by the pleasure-principle welling up from his inmost nature. In Tillich's terms, this means that the Freudian description of the id acknowledges only the pole of vitality and ignores man's capacity to discover and create ideal values. Vitality needs to be balanced by the pole of intentionality which exhibits man's *eros* or urge toward values like truth, justice, and humanity as well as sex. "In Freud's thought there is no creative *eros* which includes sex."[2] How does Tillich describe such a balance?

Man, according to Tillich, is essentially composed of both vitality and intentionality. What do these terms mean? Vitality is the power of life and includes both the drive for self-preservation and self-transcendence. Self-transcendence means that man's power is directed beyond both the biological needs of nature and man's own purely self-regarding interests. Vitality is conjoined with the pole of intentionality. Intentionality means "'being directed toward meaningful contents.' Man lives 'in' meanings, in that which is valid logically, esthetically, ethically, religiously."[3] Intentionality means that in man Freud's biologically determined id is channelled into the quest for "meanings."

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[1] Vol. II, p. 54.

[2] *Ibid.*

[3] Tillich, *The Courage To Be*, pp. 81-82.

It should be observed that Tillich frequently speaks about "meanings" instead of "values" to avoid being classified as either a Platonic absolutist or a pragmatist relativist.[1] His position is a mediating one. He agrees with the pragmatists that values must be grounded in life processes, but insists that a phenomenological description of the human situation can point to probable structures or norms within life that can best actualize the fullest potentialities of man, given the kind of world we have. Insight into his theory of values, as well as into the relationship between vitality and intentionality, can be found as we turn to his ethics of love.

A fundamental illustration of Tillich's conjoining of vitality and intentionality is seen in his description of agape-love as the normative principle of ethical values. Love, as was indicated in the last chapter, is essentially "the drive towards the unity of the separated."[2] Normative or essential love for Tillich is a combination of eros and agape. It is a love which desires (eros) unity with objects (libido or epithymia) in terms of vital self-fulfilment, unity with ideal values such as truth and beauty, and unity with other persons (philia).[3] But eros without the quality of agape is perverted love, a love which tries to possess and dominate for selfish ends. Agape-love does not destroy other qualities of love, but it frees libido from the tyranny of the pleasure-principle; frees eros from its sexual distortion and possessiveness; and removes from philia the tendency to treat other people merely as means to one's own satisfaction. Agape-love sees other persons as God sees them, namely, with respect for their individuality and intrinsic worth and desire for fulfillment.[1] Agape-love is thus not one of unlimited desire, but one that acknowledges the limits set by the other's individuality. Moreover, to affirm the reality and meet the needs of another person is always to affirm one's own essential self as a social animal. How does Tillich relate his concept of love to ethics?

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[1] Vol. I, pp. 19-20.

[2] Tillich, Love, Power and Justice, p. 25.

[3] Ibid., pp. 30-31.

Eros qualified by agape becomes for Tillich the absolute content of Kant's categorical imperative. Tillich interprets the categorical imperative to mean the unconditional character of the "ought" to be."[2] Love is thus man's essential nature, the way he ought to be. Man is obliged to love, not because it is some external, heteronomous law imposed on his nature. Love has the quality of unconditioned oughtness because it expresses man's own true nature. If the question is raised why one should follow one's true nature, the further answer implied in Tillich's ontology is that man's true nature is part of being-itself and hence has cosmic backing. But how is love or oughtness related to one's concrete decisions? Does agape-love as the ontologically grounded ethical norm give any guidance in the selection of particular values to be realized? How is love concretely related to moral laws?

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[1] Tillich would reject Anders Nygren's sharp dualism between eros and agape. Although Nygren acknowledges that eros includes concern for "higher" values, he equates eros with selfish calculating love and maintains that there is no place for eros in agape. Agape-love for Nygren is always a giving love, never seeking love. Nygren thus draws the line too sharply for Tillich between motivated and unmotivated love, Tillich distinguishes, as does Eric Fromm, between natural self-affirmation (loving the neighbor as one's self) and selfish or egocentric love (possessiveness). See Love, Power and Justice, p. 34. Nygren's classic work is Agape and Eros (London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, trans. by Philip. S. Watson), 1953.

[2] Tillich, Theology of Culture, p. 135.

For Tillich all moral rules are historically conditioned.

> Tables of laws can never wholly apply to the unique situation. This is true of the Ten Commandments as well as the demands of the Sermon on the Mount and the moral prescriptions in the Epistles of Paul.[1]

There are moral rules of wisdom gained from the heritage of the past. But all moral guideposts passed on from tradition must be judged by the absolute moral standard of agape-love, by their ability to lead to the actualization of the maximum amount of human potentialities possible in a given situation or period. Thus, agape-love can either reject or utilize any moral tradition according to the concrete demands of each unique situation.

In the name of love Tillich rejects, for example, the legalistic, unconditional binding power of marriage vows. Divorce is better in some situations than remaining married. In the context of the subject of marriage and divorce, Tillich says that "agape is not only the absolute principle but also the flexible principle."[2] Although Tillich respected the wisdom of tradition, he believed that agape-love liberates one from bondage to absolute ethical traditions and conventional morality. Agape-love is thus related to moral rules as their ground or justification. Agape-love is also the principle by which traditions of moral rules are replaced or temporarily suspended in light of unique situations.

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[1] Paul Tillich, Morality and Beyond (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1963), p. 43.

[2] D. Mackenzie Brown, Ultimate Concern: Tillich in Dialogue (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1965), p. 196.

Now what does the previous consideration of moral values imply about man's nature that Freud failed to see? Freud as a psychotherapist tried to heal his patients when they were in trouble. He would try to assess objectively the patient's problem and effect a cure. Here it would seem that Freud adhered to both the scientific ideal of objectivity as well as to some kind of model of what the person ought to be. But without the pole of intentionality, Tillich would say, Freud had no theoretical basis for preferring either scientific disinterestedness or his own healing art. To make the matter worse, to the degree that Freud attempted to move his patient away from his own self-seeking id to the reality principle of other regarding interests, Freud contradicted his own view of human nature which provided no place for any kind of altruistic motives.[1]

In contrast to Freud, Tillich's account of intentionality as illustrated in his ethical principle of agape-love is an attempt to acknowledge both self-regarding and other-regarding motives in human nature, and to show that they are compatible because in affirming the life of another person one is affirming one's own essential nature.

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[1] Tillich called Freud inconsistent in his attempt to heal. "In popular terms, his pessimism about the nature of man and his optimism about the possitibities of healing were never reconciled in him [Freud] or his followers." Theology of Culture, p. 120.

> The other person is a stranger, but a stranger only in disguise. Actually he is an estranged part of one's self. Therefore one's own humanity can be realized only in reunion with him—a reunion which is also decisive for the realization of his humanity.[1]

An account of Tillich's view of man's true nature as agape-love is incomplete, however, without considering his view of man's essential freedom. Ethical values presuppose a doctrine of human freedom. Again Tillich's description of man provides another contrast to the Freudian view of man.

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[1] Vol. III, p. 261. It is instructive to note in Tillich's analysis of agape-love, that agape alone is not viewed as a love springing from abundance. Eros is always the foundation, that is, love as need or lack. But when eros and agape are united in the divine life, there is an overflow in creativity. This is true in his view of both divine and human love.

4. Freud's Failure to Describe Man's Essential Freedom

Freud's analysis of man results in what one commentator called "the dictatorship of the unconscious."[1] Freud postulated the unconscious as a hypothesis for explaining what otherwise seemed unexplainable. He gave it such a power that man's reasoning powers (ego) which enable him to adjust to his environment were virtually subservient to it. He hypostasized the unconscious as the hidden cause behind even the most innocently appearing actions. Freud's doctrine of the unconscious, coupled with his belief in the essential formation of character before the age of six, leaves little room for the belief in human freedom conceived in terms of the ability to execute action in the direction of self-chosen goals. Tillich would consider Freud's deterministic description of the human situation an accurate account of a neurotic or psychotic person, but not of man's essential nature. What then constitutes man's essential freedom according to Tillich?

Tillich's account of human freedom is described in terms of the third and last ontological pplarity--freedom and destiny. It will aid in the understanding of Tillich's doctrine of freedom to ascertain first critically what Tillich means by human freedom, and then inquire, as promised in Chapter Three, into how his view of freedom fits into his metaphysics. Following these considerations we shall point up what Tillich's view of human freedom means in terms of philosophy of history.

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[1] Andrew Salter, The Case Against Psychoanalysis (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1952), p. 14.

Tillich believes "man is the telos (aim) of creation."[1] because, as it has been indicated, through his self-comsciousness and freedom man represents the greatest degree of individualization through which the divine life can be fulfilled.

> The divine life is the divine self-love. Through the separation within himself God loves himself. And through the separation from himself (in creaturely freedom) God fulfills his love of himself—primarily because he loves that which is estranged from himself.[2]

Our problem now is to analyze what the phrase "separation from himself (in creaturely freedom)" means. What is the ontological nature of the separation "from" suggested here? The answer to this question can be found best (a) by noting how Tillich appears to defend both freedom and determinism without really harmonizing them, (b) by analyzing more predisely the psychological process involved in Tillich's description of human freedom, and (c) by distinguishing between two kinds of freedom that are not adequately differentiated throughout Tillich's works.

a) Arguments for both Freedom and Determinism.

In the process of relating freedom and destiny in terms of a polarity in which one implies the other,[3] Tillich, in effect, ends by arguing for both freedom and determinism. Hs is a determinist, on the one hand, and not a determinist, on the other hand. His approach, however, does not hang together. Although the notion of polarity appears to be a solution on the surface, in reality Tillich merely states both sides of the freedom question without uniting them. Observe (1) several ways in which Tillich defends the belief in human freedom and then (2) some of his arguments which appear to be on the side of determinism.

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[1] Vol. I, p. 258.

[2] Vol. I, p. 282.

[3] See Vol. I, pp. 182-86.

(1) Tillich defends the Belief in Human Freedom.—Tillich offers several arguments for freedom that frequently appear in philosophical literature. First, he says that human freedom is required to account for the feeling of moral responsibility. In Kantian fashion, he maintains that moral responsibility implies that man can freely accept or reject valid moral claims:

> One can also say that man is able to respond to these commands and that this ability is what makes him responsible. Every moral act is a responsible act, a response to a valid command, but man can refuse to respond.[1]

Second, human freedom is a basic ingredient of human history. History cannot be accounted for mechanistically. Man has the capacity to transcend the push of the past, and to formulate and pursue purposes.

> He [man] is not bound to the situation in which he finds himself, and it is just this self-transcendence that is the first and basic quality of freedom. Therefore, no historical situation determines any other historical situation completely.[2]

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[1] Vol. II, p. 39.

[2] Ibid., p. 303.

Third, man's capacity for freedom or self-transcendence is presupposed in his intellectual pursuit of truth. If every thought were determined completely, there could be no possible "decision" between truth and falsehood. The determinist presupposes freedom when he tries to persuade others of the truth of determinism by rational arguments.

> The determinist does not see that the very affirmation of determinism as true presupposes the freedom of decision between truth and false . . .[1]

Fourth, human freedom is an ontological requirement for the fulfillment of the Divine Life. Tillich believes that "the eternal act of creation is driven by a love which finds fulfillment only through the other one who has the freedom to reject and to accept love."[2] In other words, human freedom is a requirement of Tillich's speculative philosophy.

(2) Tillich defends Deterministic tenets.—In contrast to his arguments for freedom, Tillich defends some deterministic ideas, but without adequately reconciling them with his arguments for freedom. Three illustrations will suffice to show this incongruity in Tillich's thought. First, he observes that legal and moral thought have found it difficult to know precisely the limits of responsibility because of such factors as lack of maturity, fatigue, intoxication, and physical and mental illness. Thus, "one cannot decide at which points in the development of the human individual responsibility begins and ends."[3] Yet, in

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[1] Vol II, pp. 200-201

[2] Vol. III, p. 422.

[3] Vol. II, p. 42.

spite of this, Tillich boldly says, "All this does not remove responsibility, but it shows the element of destiny in every act of freedom."[1] The term "destiny" is not equated by Tillich with determinism or fatalism. Yet part of his ambiguity lies in using the term "destiny" to accommodate some arguments given by determinists without showing clearly how the belief in freedom is compatible with the determinist's claims. He offers no explanation of why "all this does not remove responsibility." He just affirms it.

Second, with stronger evidence for determinism, he unqualifyingly accepts the emphasis of psychoanalysis on the "unconscious and its determining power in man's conscious decisions."[2] Tillich apparently accepts fully the strong influence of unacknowledged motives in the form of bodily and psychic strivings on what appears on the surface to be wholly free and rational acts. He does not attempt to show, however, how man's moral responsibility and capacity for truth remains if his moral and intellectual decisions are governed by unconscious strivings. Nor is it evident why history does not proceed mechanistically by means of unconscious motivation. Without even attempting to reconcile the obvious tension between the dominance of the unconscious and human freedom, Tillich simply says of an unconsciously motivated decision that "such a decision is still free, but it is freedom within the limits of destiny."[1]

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[1] _Ibid._

[2] _Ibid._

Third, Tillich not only affirms that man is determined by bodily and psychic strivings within, his personal decisions are also influenced by both the conscious and unconscious forces of society from without.

> The centered self is dependent not only on the influences of its social surroundings which are consciously given and received but also on those which are effective in a society without being apprehended and formulated.[2]

Tillich offers no explanation of how "polarity" between freedom and destiny actually operates to make freedom still possible in light of the determining influences of the "collective unconscious."

Finally, Tillich's failure to reconcile determinism and freedom is seen in his view that estrangement unavoidably accompanies human freedom.

> Actualization of one's potentialities includes, unavoidably, estrangement; estrangement from one's essential being, so that we may find it again in maturity.[3]

This statement is tantamount to saying that man is not free not to sin. It is unavoidable that man rejects valid moral claims, that he refuses love. Such a position does not harmonize with his belief that human freedom implies the capacity to either accept or reject valid moral claims such as truth and love. It is also not apparent how the unavoidability of estrangement is consistent with his claim that Jesus as the Christ actually and totally avoided human estrangement.[1]

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Tillich, Love, Power, and Justice, p. 112. Observe also his statement: "Actualized creation and estranged existence are identical." Vol. II, p. 44.

The preceding passages provide some grounds for holding that Tillich did not adequately formulate a meaningful doctrine of human freedom. He offered strong arguments for both determinism and the belief in genuine human freedom, but without synthesizing them coherently. His arguments on both sides of the problem seem to be merely juxtaposed, not reconciled. Thus, the nature of man's"separation from God in creaturely freedom" is far from clear at this point. Further light can be thrown on the problem of Tillich's understanding of the nature of human freedom by analyzing in more detail the psychological process involved in human freedom.

a) The Psychological Description of Freedom.

Tillich's description of man's freedom involves a structural polarity between freedom and destiny. On the destiny side, Tillich makes it clear that no one is absolutely free in his choices and that some persons have greater possibilities than others because of their qualitatively richer destinies. There is a complex of forces at work in the individual at any moment "formed by nature, history and myself."[2] A person is formed by heredity, environment, and by his previous decisions. A human being shares the element of destiny with all natural "things," and if man is considered merely as another "thing" then determinism would be the correct answer. Indeterminism is accordingly wrong to the extent that it ignores man's conditioning and defines freedom as "aadecision without motivation" or some "unintelligible accident."[1] Man is thus more than a determined "thing" and yet freedom must be described in a way that is compatible with the scientific evidence that indicates man's concrete conditioning. Tillich attempts to meet these conditions by describing freedom as the complementary pole to destiny.

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[1] Vol. II, p. 126.

[2] Vol. I, p. 185.

The pole of freedom has three distinguishing elements.[2] The first is deliberation. "Deliberation points to an act of weighing (librare) arguments and motives." There is no freedom possible until a person is mature enough to think of different possibilities. Without this the person would simply be swept by the most dominant desire or external pressure. But once the individual is aware of different alternatives, the second element of "decision" comes to the foreground. Given the capacity of self-consciousness (self-centeredness) the person "reacts as a whole" and cuts off some real possibilities by actualizing one of them. Decision then leads to the third element of responsibility which "points to the obligation of the person who has freedom to respond if he is questioned about his decision."[3] He has acted from the "centered totality of his being" and can therefore ask no one else to answer for him.

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[1] Ibid., p. 184.

[2] Ibid., p. 184.

[3] Ibid. p. 184.

Now this threefold description of freedom undoubtedly suggests some of the primary experienced elements of what is usually referred to as "free will." Tillich prefers the phrase "human freedom" to "free will" to avoid any connection with the notion of a "faculty" at work rather than the whole person reacting to his situation. But does a description of freedom in such a manner really get at the problem? Does Tillich really harmonize the poles of freedom and destiny, or does he describe both and merely juxtapose them?

Take a concrete example. A fourteen year old girl resents her mother's influence in practically all of her decisions. The mother has been divorced for two years and must work outside the home. The girl had a very poor relationship with her father when they were living together. She is convinced herefather does not love her, and suspects her mother doesn't either because the mother presumably shows favoritism to the younger sister, and according to the daughter, "uses" the rebellious daughter as a baby sitter. The girl is taken to be a counsellor who tries to help her understand herself better and points out other alternatives to her besides her hostile approach. At this point the girl confronts other "alternatives" but "decides" to remain hostile. She is also willing to "respond" when questioned by giving her reasons. This is where Tillich's analysis seems to bring us.

But the real problems have not as yet been met. The problem is whether or not the daughter could possibly have any other choice. Was her whole life so shaped by lack of affection that no other possibility but hostility remained? According to Freud, from a very early age she resented her mother as a competitor to her father, felt her mother was responsible for her lack of a male sex organ, and probably held her mother responsible for driving her father away from her. The point is that this girl could have "felt" the three elements in Tillich's description of freedom and still have been determined. What could Tillich have done to make his case for freedom more convincing?

Tillich's analysis of human freedom lacks two basic distinctions. The first helpful distinction would be to distinguish the different felt quality of experience between wanting and willing.[1] Tillich acknowledges that for the determinist to say that the dominant desire always wins is "an empty tautology, since the test by which a motive is proved stronger is simply that it prevails."[2] But he makes no clear distinctions whereby the feeling tone of a dominant desire and an act of will can be distinguished.[3] To be specific, could the girl in our illustration "will" an ideal of action that is qualitatively different from her felt hostility? Was it possible for her to "will" something which was contrary to her emotionally colored desires? This leads to a second needed distinction.

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[1] For an analysis of freedom which incorporates the distinctions made here for which this writer is indebted, see Peter A. Bertocci, Richard M. Millard, Personality and the Good (New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1963) Chapter 8 "The Nature of Human Freedom," pp. 175-197.

[2] Vol. I, p. 184.

[3] It could possibly be argued that Tillich makes this distinction in the following passage: "He alone must respond, for his acts are determined neither by something outside him nor by any part of him but by the centered totality of his being." Vol. I, p. 184. If deciding by the "centered totality" of one's being is Tillich's phrase for an act of will that is distinct from a dominant desire within, then our criticism does not hold. Unfortunately Tillich does not translate such terms as "centered totality" or "centered freedom" into more commonly accepted psychological terminology. In any case, Tillich fails to make clear sufficiently the important distinction between dominant desire and an act of will.

If it is granted that one can "will" some approved ideal, such as not hating one's mother, and that this is qualitatively different from one's emotionally colored negative feelings and aversions toward her, the distinction can be made further between "willing" it and actually "acting" fully in accordance with one's ideal. The prior act of "willing" may run into such difficulty with "wanting" that one's power for action will fail fully to carry through what is willed. At this point it is clear that the complexity of one's "destiny" is an important factor. There is a difference between being free to will or resolve to act in a certain way, and in being able to carry out one's resolution in repeated actions. Previous habit patterns, the subterranean desires of the unconscious, and many other factors must be taken into consideration. The problem of human freedom seems to hinge around the ability of a person to rise above his desires and will some approved ideal, and then execute at least "some" change in his circumstance that "desires" alone cannot explain. Tillich's failure to make these distinctions in his anaylsis of freedom makes it difficult to know for sure just how human freedom is any different in kind from the greater degree of modifiability found in animals. To complicate the matter even further, Tillich appears to be talking about two different kinds of freedom that are not always sharply distinguished.

c) Two Kinds of Freedom.

Freedom means many things for Tillich. A summary of the many elements involved in finite freedom is given by Tillich as follows:

> Man is free, in-so-far as he has language. With his language, he has universals which liberate him from bondage to the concrete situation to which even the highest animals are subjected. Man is free, in-so-far as he is able to ask questions about the world he encounters, including himself, and to penetrate into the deeper and deeper levels of reality. Man is free, in so far as he can receive unconditional moral and logical imperatives which indicate that he can transcend the conditions which determine every finite being. Man is free, in so far as he has the power of deliberating and deciding, thus cutting through the mechanisms of stimulus and response. Man is free, in so far as he can play and build imaginary structures above the real structures to which he, like all beings, is bound. Man is free, in so far as he has the faculty of creating the worlds above the givenworld, of creating the world of technical tools and products, the world of artistic expressions, the world of theoretical structures and practical organizations. Finally, man is free, in so far as he has the power of contradicting himself and his essential nature. Man is free even from his freedom; that is, he can surrender his humanity.[1]

In all these aspects of freedom, except the last one, man's creativity or power to go out from himself in self-transcendence is stressed. These aspects express positive powers of fulfillment. To the degree that these potentialities are fulfilled they represent what is here called "material freedom." Material freedom means the fulfillment of potentialities as stressed, for example, by Hegel. The last kind of freedom indicated in Tillich's summary as man's power to contradict or go against his own potentialities can be designated as "formal freedom" as stressed, for example, by Kant.[2]

To the degree that anything fulfills its capacities, even a tree or an animal, it can be called materially free, that is, free from impediments. According to our previous analysis anything that is *materially* free is a separation or distinction "within" the divine life, and this includes both the realms of potentiality and fulfilled life. For man this means that as he uses his capacity for language to liberate himself from concrete situations by the use of universals, as he conforms to moral and logical imperatives, as he uses his powers of deliberation and decision for optimum fulfillment, as he thinks and imagines and builds creatively, he is materially free and stands within the divine life as a part in relation to the divine whole. But what happens to his ontological status when he is formally free and acts against his own best interests, that is, enslaves himself by realizing less than his full potentiality or by obstructing his full development.

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[1] Vol. II, pp. 31-32.

[2] Tillich once made this distinction between two kinds of freedom in one of his lectures at Harvard in 1961.

Man's formal freedom is considered by Tillich as the apex of the ontological evolutionary movement. It is the way, as has been shown, that God fulfills his love "of himself", and this is "because he loves that which is estranged from himself." Now the fact that God, symbolically speaking, is loving "himself" when he loves man in his formal freedom and that man is said to be "estranged" from God gives us a clue to Tillich's real meaning. Tillich never uses the term "estrangement" to mean "complete separation."

> The profundity of the term "estrangement" lies in the implication that one belongs essentially to that from which one is estranged. Man is not a stranger to his true being, for he belongs to it. He is judged by it but cannot be completely separated, even if he is hostile to it. Man's hostility to God proves indisputably that he belongs to him. Where there is the possibility of hate, there and there alone is the possibility of love.[1]

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[1] Vol. II, p. 45.

It seems clear from this interpretation of estrangement that Tillich does not mean that man in his formal freedom becomes ontologically independent from God. In terms of our use of the part-whole metaphor, man's formal freedom means that God gives a part of himself the ability to decide against the whole, something like the manner in which a cancerous cell can oppose the whole organism. Hence when God loves the estranged part, he as the whole is still loving "himself."

Tillich is confusing at this point because he appears to use the terms "estrangement" and "separation" synonomously. When he says that creatively freedom is "separation from" God, he does not mean a complete ontological separation. There is no qualitative metaphysical pluralism here, no creation of something completely other. He means an "estrangment" which does not imply any kind of ontological separation or dualism. Metaphorically speaking, when God goes out from himself establishing centers of creative life, it does not involve the separation of life from life. If the term "separation" is used, it means separation "outside the divine life," as a part of the divine life that is unfulfilled as distinguished from separation "within the divine life" as a fulfilled part. Tillich's insistence, however, is that the part is unfulfilled because of its own God-given capacity for formal freedom. Estrangement is a result of formal freedom. In view of this observation, it is clear that we need a closer analysis of just how the part is estranged from the whole.

There are two basic ways in which man is estranged from God. It has already been observed that finite life processes are ambiguous in two fundamental ways. They encounter difficulties in normal growth both in "going out" from themselves in creative growth, and in "returning" to their own identity. These difficulties are on a horizontal plan within finitude. Tillich believes that life processes also have a vertical kind of self-transcendence, that is, in their horizontal dialectical movement they also tend to reach vertically beyond themselves toward the infinite. There is an urge to reach out to what is beyond, to go beyond their limits "toward the great, the solemn, the high."[1] In man this reaching out toward the sublime, the whole, this capacity for vertical self-transcendence, is called religion. Religion is "the self-transcendence of life under the dimension of spirit."[2] Now while all life processes encounter ambiguity on both the horizontal and vertical levels to a degree, in man (dimension of spirit) the vertical dimension of self-transcendence is most clearly seen. Not only does man share the same horizontal twofold ambiguity with lower life processes, but since in man the power of vertical self-transcendence is more predominant there is a kind of "double ambiguity."[3] Man encounters a problem in "going out" and "returning" with reference to the sublime in life. In our terminology, this means that man as a part has a greater capacity to be related to God as the whole, and in his relation to the whole he encounters two basic problems. These two problems are what Tillich calls "profanization" and "demonization."[4] These terms need some clarification.

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[1] Vol. III, p. 31.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 96.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 98.

[4] *Ibid.*

"Profanization" stands for the problem man encounters in "going out" toward the divine whole. The term itself means "remaining before the door of the temple, standing outside the holy."[1] Profanization means resisting self-transcendence, or simply the tendency toward secularism. Although Tillich discusses the profanization of life in many provocative ways, its central meaning is the ability of the part to resist a relationship with the whole. Profanization takes place, for example, when a religious organization becomes another power group or social club without an ecstatic awareness of the sacramental quality of life or a sense of the holy. Or, philosophically, profanization is expressed in various kinds of "reductionistic" naturalism (materialism). For an individual person, profanization means the estrangement from the whole by turning away from the whole (unbelief) toward oneself (hubris) because of his unlimited striving--(concupiscence or Freud's id).[2] Or, finally, in connection with his descriptive ontology, profanization represents the tipping of basic self-world polarity on the side of the self.

The other kind of estrangement between the part and the whole is "demonization" and indicates the difficulty of the part in "returning" to its own identity. "The demonic does not resist self-transcendence as does the profane, but it distorts self-transcendence by identifying a particular bearer of holiness with the holy itself."[3] In Freud's terminology, as the profane suggests a stage of narcissistic fixation in "going out," the demonic has a tendency to "go out" toward the infinite but regressively mistakes it for something finite. The part goes out, but not toward the whole which nourishes it. It goes out to another part which saps its life and keeps it from "returning" to its own identity. The part destroys its self-transcending capacity by submerging itself in another part. It tries, as it were, to return to the womb and loses its identity in the effort. This demonic kind of estrangement is seen, for example, whenever a religious or political organization, a system of values, another person, or even the making of money becomes the object of "ultimate concern." The demonic is destructive because a part does not have the power to fulfill man's essential nature. Fulfilling power comes only from the whole manifested in one's "depth." In connection with Tillich's self-world polarity, demonization means that the world (some part of it) side predominates. What then can be said of Tillich's view of freedom?

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[1] Ibid., p. 87.

[2] See Vol. II, pp. 44-55.

[3] Vol. III, p. 102.

In summary, Tillich seeks to explain freedom in terms of a polarity between freedom and destiny. Tillich's psycholigical (phenomenological) description of freedom, however, fails to make clear the distinctions between wanting and willing, as well as between willing (will-agency) and performing (will-power). Since freedom is not sufficiently distinguished from destiny, the pole of destiny predominates. His formulations do not safeguard him against the charge that human freedom is merely a greater degree of the modifiability found in animals. Moreover, there are two kinds of freedom in Tillich's thought--material and formal. Material freedom refers to the realization of an individual's essential potentialities as described, for example, by Hegel. Material freedom is always a "content" freedom. Formal or Kantian freedom is the freedom of man to say "yes" or "no" to his human potentialities. Formal freedom is described with reference to God as the withdrawal of the part from the whole (profanization), or as the affirmation of another part as the whole (demonization). In both instances there is a kind of Freudian death urge, a failure to go out of the womb (fixation) toward mature individuality or a failure to achieve individuality by returning to the womb in terms of submergence in another part. But since Tillich's description of freedom is not sufficiently clear, in the last analysis he does not show how either kind of freedom really transcends the pole of destiny by a capacity to will freely between alternatives. This is not to say that Tillich does not really "intend" to attribute autonomy to the parts of the whole, but only that it is unfortunate that he did not analyze this crucial problem more definitely. What now can be said about Tillich's view of freedom in relation to God?

c) The Relation of Man's Freedom to God.

In the preceding chapter it was maintained that Tillich's basic vision involves the view of God as an abysmal unity creating the realm of potentiality, as well as the power driving beyond potentiality toward actuality. This drive of being-itself toward creativity is motivated by divine love and occurs "within" the divine life. God creates with an aim toward individuality which culminates in man. Man is the goal of creation because God can only fulfill his own love by creating centers who can freely respond to the divine love. This means that God gives formal freedom to man, that is, the possibility to contradict his essential unity with God.

Here "God took a risk."[1] Man chooses against God and this is the "fall." Although the fall of man is a creative advance to the degree that some actuality is realized, it also represents a fall "outside" the divine life to the degree that man's created potential nature is not fully realized. God's love for "fallen" man and the offer of "new being" for his fulfillment represents the zenith of God's own fulfillment. Now the crucial issue is to ascertain the ontological status of man as he stands "outside" the divine life in his formal freedom.

If our analysis is correct up to this point, it would appear that if potential man is within the divine life then actual man is also within the divine life to the degree that he is materially free or fulfilled as a distinct, individual part of the whole. If this is so, unfulfilled man must also be within the divine life as well. An individual cannot be split in two, half God and something else. The spatial metaphor "outside" the divine life can only mean that part of God is unfulfilled, not primarily because of the whole, but because of the autonomy given the part as a means of fulfilling God's own nature as love. The individual man insofar as he is free and creative is identical with the ontological movement of God toward individuation. But insofar as the individual is "fallen" it is a result of the formal freedom of the individual. The essential goodness of the whole as such is thus not impaired by the estrangement of the part. Rather, the love of the whole for man as the estranged part is a demonstration of the perfect quality of divine love which "attracts him and lures him toward reunion."[1] What then can we conclude from these considerations?

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[1] D. MacKenzie Brown, Ultimate Concern: Tillich in Dialogue (New York: Harper & Row, Pub., 1965), p. 184.

Tillich's ontological vision is not one that gives the world of nature and history a genuine ontological independence. The ambiguities, at least, in his doctrine of freedom suggests a decidely monistic element in Tillich's world-view. His real intention is to present a view of the whole with an ontological movement toward freedom and individuality. Although his analysis of human freedom is not completely convincing in specific details, his whole ontology demands formal freedom as a means of divine fulfillment. God must have a world to love, and man can truly love God only if he is free not to love. Yet does man at this point have real freedom if Tillich's doctrine of destiny is taken seriously? Moreover, it is far from clear how man can be formally free and still be a part of God.

Although Tillich is monistically inclined, he should not simply be called a "pantheist." To call him a pantheist would fail to distinguish his position from that of many forms of Eastern philosophy and from the classical expression of pantheism by Spinoza. In contradistinction from Eastern thought, individuality conceived in terms of both potentiality and actual existence is good. Divine love requires it and preserves it. And in contrast to Spinoza, Tillich uses the model of polarity, and does not employ a mathematical model that results in a necessaritarian system without freedom. Not only individuality, but freedom as material and formal is a requirement of divine love.[1]

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[1] Vol. I, p. 283.

Tillich's world-view can be seen as a combination of the emphasis on the part-whole relationship between the Absolute and the world (which does not elucidate his emphasis on freedom), and the biblical view of the created world of finitude as good. Tillich's calls his view one of "self-transcending or ecstatic naturalism." He also refers to his view of ultimate fulfillment as "eschatological pan-en-theism." If a term is helpful as a means of identifying Tillich's position, then we might combine his own suggestions and call his system of "Self-transcending pan-en-theism." Now what has been discovered about Tillich's view of man up to this point in contrast to Freud?

This analysis of Tillich's doctrine of freedom and its connection with his ontology concludes our highlighting of some of the facets of Tillich's view of man in contrast to Freud. To sum up, Tillich's chief criticism of Freud was that he was too pessimistic because he had no adequate theory of man's ideal nature. Tillich, however, is much indebted to Freud's descriptions of man's estranged nature. Freud did not give adequate attention to man's nonphysical needs, his social nature, his capacity for grasping ideal values, and his essential freedom.[1] Although the emphasis in this chapter has been on "contrasting" Tillich and Freud, it would be instructive to conclude our analysis at this stage by drawing on Freudian categories to elucidate and point up Tillich's view of man as it relates to philosophy of history.

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[1] An interesting theological problem can be raised concerning whether or not "sin" is ontologically (not mathematically) necessary in Tillich's thought. Does God's love require only the possibility of sin, or the actuality of sin to fulfill his love? Since it is more difficult to love an actual sinner than a merely potential one, actual sin would seem to be required. But if sin is ontologically necessary, then the seriousness of sin would appear to be considerably lessened as the pole of destiny is increased.

5. The Bearing of Tillich's View of Man on his own Philosophy of History

Tillich's model for understanding history, as developed in Chapter Three, is essentially the Romantic vision of history formulated by Schiller, Herder, and Hegel. The history of mankind consists in the departure of man from an undifferentiated unity in being-itself, through a intermediate stage in which man's powers are actualized through differentiation and estrangement (alienation or antagonism) with himself and nature, and a final return to a unity of enriched harmony. Tillich's formulation of this model, enriched by his study of depth psychology, gives a more concrete basis to this view of history.

To be more specific, man's "fall" from the initial unity is marked by an anxious struggle between being and nonbeing, that is, between the life urge and the death urge. But for Tillich the dualism between life and death is only superficial or apparent. In reality the nonbeing of death is what makes for individuality and differentiation (to be a distinct part). In man's resistance (repression) to accept his own finitude (individuality) his consciousness becomes diseased, that is, the death urge that makes for individuality and freedom becomes perverted in terms of profanization (narcissistic withdrawal) and demonization (aggressive possession). The child, to illustrate profanization, finds it difficult to accept separation from its mother, a separation that confers individuality and at the same time eventuates in death. Or, once the separation is actualized and the child is aware of his individuality, he demonically rejects his role as a part and either wishes to be the whole (to be the father of himself) or he represses his individuality by submerging himself in another person or group.

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[1] Another basic contrast could be made with reference to Freud's view of religion as expressed in The Future of an Illusion. Tillich would contend here that Freud identified religion substitute-gratification in terms of illusory cognitive beliefs and failed to give due consideration to man's depth experiences of the holy. Since this contrast concerning religion will be made between Tillich and Marx, it is not necessary to develop it in connection with Freud.

History then is a process of making conscious man's unconscious (depth) need for individuality and freedom. It is a process of overcoming the desire to return to the womb of an undifferentiated unity and of maturing in individuality. The normative goal of history is thus to make conscious the noumenal unity between eros (life urge) and agape (the redeemed death urge that makes for and respects individuality). This means in terms of person-to-person relationships that men are to see themselves as brothers, as parts of a common whole, and not as opposites. What this goal means in terms of group-to-group relationships can be seen more clearly after the following chapter. In anticipation, it can be said that social structures must be ideally of the kind that will give security to the society and some degree of freedom or self-determination and decision-making to the various sub-groups within society.

Historical man is not fully conscious of his goal, of what he ought to be. He does not fully know what he really wants, or what conditions must be fulfilled to fulfill his potentialities. The dynamic of history is thus man's restless urge to become something other than he is, to overcome the guilt of not being what he ought to be, and to slowly uncover the repressed unity between life and death. Religion for Tillich is essentially the attempt to uncover the unconscious, and his ontology is an attempt to lay bare the polar or dialectical unity between being and nonbeing as it exists in the divine life (eternity). We have show in both the previous chapter and the present one that the part-whole model presupposed in his ontology does not sufficiently inform his emphasis on individuality and freedom. He does not make clear how a part can be genuinely autonomous and still be a part of a metaphysical whole or Absolute.[1]

A still fuller understanding of Tillich's view of man is possible by comparing and contrasting his thought with that of Karl Marx.

B. Tillich's Critique of Marx's View of Man

While Tillich believed Freud was strong in his descriptions of man's estrangement but weak on describing what man ought to be, his attitude toward

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[1] It would make an interesting study to compare Norman O. Brown's Life Against Death, a Freudian interpretation of history, with Tillich's thought. Tillich and Brown both agree in opposition to Freud's ontological dualism that life and death are a unity of opposites, and both offer an eschatology of hope in contrast to Freud's pessimism. Tillich and Brown differ in at least two basic points. Tillich emphasizes man's multidimensional needs, while Brown follows Freud's emphasis on bodily delight, p. 293. And while Brown finds a unity in sub-human nature that promises salvation within history, p. 84, Tillich's doctrine of total estrangement (man and nature) forces him logically to the notion of being-itself that transcends history and all subject-object categories.

Marx is almost the reverse. Marx is more aware of what man ought to be, but Tillich's basic criticism of him is that he is weak or too optimistic in his account of man's estrangement from man and nature.[1] Before contrasting the chief differences between Tillich and Marx, it would aid in understanding Tillich's view of man to indicate briefly some areas of agreement.

1. Five Areas of Agreement Between Tillich and Marx

It is essential to understand that Tillich does not equate the thought of Karl Marx with present day communism. In this sense Marx is not always, a Marxist, as he himself claimed when he observed the French Marxists in the late 1870's.[2] With this qualification in mind there are at least five important areas in which Tillich agrees with Marx's interpretation of man and history.

a) Marx's Critique of Early Capitalism

The first point of agreement is Tillich's acceptance of Marx's criticism of early capitalism with its long hours, low pay, unsafe working conditions, and child labor. Marx spoke out against the treatment of men as mere cogs in the industrial machine while most religious institutions accepted the status quo. In this setting Tillich calls to mind that Marx was a Jew and identifies the carping criticisms found in his Communist Manifesto with the tradition of the Jewish prophets.[1] With respect to Marx's protestations against the dehumanization of men by treating them merely as "things," Tillich also identifies Marx with the existentialist's revolt against the modern machine age.[2]

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[1] Since Marx did not believe in God, we shall refrain from accusing Marx for not emphasizing estrangement in this demension.

[2] Lewis S. Feuer (ed.), Marx and Engels: Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy (New York: Doubleday and Co., An Anchor Book, 1959), p. 396.

b) The Need for Action

The second areas of agreement reflects a pragmatic motif, namely, the need for action. Things do not work out for the best in terms of automatic progress. Tillich accepts Marx's criticism of Feuerbach to the extent that Feuerbach emphasized contemplation to the neglect of human action. Man's problem cannot be solved merely by understanding a state of consciousness. Knowledge must be directed toward changing the objective world. Theory and practice should be united. The modification of human consciousness involves a change in behavior. Marx is an existential thinker in that he is "against any theory that merely interprets the world without changing it."[3] Tillich agrees with the "shaping" function of reason, and his entire philosophy of history can be seen as an attempt to provide norms and principles for the direction of social change. Agreeing with Nietzsche and Heidegger, Tillich acknowledges that mere historical knowledge is not enough. We must be "makers of history."[4]

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[1] D. Mackenzie Brown, Ultimate Concern, pp. 58-59. Tillich, The Religious Situation, also speaks of the "prophetic power" of Marx. (New York: Meridian Books, trans. by H. Richard Nieburh, 1956, p. 112.

[2] Courage To Be, p. 136.

[3] Theology of Culture, p. 109.

[4] Ibid., p. 102. Also see Vol. I, p. 92; Vol. III, p. 330.

c) Man as a Social Animal

Tillich follows Marx's criticism of Feuerbach in yet another related aspect which makes a third area of agreement discernible. Feuerbach "knows man in the abstract, and man the individual, but not man the social being."[1] Both Tillich and Marx consider man as a social animal and acknowledge beyond the physical needs stressed by Freud the need for social relatedness. According to Marx, Feuerbach knew man's social need for other men but tried only to produce a correct consciousness about it. The stand-point of Marx's new materialism is "human society, or socialized humanity."[2] Man's social nature must be met in real life. Although Marx tended to stress man's economic needs, Tillich does not interpret Marx to say that man has *only* physical needs or to mean that *only* economic factors determine history. Dialectical materialism means that "the economic-social conditions of a society determine all other cultural forms."[3] Society is thus not viewed primarily by Marx and Tillich as a threat to the individual's freedom as it was in Hobbes egoistic atomism. Man is social by nature. Men must cooperate to produce the means of production. Man's social nature demands cooperative action and social intercourse to achieve full humanity.

d) The Ideological Nature of Thought

The fourth area of rapport between Tillich and Marx follows from the preceding agreements. Both men were aware of the ideological nature of thought, that is, the social conditioning of all human thought coupled with the tendency to justify and preserve the status quo. If society is faulty, and if the call is for action to realize men's social nature more fully, then why has there been so little action? Why is change so slow and difficult? This question is answered by Marx's view of ideology. According to Tillich, "Karl Marx called every theory which is not based on the will to transform reality an 'ideology,' that is, an attempt to preserve existing evils by a theoretical construction which justifies them."[1] Tillich is aware of the social relativity of human thought, including value systems. It is the influence of Marx at this point that probably lies behind Tillich's insistence on the inevitability of having some theological circle and the impossibility of viewing history from any vantage point outside history. It is highly probable also that Tillich's persistent opposition to supernaturalism stems from Marx's attack on religion as the "opiate" of the people. What Marx had in mind when he attacked religion was not the kind of religion that is born as a protest against real distress, but one which tries to meet this distress by projecting human needs into some imaginary other world. The struggle against religion is "the fight against the other world, of which religion is the spiritual aroma."[2] What Marx says about religion in general, Tillich says about supranaturalism. Tillich's fight against supranaturalism stems from his experience with the rise of Nazism in Germany and the otherworldly attitude of Lutheran piety that failed to oppose Hitler and assume responsibility for this life.

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 104.

[2] Feuer, *Marx and Engels*, p. 245.

[3] Vol. III, p. 329.

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[1] Vol. I, p. 76.

[2] Feure, Marx and Engels . . . , p. 263.

e) Similar Attempts to Overcome Ideology.

The fifth area of agreement is seen in the way both Tillich and Marx try to avoid the charge of ideology against their own views. It is true that Tillich appeals to a mystical model in his doctrine of revalation that is quite different from Marx. Yet they both acknowledge two similar ways of partially overcoming the relativistic implications of Marx's doctrine of ideology. The first way is through science. Engels no doubt speaks for Marx when he writes about the "false" understanding of nature and man as seen in the superstitions about spirits and magic in the past and comments: "The history of science is the history of the gradual clearing away of this nonsense, or rather of its replacement by fresh but always less absurd nonsense."[1] Tillich's attempt to give full value to the place of science, in contrast to many existentialists, has already been noted in Chapter Two.

Tillich follows Marx at another point. Truth can be approximated through action, especially the action of those who suffer. In Tillich's interpretation, Marx saw the proletariat as a suffering people and believed, in ways suggestive of the concept of the suffering Messiah in Isaiah, that action in the midst of suffering opens up areas of insight into man's condition that the privileged few never know. Tillich ties this approach to truth with the "whole biblical tradition that without active participation in the 'new reality' its nature cannot be known."[2] Truth must be done to be known. Although man cannot totally escape the social conditioning of consciousness, he can throw himself in the processes of history and achieve a degree of "experiential" verification.[1]

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[1] Feur, Marx and Engels . . ., p. 263.

[2] Vol. I, p. 93.

In the preceding five agreements between Tillich and Marx some primary motives behind Tillich's view of man and history come to the surface. However, our interpretation of Tillich's estimate of the human situation is not complete without noting some crucial differences between these two thinkers. Our analysis will focus on two primary differences.

2. Marx Failure to See the Extent of Man's Estrangement

Marx lacks the depth and profundity in Freud's description of man's estrangements. Marx's answers do not meet the depth of man's estrangement that Freud described. Marx focused on man's estrangement in society, but did not recognize any intrinsic estrangement within human consciousness itself. This is what Tillich means in his critique of Marx's criticism of Feuerbach. Feuerbach understood man's inner loneliness but, according to Tillich, Marx overemphasized the social pole that Feuerbach lacked.

> Feuerbach knows man in the abstract, and man the individual, but not man the social being. Marx himself sees only this social man. But he there discovers man's estrangement, which is not only man's estrangement from himself but also from every other man. For him, this loneliness arises from the present historical conditions which must be transformed.[2]

In other words, Marx, like Rousseau, locates man's trouble exclusively in society rather than in the individual also. Marx does not give due consideration to the extent of estrangement that Feuerbach found within human consciousness. In correcting the lack of social emphasis in

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[1] Vol. I, p. 102.

[2] Theology of Culture, p. 104.

Feuerbach, Marx moved too far to the pole of society and recognizes no causal power for producing estrangement within the individual. Human consciousness became a mere epiphenomenon. According to Marx:

> The mode of production in material life determines the general character of social, political, and spiritual processes of life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but, on the contrary, their social existence determines their consciousness.[1]

By failing to see the intrinsic estrangement of individual consciousness Marx exempts some aspects of life from estrangement and thus makes the human effort to change society the source of overcoming man's estrangement. It is because of Marx's failure to see the sweeping character of man's estrangement, and his consequent expectation of human fulfillment within history through human effort alone, that Tillich refers to Marxism as "utopian."[2] The question immediately arises how Tillich defends his view of man's total estrangement against the partial or so-called utopian estrangement held by Marx.

Tillich's phenomenological descriptions of essential finitude in terms of polar unity is one kind of argument for his view of total estrangement. His theory of estrangement follows consistently from his description of the polar nature of human experience.[3] Since man is never completely "separate" from his world, what happens in self-consciousness is also happening in the world. Man is always man-in-the-world for Tillich. This means that if Feurerbach is "abstract" for omitting the social pole, Marx is equally abstract for ignoring the self pole. Poles can be distinguished, but they cannot be separated.

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[1] Feuer, Marx and Engels . . ., p. 43.

[2] Vol. I, p. 268.

[3] Epistemological reasons for Tillich's use of polar descriptions have already been noted in Chapter Two.

Take, for example, the ontological pole of individualization and participation, referred to in man as the poles of solitude and communion. In man's essential nature within the divine life these poles are in polar unity. But when man swings to the side of solitude, loneliness ensues. When the balance tips toward the social pole of communion, the individual's ego-self is submerged in a collectivist group. Now the point for Tillich is that whenever either side is estranged, both are. If the self is estranged, so is the world and vice versa. Whatever occurs in one happens in the other, since they are never separated. Hence if there is any estrangement from nature and man at all, the estrangement must be total.

And what is more, estrangement on one polar side leads to estrangement on the other polar side. The estranged person submerges himself in a group because he is lonely, and is lonely because he is submerged in the group.

> In the state of estrangement man is shut within himself and cut off from participation. At the same time, he falls under the power of objects which tend to make him into a mere object without a self. If subjectivity separates itself from objectivity, the objects swallow the empty shell of subjectivity.
>
> This situation has been described sociologically and psychologically. These descriptions have shown the interdependence of the loneliness of the individual and his submergence in the collective in a convincing way.[1]

This statement also reveals that Tillich supports his view of total estrangement by empirical observation in the social sciences. The upshot of the matter is that Marx fallaciously assumed that if society is transformed estrangement would be overcome. But for Tillich, men can have their economic needs justly met and still be estranged from themselves and from each other.

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[1] Vol. II, p. 65.

This analysis of Tillich's position results in a rejection of two basic Marxian beliefs. One is the utopian belief that the dialectics of history are working inevitably toward "triumph in an indefinite future."[1] Marx failed to see the depths of man's estrangement and the tragic quality of history. Utopian dreams can lead only to existential disappointment and despair. Tillich agrees with Hegel's statement that history is not a place for happiness.

The second Marxian tenet denied by Tillich is that human estrangement can be overcome through human effort. If man is totally estranged, then help for man's condition must come from a source beyond the subject-object polarity, from a source beyond man and history. Finitude is not self-sufficient. Help can be found in history, but it is not derived from history. This consideration brings us to Tillich's second fundamental criticism of Marx's position.

3. Marx's Failure to Provide an Adequate Answer to Man's Estrangement

We now turn to Tillich's second major criticism of Marx. It should be noted at this juncture that Tillich's answer to man's estrangement follows from his analysis of the human situation. He defined man's problem in such a way that his answer follows logically. If both subject and object poles of finitude are estranged, then help can come only a source beyond the subject-object split. His method of correlating answers

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[1] Vol. II, p. 266.

156

with problems is clearly at work here. It is difficult to decide whether his answer coerces his description of the problem, or vice versa. Possibly they interact on each other. At any rate if one rejects his account of total estrangement, his particular kind of answer is not necessary.[1]

The task at hand is to ascertain more definitely how being-itself works within the individual historical agent to overcome human estrangement in contrast to Marx's emphasis on human action alone. This analysis will help lay a foundation for the next chapter on the relation between God and history as viewed chiefly within the context of historical groups. In other words, now the focus is on how God works in the subject pole of history, while the next chapter will consider more how God operates in the object pole especially as seen in the kind of difference God makes in the problems and ambiguities of human groups.

In contrast to the Marxian view of religion as an ideological opiate to preserve the existing power structure, Tillich defines religion in terms of the experience of an unconditional ultimate concern.[2] Religion deals with what men take most seriously, or what evokes what Kierkegaard called "infinite passion." Since the content of an ultimate concern varies for different individuals and groups, Marx's description of religion holds in many cases. Some people may ultimately trust or depend on another world to the neglect of this one. But for Tillich this other worldly emphasis is a picture of false or idolatrous (worshipping the part) religion. Tillich believes the "content" of his ultimate concern avoids this charge Marx made against religion. Marx erroneously identified the definition of religion with an estranged type of religion. The "content" of Tillich's ultimate concern viewed in terms of an ecstatic awareness of the holy has already been discussed in light of the axioms of transcendence and harmony. These axioms take on more concrete meaning as they are seen to modify individual human consciousness in definite and describable ways. As these axioms are explained in this context, it should become apparent that Tillich is trying to synthesize Marx's insistence on the need for social change with Feuerbach's emphasis on overcoming human estrangement through expanding or modifying individual human consciousness.[1] Observe first the effect of the axiom of transcendence, that is, Tillich's insistence on the abysmal and indefinable quality of being-itself.[2]

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[1] Norman O. Brown, for example, exempts nature from estrangement and thus believes that man can return to nature and heal himself. Life Against Death, p. 84.

[2] Vol. I, p. 12.

The axiom of transcendence points to the expansion of consciousness by an awareness of the abysmal and inexhaustible quality of reality. Man stands in awe before the presence of the holy (whole). This means with reference to Marx that the dialectical process can never be stopped or completely grasped. Such an awareness becomes for Tillich an instrument for attacking any attempt to stop the processes of history. History must end with the present, since the future has not yet happened. But this does not mean we should glorify the present or any particular stage of history. Hence Marx is as guilty of idolatry for conceiving the fulfillment of history in an indefinite future as Hegel was for presumably stopping the ongoing dialectical process with the then existing Germanic world.[1] Tillich's axiom of transcendence is the source of his "Protestant Principle" by which he protests against any identification of social structures, concepts, or stages of history with the whole of reality.

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[1] The manner in which being-itself modifies individual human consciousness in history will be treated further in Chapter Five.

[2] It should be recalled that the nature of the axioms of transcendence and harmony was developed in Chapter One. They represent the cognitive core of Tillich's doctrine of revelation, and are called "axioms" in this study because he affirms (presupposes) them without overtly attempting to justify them.

Another related advantage of the axiom of transcendence, on the intellectual level, is the fact that without this quality of the awareness of transcendence, the need for thought to expand through dialogue is slighted. If a person identifies his own thoughts with the Absolute, then he may well burn the heretics rather than try to learn from them. Such disregard for the free interplay of conflicting opinions is what happens in idolatrous forms of Christianity as well as Communism. The awareness of transcendence provides a basis for self-criticism which communism's demand for orthodoxy does not have. Concerning this lack of prophetic self-criticism Tillich states:

> The Founders of Communism set up no principle of self-criticism inherent in the structure itself, no principle by which the collective or the party or the representatives of the part could criticize itself or themselves.[2]

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[1] Tillich's interpretation of Hegel as stopping the dialectical process of history in his own day is highly questionable. For Hegel the Germanic world meant the European West (including England), and he also speaks of America as the land of the future. Moreover, as Collingwood observed, even if Hegel was in "unintelligent conservative" in practical politics, it was the fault of the man and not of his philosophy of history. See The Idea of History, p. 120.

[2] Brown, Ultimate Concern, p. 75.

While the axiom of transcendence operates actively in history primarily in a negative, protesting manner, the axiom of harmony gives more positive direction.

The axiom of harmony describes the essential polar unity within the divine life. This axiom is ontologically expressed in terms of the divine love which "goes out" toward individualization to provide a content to love, and "returns" in *agape*-love by overcoming the estrangement of the parts without destroying their individuality. Here revelation means an enrichment of human consciousness through an immediate awareness of the whole as redeeming love. *Agape*-love is not derived from man's experience, it is rather "given to" man through God's grace. Here Tillich seeks to preserve the pole of individuality against submergence in authoritarian groups. This means with reference to Marx and communism that without the axiom of harmony the value of the individual is lost in the collective. The individual is expendable in the historical process, and can be used as a means for the good of the group. Thus while Marx prophetically criticized early capitalism's treatment of men as mere tools of industry, he provides no positive safegard, such as *agape*-love, against the same inhuman treatment of individuals within his own system. "Marx sees no fulfillment of individual destiny, except in the collective fulfillment."[1] The dictatorship of a small hierarchy comes out of the proletariat, and since individual consciousness is only a mere reflection of social processes, the hierarchy moulds the rest of the proletariat into its patterns. In Tillich's words,

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[1] Vol. I, p. 266.

> But the struggle to create true humanity in the proletariat has led in actual fact not to "community," but only to "solidarity," a relation which is still external and remains a symbol of man's estrangement.[1]

Now where has this analysis brought us?

To summarize in different words, Tillich's indictment against Marx is that he failed to see the extent of man's estrangement from himself and others, and therefore provided no adequate answer. Marx's lack of an adequate answer is due to his disregard of man's awareness of the holy. The experience of being-itself in man's depths brings healing to his condition by providing a fundamental modification of man's self-understanding. Marx's thought is based on a false consciousness, false because it does not recognize the dynamic quality of revelation to at least partially overcome man's total estrangement by reuniting him with his own essential polar unity. Revelation brings freedom to the individual. There is freedom from a lack of awareness in man of his deepest resources, a freedom that protects him against idolatry. There is freedom for an increased awareness of agape-love that protects the individual from submergence in the state. Moreover, this kind of freedom through awareness acts as a catalytic agent to effect social change without the despair that comes from communism's superficial utopian dreams.

Although history is primarily concerned with man, man is only fully human when he belongs to groups. History is the history of groups. The following chapter centers on Tillich's analysis of groups, their structures and problems, as well as the relation of his ontological vision and answer to the problem encountered by groups.

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[1] Theology of Culture, p. 104.

C. Reflective Summary

History is fundamentally concerned with the events of man. Since history deals primarily with man, a full understanding of Tillich's philosophy of history involves a study of his view of the human condition. The views of Freud and Marx provide a helpful background for highlighting Tillich's estimate of man.

The basic thrust of Tillich's criticism of Freud is that he was too pessimistic in his understanding of man. This does not mean that his description of man's estrangement was too severe. Tillich accepts much of Freud's descriptions. Tillich's contention is rather that Freud does not offer a model of what a whole or healthy man ought to be. Freud adequately describes the physically based needs represented by the "id" as it holds for a neurotic person, but omitted the non-physical needs of man's multidimensional nature as indicated by the modern emphasis on psychosomatic medicine.

In contrast to Freud's Hobbesian atomistic view of man, Tillich's phenomenological description of the basic self-world polarity results in the more Greek view of man as a social animal. Man becomes a true person only in relation to other persons.

Freud's stress on man's vital powers is put in polar relation to man's capacity for intentionality by Tillich. Man lives in a world of meanings, that is, of reason and ideal values. Freud assumed that reason has a causal power in man when he worked as a doctor to understand "objectively"

162

his patient. He also recommended a growing regard for other persons. But, according to Tillich, he made no place in his theory of man to either justify his trust in reason or to appeal to any other regarding motives. Tillich believes there are norms for reason and ethics. These norms are not independent of life in a Platonic fashion, but they are ascertainable with probability by man's capacity for intentionality within the processes of life.

There is no place for human freedom in Freud's view of man. The unconscious rules supremely. Tillich interprets human freedom in terms of a polarity between freedom and destiny. Although Tillich tends to justapose freedom and destiny, and fails to synthesize them in a convincing way, his ontology requires a view of formal freedom to explain man's estrangement. Man is free to turn away from God in profanization and demonization. In his estrangement from God man is still a part of God. He stands "outside" of God only as an unfulfilled part resulting from his formal freedom. Man's formal freedom is a requirement of God's nature as love. God fulfills himself by loving what resists the whole and by giving new being to what is unfulfilled.

The problem at this point is whether or not formal freedom is compatible with a part-whole relationship. Tillich's "self-transcending pan-en-theism" combines a mystical emphasis and a stress on the importance of individuality. His system hangs or falls on whether or not he can get these two elements together. On the mystical side Tillich is aware of the "whole" as divine love, a love that makes differentiations (individuality) necessary for the fulfillment of the whole. There are two basic factors that keep him from harmonizing freedom and the part-whole pantheistic element.

The first difficulty is with his characterization of the "whole" as perfect. On the one hand, God is "in no way dependent on man," and yet God must create man with formal freedom to fulfill himself. Although we have mentioned this criticism in another context, it is crucial here. If the whole is complete and not dependent on man in any way, then God does not need to create differentiations, and if he does create them, he does not need to preserve them. Hence, individuality is not safeguarded as Tillich wants. In effect, this means in history that Tillich's ontological model does not necessarily oppose totalitarianism. Such a consideration weakens the effectiveness and validity of Tillich's criticism in connection with the loss of the individual in Marxist society. The mystical element in Tillich with its stress on the fulness and completeness of God's being results in an ontological unity that might well swallow the variety involved in individualization. History is then lost in *maya*. Tillich could have avoided this difficulty by reducing his emphasis on God's total completeness (perfection), and by making further distinctions about how God could be complete in some ways (for example, *agape*) and not in others (for example, *eros* as a sense of lack).

The other difficulty in synthesizing freedom within a part-whole system is his failure to give a convincing description of human freedom. On the surface Tillich defends formal freedom. But since this is so crucial to his system it is unfortunate he did not analyze the meaning of freedom with more precision. Our criticism of this point has been elaborated within the chapter. It can be pointed out here further that, as we saw in the former chapter, the pole of destiny(as the side in which God operates through other temporal forces) plays a greater role in bringing the actual world into being than a superficial reading of Tillich would reveal, so without a strong description of human freedom the element of destiny can easily override the freedom pole altogether. There can be "feeling" of possible alternatives, decision, and responsibility, but they could possibly be appearances only. Freedom could be an illusion. Distinctions that would have helped strengthen his analysis of freedom were given in the chapter.

Tillich's attempt to unite freedom with a kind of pantheism does, however, have the advantage of stimulating further thought by challenging the traditional assumption that freedom presupposes an ontological separation between God and the world. His attempts to view both potential and fulfilled finitude positively, and to ground individuality in the ontological nature of love are also highly provocative.

Other aspects of Tillich's view of man become apparent in his relation to the thought of Karl Marx. He agreed with Marx's prophetic criticisms against early capitalism's mistreatment of man as a mere cog in the industrial machine, with his emphasis on action, with his stress on man's social nature, and with the ideological nature of human thought. Moreover, both Tillich and Marx try to escape the charge of ideology for their own thought through their emphasis on science and social action.

Tillich differs from Marx on the extent of human estrangement. Tillich holds that man is estranged at both poles of individualization and participation. Marx gave little or no emphasis to the estrangement of individual human consciousness, and located the source of estrangement solely in society. Estrangement for Marx could thus be overcome by changing society through human effort. Tillich rejects this emphasis on overcoming estrangement by human effort alone. Marx failed to consider the depth experiences of man because of his view of religion as ideological. Tillich stressed the need for revelation viewed in terms of a modification of human consciousness from within that functions to avoid idolatry and to protect the individual from submergence in a collectivist group. According to Tillich, Marx's failure at this point results in the inability of communism to practice self-criticism and to protect the individual from being a mere tool in the communist machine.

It should be observed that Tillich's criticisms of Marx rests fundamentally upon Tillich's description of human estrangement. Tillich supports his view of total estrangement by implications from his total system and by his interpretation of findings in empirical data taken from sociology and psychology. Tillich's use of his doctrine of total estrangement, however, becomes almost a self-evident (to him) axiom by which he attacks all other views. If his description of man's total estrangement is once granted, his criticisms of Marx and all naturalists are compelling. But if some areas in man and society that are relatively free from estrangement, then neither his criticisms nor his solutions are particularly cogent.

At this point in our study, five important facets in Tillich's philosophy of history begin to take shape. First, by contrasting Tillich with Freud it was shown that the life of man and thus of history is filled with axiological content. History is a place for actualizing normative (not mere arbitrary) values. There is related-ism, not relativism. Values do not reside in some non-historical other world, but rather are discoverable within the historical process as man interacts with his environment. Norms for both reason and ethical behavior are not imposed on history from somewhere outside of history. Dependable structures of value rather emerge from the content of history itself.

The second facet that takes shape in Tillich's philosophy of history follows from the first. If there are values to be realized, then history must be explained in terms of man's capacity to pursue ideal values or ends. Teleological causality was shown to be important for Tillich in Chapter Two in the discussion of historical explanation. Tillich's recognition of both man's nonphysical needs as expressed in his doctrine of man's multidimensional nature, and man's capacity for intentionality further confirm his emphasis on understanding history in terms of the lure of values in contrast to the reduction of history merely to the mechanical causality of natural science and the push of the past. The pursuit and realization of ideal values presupposes a third element.

The third factor in philosophy of history that arises in Tillich's view of man is the importance he gives to human freedom. Man is not totally bound to the situation in which he finds himself. He can modify his own circumstances in quest for values and ends. Although the pole of destiny limits man's freedom, man is still within these limits free to alter his situation. Tillich's emphasis on man's self-transcendence or freedom is intended to recognize the efficacy of psychical causation in the historical process. Tillich does not give a completely convincing synthesis of freedom and destiny. Neither does his part-whole ontological model sufficiently support the freedom he wants. The general tenor of his thought, however, indicates that he "intends" to make man's capacity for freedom an efficacious force in the direction history takes.

The fourth element that becomes clearer and more concrete in this chapter is that history has meaning. That is to say, there is a goal or plot to history. History is the gradual unfolding of the hidden unity between being and nonbeing, life and death. This concept appeared in the preceding chapter on Tillich's ontology. It now becomes concrete in his view of man. The historical process begins with the emergence of nature from an undifferentiated unity, and proceeds through an intermediate stage with an immanent urge (*telos*) toward individuality and eventuates through the evolutionary process in man. The ontological drive toward individuality continues in man, although mostly unconscious at first. Human history is the process of making conscious man's unconscious (depth) need for individuality and freedom.

To say that history has a goal, however, is not to say that history proceeds inevitably toward a final stage within history. In each man's refusal to accept his own finitude (the individuality of a part), that is, to repress it in Freud's language, his consciousness becomes diseased. He fights against the death urge (nonbeing) which confers individuality as well as terminates in death. Profanization and demonization are Tillich's descriptions of man's struggle against his own true nature. The energy of history is thus man's restless urge to become something other than he is, to overcome the guilt that results from not being what he ought to be.

Religion or revelation for Tillich is the manifestation of the ontological healing power in human consciousness that makes for polar harmony (dialectical unity) between *eros* (life) and *agape* (the love that drives toward individuality). Revelation is thus the ontological thrust in the evolutionary process to make the unconscious conscious, a thrust that overcomes guilt, and gives meaning to life by creating free men within a community. But the death urges is so prominent in history that healing is only partial. The final goal of history is reached only through a "return" to a trans-historical unity enriched by the historical process.

The fifth consideration in the emerging picture of Tillich's philosophy of history follows from the previous one. The goal of history has ontological support. The ultimate purpose of all life supports the fulfillment of essential human ends. Although a full understanding and estimate of the relation of God to history is not possible until after the next two chapters, this chapter has given content to the previous chapter on ontology. Being-itself is not at cross purposes with historical fulfillment. The goal of history is one with the cosmic goal. The fulfillment of man is identical with the fulfillment of the divine life. History means something to God as the content of the divine life (whole), and God means something to history as the power qualifying human consciousness in the direction of the goal.

CHAPTER V

THE KINGDOM OF GOD WITHIN HISTORY

In the last chapter it was indicated that an individual becomes a human being only through encountering other persons within a community, that is, within groups. The nature of historical man was discussed without focusing on the problems and nature of man as he exists in groups. But since for Tillich "the direct bearers of history are groups rather than individuals",[1] it is necessary now to concentrate on Tillich's description of the problems of groups as well as on his answers to these problems. Since this analysis involves some of the key concepts in Tillich's interpretation of history, it will be helpful to narrow down Tillich's position by briefly observing his classification of various contrasting kinds of interpretations of history and, in the light of our previous chapters, indicate why he is opposed to them. Then after identifying his general position as seen in the symbol "The Kingdom of God," we shall note the three basic ambiguities in historical groups and how his ontological vision attempts to solve these problems. The chapter will conclude by considering the existential concern and practical motif underlying Tillich's philosophy of history.

A. Contrasting Interpretations of History

It was shown in Chapter Two that the subject-object character of history means that all history (Hp) is interpreted history. Most working historians are not particularly interested as such in going beyond the description and organization of historical facts. Yet Tillich insists that the historian does acquire a general interpretative framework from the "vocational consciousness" of his particular tradition. It is only when the historian is sophisticated enough to bring his hidden assumptions to the surface and compare them with other assumptions that he can move from mere arbitrariness toward a more universal rationality. Tillich's aim is to make clear the assumptions of a philosophy of history conditioned by Christianity.He is admittedly confessional in his approach. Yet his drive toward a more universal historical consciousness is seen in his treatment of other kinds of historical interpretation. Tillich distinguishes between two broad kinds of interpretation--the non-historical and historical.[1]

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[1] Vol. III, p. 308.

1. Non-historical Interpretations of History

Non-historical interpretations of history are "negative" views of history. Non-historical interpretations of history such as found in Stocism, Eastern mysticism, and mechanistic materialism, are negative because they do not view the values that emerge in history as ultimately significant. They are thus contrary to Tillich's emphasis on being-itself driving toward historical actualization as a means of fulfilling divine agape-love. Such interpretations are also negative because without the sense of ultimate meaning they provide little motivation, in contrast to the intentions of Marx and Tillich, for transforming historical existence. Moreover, they all view history in deterministic categories, leaving little or no place for human freedom. The drive toward historical creativity, part of man's essential nature, is thus aborted.

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[1] Tillich's discussion of various kinds of interpretations of history is found in Volume III on pages 350-56.

Perspective on Tillich's own philosophy of history can be achieved by observing more closely the specific kinds of non-historical interpretations he opposes. Tillich distinguishes three basic kinds of negative or non-historical views of history.

a) Greek Views of history

The first non-historical view of history is classically expressed in Greek thought, especially among the Stoics, although not confined there. History simply runs in a circle--genesis, acme, decay --and this description refers to all being. There is nothing beyond a fatalistically determined cosmic circle. There are periods distinguishable within the circle such as the original perfection, the fall or deteriorization, and finish. The Stoic position is thus the antithesis of all progressivistic theories.

A classic expression of this circular view of history is found by Tillich in a fragment of Anaximander.

> The beginning of that which is, is the boundless but whence that which is arises, thither must it return again of necessity; for the things give satisfaction and reparation to one another for their injustice, as it appointed according to the ordering of time.[1]

Here the boundless is the original unity and perfection, and the fall of individualization involves "reparation" and is seen as tragic guilt. Existence in time and space implies the separation of individuals from each other and from their source. In contrast to Tillich's emphasis on individualization (both in potentiality and fulfilled actuality) as "good," with only unfulfilled actuality viewed as the "fall," Anaximander identifies the whole of individualization (variety) as "bad" or tragic guilt. A tragic view of history presupposes greatness as seen in man's self-consciousness and creativity. The glory of life is acknowledged, and great individuals are praised. But without a sense of an ultimate telos in history, the more man experiences the fullness of life, the more he deplores the tragic elements of brevity and misery simply because there is no escape. The tragic circle of genesis and decay is the last word "according to the ordering of time." The negative forces of disintegration, destruction, and profanization are inevitable. The only answer to the tragedy of history is the Stoical courage which elevates the hero and the wise man above the ups and downs of fate, but this is not the kind of answer Tillich wants, namely, one that can effect social change. Both Marx and Tillich would identify this tragic view of history with "ideology," since it effects no social change.

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[1] T. V. Smith (ed), From Thales to Plato (The University of Chicago Press, 1934), p. 6.

b) Mystical Views of History

The second type of the non-historical understanding of history is the mystical. It is basically an attitude developed in the East as seen in Vedanta Hinduism, Taoism, and Buddhism, although it is also found in Western culture in Plotinus and Spinoza. All of these positions for Tillich hold in common the view that existence in time and space does not represent true reality. History is appearance only.

Although some Hindu philosophies speculate about cosmic cycles similar to Stoicism, in general there is no awareness of historical time and no sense of an "end" toward which history is running. Determinism is expressed by the law of Karma. The chief difference between the mystical view and the Stoical one is that while a few Stoics acquire inner peace through rational understanding of the determined cycles, a few mystics conquer their own involvement in time by ecstatically returning to the Ultimate One. Tillich does acknowledge favorably the profound compassion for all kinds of suffering found in some forms of Buddhism. Yet the central arguments against the Stoics also apply here. Individuality is devalued, social conditions remain un changed, and ideology prevails.

c) The View of Mechanistic Materialism

The third type of non-historical interpretations of history is mechanistic materialism. Everything is reduced to matter conceived as atoms in motion. This third type is a reductionistic naturalism which equates all facts with physical ones. History is a series of happenings in the physical universe. There is no place given here to Tillich's stress on the uniqueness of history as a science, as noted in Chapter Two. The teleological content of history is reduced to atoms in determined motion. Man's essential freedom is denied.

The mechanistic view of history lacks the Greek view of the greatness and tragedy of historical existence, as well as the Buddhist's emphasis on suffering. The emphasis on the technical control of nature by science and technology does, however, permit a certain progressivistic character which makes it less ideological. There is a sense in which technology can go on and on without a definite aim. But mechanistic naturalism is too open to the cynic attitude, especially if technological progress becomes identified with the idea that the world is getting better and better. Since there is no feeling for greatness and tragedy in life, and no clear aim to history, it is easy to become indifferent to whatever happens, even to the possible catastrophic end of history made possible through man's technological ability to unleash the energy of the atom. Materialism simply looks at history with interest, but not with the kind of passion for social change Tillich wants, that is, the kind that is motivated by the belief that history has an ontological aim and is the bearer of ultimate meaning.

The partial interest in history found in materialism provides a transition to the types of historical interpretation that do evaluate history more positively, and yet not in the way Tillich's ontological vision demands.

2. Historical but Inadequate Interpretations of History

Positive or historical interpretations of history recognize an aim to history, either within or beyond history. Tillich distinguishes three such types of positive but inadequate theories of history: infinite progressivism, utopianism, and transcendental utopianism.[1]

a) Infinite Progressivism

Progressivism is a positive view of history because it believes history is going somewhere. Tillich differentiates between two types of progressivism: one which views history as progressing infinitely without any end in view, and one which believes in a final or utopian stage of development obtainable within the historical process. Tillich associates the first kind of infinite progress with Neo-Kantianism, with the elements of infinite progress in Hegel's dialectical processes goaded by the driving power of negation, and with the open-endedness of Bergson's elan vital. Comte and Spencer also contributed much, under the guise of science, to viewing progress as a universal law of history.[1] Although the specific meaning and content of progress in these various philosophies depend on their particular characterization of the end of history, since the end determines the criterion of progress, yet the general meaning of progress is associated with the fulfillment of human potentialities however defined in details. Before turning to Tillich's argument against both types of progressivism, we turn briefly to his characterization of Utopianism.

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[1] See Volume III, pp. 352-56.

b) Utopianism

Utopian is a form of progressivism which is distinguished from the belief in infinite progress by thinking that historical fulfillment is "just around the corner." At least, it looks forward to some definite time within the historical process in which the problems of history will be solved and man's essential nature will be fulfilled. The roots of many secular forms of utopianism lie in the Renaissance with its life-affirmation and its belief that in man, the microcosm, all the potentialities of the universe will be actualized. Utopian dreams are a source for revolutionary action. No doubt with Marxism in mind, Tillich defines Utopianism as the view that "present revolutionary action will bring about the final transformation of reality, that stage of history in which the ou-tópos (no-place) will become the universal place. This place will be the earth . . ."[1] Utopianism is thus for Tillich the idolatrous belief that a particular historical situation can be raised to ultimate significance. Since the belief in Utopianism and infinite progress are both aspects of an underlying belief in the progressive nature of historical existence, his criticisms of them can be viewed jointly.

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[1] Vol. III, p. 353.

Tillich believed with the adherents of progressivism that there is a progressive element in history in the sense that creative action in history reaches out toward a goal. To solve any kind of problem, for example, one moves ahead toward a more satisfactory situation. He also acknowledges an incentive in progressivism to social transformation. Yet five basic reasons can be found for his rejection of the belief in infinite progress. The first reason is that the term "progress" is too sweeping and too ambiguous to be empirically meaningful. Tillich analyzes the meaning of progress with reference to different areas of experience. For example, there can be progress in making a philosopher's ontological vision more explicit and systematic. Such progress is made possible by the development of analytical tools that make for semantic refinement and clarity. But there is no progress according to Tillich from one classic view of reality to another. This is seen in the fact that "none of the great philosophical solutions has ever become obsolete, although their scientific observations and theories soon become antiquated."[1] The same kind of reasoning holds also for various styles of cultural creations as seen, for example, in the arts. Styles or art changes but not in a continuous line of progress. In other words, the concept of progress is so complex that a belief in some kind of general progress is too vague and hence meaningless.

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[1] Vol. III, p. 354.

The second criticism Tillich offers is against those who would advocate a more precise view of progress in terms of a continuous line of moral progress in history. On the one hand, there is no universal agreement concerning what constitutes the criterion of moral progress. Different cultures have different values and although within one culture it is possible to speak of a quantitative progress in terms of extending the values of that culture to more people, still for Tillich a cross-cultural evaluation would inevitably reflect the historical conditioning of the evaluator. This follows from Tillich's confessional approach to history.[2] But, on the other hand, even if a criterion were accepted for the most part, such as in the Judeo-Christian emphasis on justice and mercy and the inherent worth of the individual, then history itself refutes the belief that these values have been progressively realized.[1] Tillich calls to mind here the wars in the Twentieth Century with their "relapses to stages of inhumanity supposed to have been conquered long ago..."[2]

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[1] Vol. III, p. 335.

[2] The tension between Tillich's confessional approach to history and his quest for a universal historical consciousness as indicated in Chapter Two, can be seen in his attitude toward ethics. On the one hand, he believes that there is no progress from one philosophical system to another (which includes ethics), and yet, on the other hand, he says there is "cultural progress in the moral realm" in the sense of a "deeper understanding of man's essential nature in individual and social relations." Does this not indicate that some philosophical perspectives have at least a more dependable view of man's nature than others? See Tillich, The Future of Religions (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1966), p. 72.

The third criticism against the belief in a continuous line of infinite progress follows from his view of man's formal freedom, that is, the freedom to contradict one's true nature.[3] There is no progress in the moral realm. This means that each individual has to make a decision to do what he believes he ought to do, or to disobey. Here the cave man and modern man are the same. There is no progressive element in the categorical imperative. To the extent a cave man followed the best he knew, he is "better" than the civilized man who acts against what he believes to be best. Now this means that as long as man has formal freedom there will always be the possibility for both moral elevation and degradation. The future is open. Human freedom for good or evil does not progress but starts anew in each individual. The belief in the continuous line of progress in humanitarian ideals thus contradicts Tillich's emphasis on man's formal freedom.[4]

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[1] There are those who would still argue that history has revealed some quantitative, spiraling progress in the treatment of human beings as seen, for example, in the treatment of the aged, the mentally sick, and the criminal.

[2] Vol. III, p. 354.

[3] Man can "refuse to respond" to moral norms. Vol. III, p. 39.

[4] In the previous chapter it has been argued that while Tillich "intends" freedom, his ontology does not elucidate it.

The fourth criticism from Tillich's point of view follows as a correlary to the third. Not only is man formally free, but he does in fact act contrary to his own fulfillment. That is to say, man is estranged.[1] Progressivism takes no realistic account of human estrangement. This argument was developed at length in opposition to Marx in Chapter Four.

Tillich's fifth animadversion against progressivism is that it is demonic. Rather than being a justifiable empirical law as Compte and Spencer tried to make it, progressivism is in reality a religious symbol. It is a quasi-religion. The communist, for example, who argues for the inevitability of communism in the name of science confuses science with his religious commitment to communism. He worships the historical process, and for Tillich this means that progressivism mistakes the part for the whole.

In the case of Utopianism, it worships a supposedly final phase of history. It neglects Tillich's axiom of transcendence, that is, the abysmal inexhaustible nature of reality. Here Tillich's motive for opposing all forms of progressivism comes to light. Demonization is a structure of destruction. The type of destruction involved in the belief in progressivism is that of frustrated hopes, cynicism, despair, and emptiness. On May 19, 1964, Tillich delivered a lecture entitled "The Decline and Validity of the Idea of Progress" at the Ohio State University. In the context he is speaking particularly of Utopianism, but his comments hold for the belief in infinite progress as well.

> I want to save you, by my criticism of the idea of progress, from the cynical consequences of disappointed Utopianism. In my long life I have experienced the breakdown of the Utopianism of the

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[1] See "Estrangement as Fact and as Act", Vol. II, p. 55 f.

> Western intelligentsia both in Europe and America and the tremendous cynicism and despair which followed it and, finally, the emptiness of not being ultimately concerned about anything.[1]

c) Transcendental Utopianism

There is yet another positive but inadequate interpretation of history. Tillich calls it "transcendental utopianism" or transcendentalism in philosophy. The other-worldliness of this view is implicit in the eschatological mood of the New Testament and the early church, and was expressed most radically in orthodox Lutheranism. The emphasis in this view is that history is a place where Christ appeared to save individuals from sin and guilt and prepare them for the next world beyond death. Insight into Tillich's own position can be seen by noting why he opposed this kind of interpretation of history.

There are two basic reasons why Tillich rejects this form of supranaturalism so strongly. The first one has already been indicated in the previous chapter. Although Tillich does not use Marxian terminology specifically in this respect, he views supranaturalism as ideological. Although supranaturalism's doctrine of creation calls the world "good," yet the emphasis is on preparing the soul for the next world. There is no call for social justice in this world. Tillich's experience of the irrelevance of the orthodox Lutheran Church during the rise of Nazism is always in his thinking in his rejection of supranaturalism. The emphasis is too much on God's grace to the neglect of human decision and social responsibility. In Tillich's ontological vision being-itself works toward positive fulfillment in history, and hence supranaturalism for him is working against or at least ignoring the thrust of the divine whole. Tillich wants a church fighting against destructive forces within the historical process.

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[1] Tillich, The Future of Religions, p. 77.

The second related major difficulty of other-worldly forms of Christianity is that the individual is emphasized to the neglect of nature and culture. As has already been indicated, a person is both an individual and a social creature by nature. The total emphasis on individual piety fails to see God working in both nature and historical groups. Tillich has been criticized for subjectively finding God only within the depths of the individual.[1] But this criticism fails to take into account his emphasis on the social pole of man's essential nature. The divine whole is also at work in the healing process of nature, and in the movements of historical groups. Tillich acknowledges no salvation for the individual outside of groups. Thus, supranaturalism is too other-worldly and too individualistic.

After having seen the kinds of interpretations Tillich opposes and some of the reasons why, the way has been prepared to understand the general framework from which Tillich views the meaning of history. Such a framework is provided by the symbol "The Kingdom of God."

B. History and the Kingdom of God

Before analyzing what Tillich believes to be the basic problems encountered by historical groups and indicating how his metaphysical position is designed to answer these problems, it is helpful to present briefly a general view of his aims. If we know where he is going we can better observe the steps by which he arrives.

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[1] See John J. Vincent, Christ and Methodism (New York: Abingdon Press, 1965), p. 58.

The symbol that Tillich uses to express the central thrust of his vision of the meaning of history is "The Kingdom of God." It is with this symbol that he attempts to relate the historical process to the fundamental forces of the universe. The Kingdom of God represents his evaluative response to history. It is the symbol he employs in pointing to the cosmic purpose he finds at work in historical existence. The meaning of The Kingdom of God, as Tillich sees it, can be spelled out in five distinct points.

1. The Kingdom of God as Political

First, the Kingdom of God has a political connotation. Tillich believes that the political realm is predominant as the framework within which plural causality (e.g., social, economic, cultural, and religious) operates.[1] In the metaphysics of history this preponderance of the political sphere means that God (the whole) has a realm (as part) over which he rules, and this realm is history. God is the originating, sustaining, and directing power of history. Just what this means in detail will be shown later. Here it is sufficient to note that Tillich enters the philosophical level beyond the historian's scientific interest is describing and organizing historical facts. The question of the "meaning" of history involves responding to the question of the relation of history to the universe. More specifically, the question Tillich seeks to answer is; What is the nature of the reality that could account for the historical process?

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[1] Vol. III, p. 311. By "political" Tillich means the "centeredness of a group." Vol. III, 346. That is to say, "political" has the broad connotation of any persistent pattern of power, rule, or authority in human relationships that holds a group together whether small or large.

2. The Kingdom of God as Social

The second characteristic of the Kingdom of God is that it is social in nature. In contrast to supranaturalism, the Kingdom of God is concerned with social justice within history. What Tillich intends here is to provide a dialectical tension between the Utopian drive for historical fulfillment with what he takes to be a realistic acknowledgement that complete fulfillment within history is impossible. The impossibility of historical fulfillment follows from his view of man's formal freedom to deny his true nature, and to resists the lure of the divine whole through demonization and profanization. This means that his view of reality must be one that does not ignore the fact of man's estrangement, and yet provides the motivating power for man to work for limited goals of historical fulfillment. He wants the revolutionary drive of Utopianism without the despair that follows from man's inability to create a perfect society. Tillich's difference from the non-historical interpretations of history is also evident here. History is not mechanistically determined or unimportant. Human effort can and should modify the historical process.

3. The Kingdom of God as Personal

The third quality of the Kingdom of God is personal (individual). It gives eternal meaning to the individual. This emphasis is a consequence of Tillich's view of God as divine agape-love creating individuality or finitude in order to fulfill itself. In contrast with Anaximander's identification of individualization with the "fall" and tragic guilt, the creation of actual (as well as potential) individuality in time is good. Instead of losing individuality in the Nirvana of Buddhism, the status of each historical agent in the Kingdom of God is ontologically significant. But the Kingdom of God extends beyond man.

4. The Kingdom of God as Universal

The Kingdom of God is also universal. This fourth factor points to the non-human aspects of the Kingdom of God. Although we have seen that Tillich identifies history (Hp) with man, yet he speaks of the "historical dimension" (Hf) as the most embracing of all life processes.[1] The "dimension of history" in distinction from history proper is Tillich's way of recognizing the evolutionary quality of nature, its change and the emergence of new species. His distinction between nature and history is not as exclusive as was Hegel's.[2] As man has emerged he brings within his nature all the preceding levels. Hence, man is the actual multidimensional unity of all life processes. Man was potential in nature, and nature is actual in man. This view of the multidimensional unity of all life leads Tillich to consider the ontological importance of nature as well as man, since the fulfillment of one dimension implies the fulfillment of all others. Since nature and history cannot be radically separated, the Kingdom of God must, in contrast to supranaturalism, include the teleological significance and fulfillment of nature as well as man. Nature is thus teleological. It too has a goal as part of the divine whole.

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[1] Vol. III, p. 297.

[2] See Collingwood, The Idea of History, pp. 114-15.

5. The Kingdom of God as Immanent and Transcendent

The final and fifth aspect of the Kingdom of God follows from the teleological implications of the former characteristic. The Kingdom of God is both historical and transhistorical, that is, both immanent and transcendent. The symbol "Spiritual Presence" means God present "within" (immanent) the processes of life including man, while "Eternal Life" refers primarily to their transhistorical goal.[1] In contrast to the Greek cyclical view of history, Tillich sees history in terms of an arrow aiming at a target (the metaphor is not Tillich's). Since Tillich holds that history is never utopian, and even if it were the people before the perfect stage would have perished into oblivion unfulfilled, the ultimate end of history is beyond history. If the purpose of creation is to create free persons for God to love as parts of a whole, then if these persons totally fade into nothingness, Tillich's God could be accused of "using" history (the parts) solely for the purpose of fulfilling his own nature as the whole. This would seem to violate or contradict Tillich's definition of love. To avoid this consequence, as well as to provide a fuller motivation for historical action, Tillich is driven to a view of "last things." This will be the subject of the following chapter.

In view of the preceding considerations, The Kingdom of God for Tillich is viewed as political, social, personal, universal, as well as immanent and transcendent. Keeping in mind this general understanding of the basic elements in Tillich's interpretative framework, as well as the contrasting views he opposes, we turn next to the particular problems encountered by historical groups, and then to the way in which the Kingdom of God solves these problems.

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[1] Vol. III, p. 298.

C. The Problem of Ambiguity in Historical Groups

Tillich's analysis of the ambiguities of historical forces is an extension of his treatment of the ambiguities of life, but now under the dimension of history. As his treatment of the ambiguities of life has been already shown to be an application of the basic ontological polarities developed in Volume One, so the ambiguities of history are an application to history of the three-fold life processes of self-integration, self-production, and self-transcendence. The term "ambiguity," as it has been indicated in Chapter Four, refers to the difficulty any center of power or energy has in both "going out" and in "returning" to its original identity. Tillich uses the term "ambiguity" when dealing with life processes, and "estrangement" when discussing man's predicament without focusing on the problems of groups of men. His systematic treatment of both terms, however, is basically the same. In many respects the historical group is the individual writ large. It should be kept in mind that Tillich intends his analysis of the problems of groups to apply to all kinds of groups, all the way from the family, through city government, nations, and international tensions. The task now is, therefore, to explain Tillich's description of the three functions of life and their ambiguities in the dynamics of historical groups.[1]

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[1] Tillich's discussion of the three ambiguities in historical groups is found in Volume III, pp. 339-346.

1. The Ambiguities of Historical Self-Integration: Empire and Particular Centralization

Tillich's primary concern in the ambiguity of historical self-integration is to describe the problems of political power. By "empire" Tillich means the tendency of political life to "go out" into larger unities and become all-inclusive. Man by nature is an empire builder seeking a unity of mankind as a whole. The great empires of the past reveal this tendency, such as the Roman, Germanic, and British empires. Tillich also illustrates the tendency toward empire building in the tendencies of Russia and the United States to extend their influence in various ways. Why is there such a tendency in history?

This striving toward universality comes from two sources, neither of which in insolation is sufficient to account for it. There is first of all a natural self-affirmation or will-to-power, that is, some centered power such as a nation which makes historical acts of history-bearing groups possible. The drive toward all-inclusiveness is also derived from the vocational consciousness or self-interpretation of the group. In the United States, for example, there is both a political-centered power in the government and a vocational consciousness to represent and extend the principle of liberty. Russia likewise has a political center and a vocational consciousness to represent "the depth of humanity against a mechanized culture . . ."[1] The present universal split between the United States and Russia must be explained in each case by their will to economic and political power and by their vocational self-understanding.

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[1] Vol. III, p. 340.

There is a counter movement to empire building, however, a tendency toward particularization, that is "to return" to the original center and maintain a distinct identity. Ambiguity occurs when the forces for empire building and particularization clash. As an individual is estranged from the whole (God) through profanization, so power groups resist larger, more inclusive unities. Ambiguity is seen, for example, when the need for a more centralized city government exists to make progressive action possible is countered by smaller groups and committees representing vested interests. This ambiguity between the expanding tendencies of empires and the forces for particular centralization is also graphically illustrated in the resistance of both the United States and Russia to become integrated under any one principle. In each there is a strong centralized government (particularization) in a world that is struggling for global harmony(empire). It is the nationalistic spirit of particular governments that prevent the actualization of a united mankind and sense of world history.

Up to the present point in history there has been no history of mankind, but only histories of human groups because there has been no global unity. Histories may be compiled and called world history, but they do not represent a unified history of mankind. Tillich believes that the present conquest of space is making a united mankind more possible. It marks a new stage of historical integration (empire) and thus properly designates the twentieth century as one of the great centuries. The nationalistic spirit of particularization clashes with the forces for unity as exemplified in the United Nations. There is ambiguity present, however. Technological advance brings with it greater possibilities of both integration and destruction. "The moment of greatest integration in all history implies the danger of the greatest disintegration, even of radical destruction."[1] Since new possibilities for historical integration exists today, can history be viewed monistically as predominantly the empire for more inclusive world unity?

Tillich asks in this context whether or not it is justifiable to speak of one aim in history. Empirically it cannot be said that every political group has aimed at all-inclusiveness. There has been strong national centeredness which has blocked the impulse toward empire. Facts indicate a tendency against the universalistic element in history. Yet Tillich defends a monistic aim by considering anti-empire tendencies as reaction rather than genuine action. In other words, the drive toward the "whole" is preferred to the ambiguous resistance of parts.[2] The tendency toward particularism is a withdrawal from involvement in expansion. The thrust of historical dynamics is in the direction of empire-building (whole), and all isolationist tendencies (part) are thwarted. The United States, for example, has tried to be isolated, but historical forces have pushed toward closer communication. Tillich's penchant to view history as a "battlefield of the divine and the demonic"[1] still makes him doubtful concerning the possibility of genuine world history which presupposes a world-wide power structure and vocational consciousness. As an individual is always formally free to contradict his essential nature, so particular groups can resist the urge toward a united mankind. But there is yet another way in which the tension and conflict between integration and particularization can be described.

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[1] Vol. III, p. 341.

[2] The difficulty in Tillich's system of showing how the individual part is both free and yet still a part, together with his preference for the whole over the part, parallels his tendency in describing historical ambiguities to give priority to the side of empire-building, the revolutionary new, and the transhistorical whole over the idolatrous claim of historical parts or periods (the last two of which as yet to be considered.).

The ambiguities involved in integration and particularization also apply intensively to tendencies within groups as well as extensively among different historical groups. Each historical group has its own power structure which enables it to act historically, be it a family or a nation. Analogous to the ontological polarity of individualization and participation, there is in a group the relationship of leader (centeredness) and mass (participation). The ambiguity here is the pull between two opposing tendencies within a group; one tendency toward totalitarian control, and another tendency toward personal freedom that makes for creativity. The group needs controlled leadership, but the sustained actions of a dictator tends to become empty and ineffective. Power which loses meaning, loses its power. The group needs individual participation and freedom for historical creativity, but this alone would render a group powerless to act. If no embracing center can be established and if power shifts from one subcenter to another, then despite its creativity it either becomes tragically ineffectual or paves the way for a dictatorial period.

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[1] H. G. Wood, The Kingdom of God and History, (Chicago: Willett Clark, 1938), p. 117.

Since history moves by means of a dialectical tension, and frequently destructive tension, between the impulses toward expansion and particularization, the question arises: How can such ambiguity be conquered? Tillich's answer, as we shall see, is the Kingdom of God.

But there is a second kind of ambiguity found within historical groups which poses some different problems.

2. The Ambiguities of Historical Self-Creativity: Revolution and Reaction

Everything new keeps an element of the old. History drives toward the new, but the new both negates and preserves the old. Hegel described this relation by his term aufgehoben.[1] The latter stage in history implies the former stage. Tillich's stress here is on the destructive possibilities in growth which he believed Hegel slighted. The greatness of history is seen in its "going out" toward the new, while the tragedy of history is the necessary conservative "return" involved in producing the new. Ambiguity occurs when the new and the old clash. This is the problem of the struggle between the old and the new that is seen between generations as well as within political and religious life. There is always the revolution of the new and the reaction of the old.

The basic problem between generations is this struggle between the old and the new. The new generation receives from the creativity of the old generation, but the new generation has not known by experience how the old really worked to solve problems. Tillich views the attacks by the new on the old as tragically both necessary and unfair.

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[1] Vol. III, p. 343.

The new must replace the old as an expression of the ongoing of creativity. It is still unavoidably unfair to the creativity expressed in the old. The older generation reacts to this unfairness negatively. The result all too often is that the old generation becomes hard and bitter, while the new becomes critical and empty. Even if the conflict between the old and the new does not reach revolutionary proportions, still the struggle between conservative and progressive forces in different kinds of groups leads to estrangement, mutual suppression, and revolution.

A revolution, however, can perform a "break through" to a new reality, and in some situations it takes a revolution as, say, in the French and American revolutionary wars. This is destruction for the sake of creation. But many different reactionary forces can follow a revolution. If the revolutionary destruction is too radical, then a new creation is often impossible and utter chaos follows. A revolution can run wild and annihilate even its instigators. Such a possibility is the ideological justification to suppress revolutionary forces or attempt to avoid them by counter-revolution. If this reaction is successful something new has still taken place even if the new disclaims newness.

The question here is; Does creativity always involve the ambiguity of revolution and reaction? Is there unambiguous creativity? This sets up the second problem in the dynamics of history for which Tillich, as we shall see, finds an answer in the Kingdom of God. The third and last problem of ambiguity within historical groups is historical self-integration.

3. The Ambiguities of Historical Self-Transcendence: The "Third Stage" as Given and as Expected

The self-transcendent function of life in history is seen in the tendency of history to run ahead toward inclusiveness and novelty. This function becomes ambiguous when something finite is elevated demonically to infinite value and meaning. In the conflict between the sacred old and the prophetic new, either side can idolatrously claim ultimacy for itself. Groups or periods of history (parts) often claim historical ultimacy to be the whole. This claim of ultimacy is often expressed in the view of the "third" or final stage of history. Augustine viewed the third stage as the age of the church which was just beginning. Joachim de Fiore, and the Montanists who preceded him, spoke of three stages, and believed the third stage was to appear in a few decades. One can add to Tillich's illustrations the expectation of present-day millennialists of a thousand-year reign of Christ on earth.

Although religion provides the best examples of this demonic claim for ultimacy, of the part over the whole, the secular society is not without representatives. The third stage was secularized by the Enlightenment with its "Age of Reason" as expressed by the bourgeoisie. The proletariat express their anticipation of a "classless society." Tillich indicates that two basic difficulties result from such an elevation of some historical period or groups to ultimacy.

On the one hand, when some particular historical group fails to "go out" and absolutizes its present organization, the difficulty is that the self-transcending or creative processes of life are frustrated. This means that the creative forces of the divine whole are blocked. Life becomes static and unfulfilled. Tillich identifies this difficulty with the Roman Church, at least with its traditional stance.

The second difficulty, on the other hand, is with the claim that some future period of history is to be identified with the "third stage." The problem with the utopian dream, as has already been indicated, is its failure to be actualized and its consequent cynicism or despair over disappointed hopes. The disappointed dreamer cannot "return" to his essential identity. Hence, the claim for historical ultimacy is demonic, that is, it either hinders creativity or produces existential despair. Is there an answer to the ambiguity found in historical self-transcendence?

Again Tillich can be shown to seek an answer to this ambiguity in the Kingdom of God. Before proceeding to show specifically how Tillich answers the threefold problem of ambiguity, a fuller understanding of Tillich's philosophy of history can be achieved by observing how God is related to history in general. This analysis will give perspective to Tillich's solution of the problem of ambiguity in history.

D. How the Kingdom of God is Manifested in History in General

The central problem now is how God is related to history. In what way does God account for the historical process? What is the relation between divine and human activity? Walter M. Horton says the relation between God and history is the greatest theological issue in our day, "an issue as important for us as the issue of Christ's divine and human natures was for the post-Nicene Father."[1] This is especially true in our age because of the change in attitude toward history since the nineteenth century. History is no longer conceived in terms of inevitable progress. It does not contain the answer, rather it is the problem. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., is a spokesman of the contemporary attitude toward history.

> History is not a redeemer, promising to solve all human problems in time nor is man capable of transcending the limitations of his being. Man generally is entangled in insoluble problems; history is a constant tragedy in which we are all involved, whose keynote is anxiety and frustration, not progress and fulfillment.[2]

Although we have seen that Tillich is aware of the problems of ambiguity in history, he insists that something arises within history that is not derived from history. Basic human needs are met, if only in a fragmentary manner. In time man hungers and lacks. In his The Courage To Be Tillich offers a phenomenological description of both the threat to every human life of total personal non-fulfillment (non-being), and of the courage to meet this threat.

For example, in place of the threat of the horror of death, the awareness that each individual's hopes and works must one day come to an end, there are moments of "grace" in which the sting of death is removed or conquered. Man also experiences a sense of guilt because of real or imagined wrongdoing. Instead the tortureous self-accusation that comes from the feeling that an individual has missed the way he ought to go, there is a sense of acceptance or personal worth that overtakes one (forgiveness). There is also the feeling that if death has the last word, and if an individual has missed the way he should have gone in life, then life must be utterly devoid of meaning. This threat of meaninglessness is overcome by a sense that some tasks can be taken seriously, and life appears as worth living.

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[1] Charles W. Kegley, and Robert W. Bretall (eds.) The Theology of Paul Tillich (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1961), p. 33.

[2] Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., wrote his well-known essay entitled "The Causes of the American Civil War: A Note on Historical Sentimentalism" in 1949. It is found in The Causes of the American Civil War edited by E. C. Rozwence (Boston: Heath Publishing Co., 1961), pp. 189-190.

Tillich believes that these experiences of "courage" that overcome the threat of death, guilt, and meaninglessness (nonbeing) have a "revealing power" that point to the nature of being-itself.[1] His answer to Schlesinger, then, is that being is prior to nonbeing, or less abstractly, that the ultimately Real is working toward human fulfillment. The universe is congenial, not hostile or indifferent, to human aspirations. Both Tillich and Schlesinger could share similar ideals, but Tillich seeks a greater ontological support. Man can experience something in Reality that fulfills his deepest hunger and fills his sense of lack with meaning. The term "God" is the religious symbol that indicates the source of courage that overcomes the ambiguities that threaten and oppresses human existence.

Tillich's interpretation of history is an attempt to explain the nature of the Reality that could account for and point in the direction of the answer to the ambiguities encountered within history. To ascertain his answer in more detail, we shall note first what Tillich means in general when he claims that God is manifested in history, and, secondly, focus on the particular identifying content of God's manifestation.

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[1] See Tillich, The Courage To Be, p. 181.

1. What It Does Not Mean to Say that God is Manifested in History

If we are to be clear about how God is related to history, it is necessary to be aware of what Tillich opposes. Although it may be that Tillich creates a straw man to attack as far as most sophisticated theologians are concerned, he is adamant in his fight against the popular understanding of how God is related to history. The popular understanding is "super" naturalism which induced him to change the prefix to "supra." This prefix "indicates a higher level of reality in which divine action takes place without connection with world history."[1] Tillich totally rejects the idea of God as a self-sufficient being on a level "above" the world who miraculously intervenes at special times in ways that contradict our most scientifically dependable ways of understanding nature and history. Tillich does not believe in miracles as popularly understood. He wants to eliminate the idea of God as a kind of *deus ex machina*. As revelation was seen not to represent some supranatural invasion of reason by a strange body of knowledge which contradicts our rationality, so the Kingdom of God does not refer to some divine "act" in history which miraculously interferes with the empirical chain of events describable by established methods of historical research. "The church historian is not supposed to write a history of divine interferences in world history when he writes of the Christian churches."[2] God is thus not a stranger, an individual up in the air somewhere who may not be related to history.[1]

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[1] Vol. III, p. 363.

[2] Vol. III, p. 384.

In other words, God does not "act" in history in the same manner as historical agents. God does not "act" in history as one cause along side of others. God is not one cause among others within the subject-object relationship of history. God does not act "from outside in a particular causality."[2] To avoid this confusion Tillich prefers to speak of "the manifestation of the Kingdom of God in history," rather than "acts" of God."[3] God's "manifestation" in history is thus not a matter for empirical investigation. From what Collingwood calls the "outside" of an historical event, God's manifestation is indistinguishable from man's action. What then is the positive meaning of the relation of God to history?

Rather than some particular actor, God is the "ground" of being and is creative in everything as a pervasive presence that can "break through" in any experience potentially, but who is manifested in special qualities "inside" historical events. That is to say, God is found in certain ways of expanding and shaping man's conscious awareness both distributively in individuals and collectively in groups. God is found in certain attitudes and qualities of human experience, the content of which we shall note shortly.[1]

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[1] Tillich speaks in this manner. See Brown, Ultimate Concern . . . , p. 48.

[2] Brown, Ultimate Concern . . . , p. 175.

[3] Vol. III, pp. 363-64.

The identification of God with certain kinds of human experience, however, is not to reduce theology to anthropology as did Feuerbach. It has been shown that the evolutionary development of life culminating in human self-consciousness is one with the ontological movement of being-itself. In Hegelian fashion Tillich's vision of ultimate reality is one that includes "more" than the human equation. This "more" is phenomenological describable as "grace," as a gift from the source of all life. Although man is part of the divine whole, Tillich's axiom of transcendence requires that the abysmal whole be more than the sum of its parts. This is what Tillich means when he says the "saving power breaks into history, works through history, but is not created by history."[2]

Now that it has been seen what it does not mean for God to be manifested in history, the important question is how to distinguish the divine forces from the ambiguous forces of history. How does Tillich provide criteria by which to distinguish demonic possession from divine ecstacy? Since Tillich desires social transformation he needs to point to the direction social change ought to take. How God is more specifically identified in history is our next problem.

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[1] Concerning the emphasis on God as working "within" both nature and history, Tillich says: "This is a good old Thomistic idea, namely, that God acts in the world by secondary causes, which means through the inner nature of the creaturely things themselves." Brown, Ultimate Concern . . ., p. 175. In terms of the part-whole model, this means that God is not one part (the highest or largest) acting on other parts, but is the whole making conscious its properties as a whole, properties that already reside unconsciously in the parts. How the parts enjoy a freedom or contingency in relationship to the whole is not clear in Tillich's system.

[2] Vol. III, p. 363.

2. What it Means to Say that God is Manifested in History

There are strains in Tillich's thought that need to be systematically brought together in order to understand more fully how God works in history. These strains involve his views of God as incarnate, as *kairos*, as creative power, and as redeeming love.

a) God as Normatively Present in the Incarnation

Nels Ferré accuses Tillich of not having a doctrine of "Incarnation of being as well as of meaning, in the full, literal sense . . . " or a doctrine of the church "which in some real sense *incarnates* as well as *represents* the Kingdom."[1] Tillich is aware of Ferré's criticism, but sees it as a criticism from the standpoint of the kind of supranaturalism he rejects in favor of his own position which he refers to as self-transcending or ecstatic naturalism. Tillich responds to a number of Ferré's criticisms as follows:

> Mr. Ferré is afraid that this attitude makes my idea of God transcendental instead of transcendent, that it prevents a genuine doctrine of incarnation, that it implies the negation of personal immortality, that it evaporates the independent character of the Church, that it denies a realistic eschatology. He is right if "transcendent" means the establishment of a divine being from a heavenly place and its metamorphosis into a human being, if "immortality" is understood as the continuation of temporal existence after death, if the latent church within cultures and religions is denied, if a dramatic end-catastrophe some time in the future is affirmed. All this is a supranaturalism against which my theology stands.[2]

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[1] Nels F. S. Ferré, *Searchlights on Contemporary Theology* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1961), p. 131.

[2] Kegley and Bretall, *The Theology of Paul Tillich*, p. 341.

We select from this array of criticisms, each of which is relevant to what has preceded or is yet to come, Tillich's reaction to the idea of a literal incarnation. Behind much of Ferré's criticism is his contention, shared with others, that in Tillich the Christian message is subordinated to philosophical speculation about being-itself.[1]

Tillich's comments, however, do inform us that he is quite intentionally reconstructing many classical statements of Christian theology in an intellectual attempt to shepherd our secular age. Consequently, instead of saying that Tillich has no "real" doctrine of the incarnation in the Christ or the churches, or that he has no "real" doctrine of creation, it is better to inquire into what kind of doctrines he does have on these matters, and whether or not they are internally coherent with the rest of his system and evocative of the kind of social transformation he seeks. What then does Tillich mean by incarnation?

The incarnation of Jesus as the Christ represents what Tillich calls the "center of history."[2] Tillich acknowledges that this affirmation is a confessional one, not capable of objective proof. This is the reason he speaks of Jesus "as the" Christ, to make it clear that "Christ" is not the last name of Jesus but is rather a faith stance. In order to avoid the supranaturalistic connotations of the incarnation, Tillich prefers to speak of the central manifestation of the Kingdom of God in history. This means that in the life and death of Jesus the Christian finds "the appearance of the ultimate meaning of life in history."[1] The problem is to ascertain just what this ultimate meaning constitutes.

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[1] See George H. Tavard, Paul Tillich and the Christian Message (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1962), and Kenneth Hamilton, The System and the Gospel (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1963).

[2] Vol. III, p. 364.

In the New Testament account of Jesus as the Christ the ultimate meaning of history for Tillich is revealed and thus becomes "the ultimate criterion."[2] In terms of our explanatory categories in Chapter Two, the uniqueness and centrality of Jesus as the Christ can be said to mean that in his personal existence the axioms of transcendence and harmony are fully revealed. The event of Christ is the center of history because it provides for Tillich the criterion by which history is evaluated. The axiom of transcendence means here that God's abysmal power was efficacious in uniting essence and existence in a personal life. This means that New Being was present in Jesus transforming his potential (true) nature fully into actuality, and in overcoming possible estrangement[3] viewed, as we have seen, in terms of profanization and demonization. Instead of the profanization of "unbelief" expressed by turning away from the sublime whole or divine center, there is "faith." Instead of the demonization of hubris expressed in terms of self-evaluation, there is "surrender."[4] Jesus as the Christ was thus man in full unity with the divine life as an "eternal God-man-unity."[1] Jesus was a fulfilled part of the divine whole. All of this is implied in Tillich's abstract formulation of being-itself as the power of being to resist or overcome nonbeing.[2] God conceived as the divine whole driving toward the actualization of finitude (part), as described in Chapter Three, supports this interpretation of the incarnation.

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[1] Wood, The Kingdom . . ., p. 119.

[2] Brown, Ultimate Concern . . ., p. 139.

[3] Vol. II, p. 119.

[4] Vol. II, p. 177.

But it was argued in Chapter Three, moreover, that the power of life is also the power or drive of love. God as love suggests the second criterion of ultimate meaning which makes the Christ the center of history for Tillich, that is, the axiom of harmony. Jesus as the Christ represents the concrete manifestation of ontological model of love. Instead of the Freudian estranged id or concupisence, there is essential love.[3] The New Being in Jesus reveals "the self-surrendering love which represents and actualizes the divine love in taking the existential self-destruction upon himself."[4] The notion of the suffering of Christ on the cross for the world is a window through which man sees nonbeing within God from the inside, that is, through which man becomes aware of "the suffering that God takes upon himself by participating in existential estrangement for the state of unconquered negativity. Here the doctrine of the living

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 148.

[2] Vol. II, p. 125.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 177.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 138.

God and the doctrine of atonement coincide."[1] Since estrangement is defined by Tillich in terms of polar disruption, it follows that God is that redeeming love seen in the Christ that makes for polar harmony between solitude and communion, vitality and intentionality, and freedom and destiny.

The question arises in connection with the uniqueness of Jesus as to whether or not Jesus is the only "part" that can be completely fulfilled. Although Tillich is skeptical concerning historical details, he does believe that the New Testament reveals the image of an actual person who "never" was estranged from God, that is, was never overtaken by unbelief, hubris, or concupiscence.[2] Jesus was _a_ man who always possessed the qualities of _the_ ideal man. The normative unconscious was fully conscious in him at all times. Tillich believed Jesus was unique, on the one hand, because this was the first time such a person appeared in history.[3] The prophets in the Old Testament expected the Messiah, but they did not represent in their lives the essence of the Kingdom of God.

On the other hand, Jesus is unique because probably there have been no other persons since him who have enjoyed an uninterrupted unity with God. Tillich is not dogmatic at this point, however. Since Jesus personified the true (Christ-like) nature of all men, there is no logical reason why another man (part) might not achieve the same unity. The goal is a possible one. In fact, Tillich acknowledges that the final stages of sainthood of individuals like Teresa of Avila or John of the Cross might well have been identical with the nature of Jesus. In this context Tillich says:

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[1] _Ibid._, p. 175.

[2] Vol. II, p. 126.

[3] Brown, _Ultimate Concern . . ._, p. 139.

> The question of whether the approximation leads to a full identity would have to be resolved by examining the inner souls of the saints in their latest and most perfect development.[1]

But even in the saints' "most perfect development" the "scars" of their previous separation from God before reaching their highest stage would never entirely disappear. The problem, then, of whether or not there can ever be another person like Jesus is an empirical and open-ended one. But Jesus would still be the "center" of history by virtue of being the first break-through of the Kingdom of God. Now, where has our discussion brought us thus far?

Tillich provides a summary statement combining our interpretation of the axiom of transcendence in terms of the abysmal power that aims at fulfilling humanity, and the axiom of harmony which defines the nature of fulfillment as *agape*-love.

> The special concept in Christianity is that a part of the divine, the heart of the divine, appeared in him [Jesus]. So I would say that from both sides--from God's side his heart, namely his *agape*, and from man's side his full humanity--the divine appeared in the Christ.[2]

As the ultimate criterion, Jesus as the Christ provides the norm by which the divine forces in history are distinguished from the demonic. Whatever movements in history point in the direction of fulfilling humanity by overcoming profanization anddemonization, and revealing agape-love, are the ones to be supported. Whatever works against these tendencies should be opposed. But our analysis of Tillich's meaning of the incarnation is not complete without further observing its connection with his doctrine of kairos.

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 144.

[2] Brown, *Ultimate Concern . . .*, p. 214.

b) God as Present in Kairos and Kairoi

"Kairos" is a Greek term with a rich and varied connotation. Richard B Onians traces its meaning back to the idea of a target at which a Greek archer would aim.[1] It also is connected with the idea of an opening through which a weaver would shoot his woof-thread. Thus, Kairos has the connotation of a target at which to aim, an opening that is ready for something to be thrust into it. Tillich takes its general meaning in the Greek language as a word "used for any practical purpose in which a good occasion from some action is given".[2] Aristotle used the term to signify the good in the category of time. There is a right moment for something to be done. In the New Testament, Jesus says that his time of suffering and death has not yet come, both Jesus and John the Baptist speak of fulfilled time in the announcement that the Kingdom of God is at hand, and Paul too uses kairos for the moment of time in which God decides to send his son into the world.

It is this Pauline meaning that Tillich uses when he speaks of the great or unique kairos, the normative manifestation of the Kingdom of God as the center of history in Jesus as the Christ. Kairos stands symbolically for the turning point in history, the time in which the eternal bursts through with momentous consequences calling for decision and action either for or against. In this sense then kairos is a qualitative aspect of time, as contrasted with kronos which is simply quantitative clock time. There is no kairos without kronos, but not the converse. There are times that are not ripe for certain action. They may be too early or too late. The English word "timing" suggests this qualitative aspect of time. But at one particular moment in time a chronos became a kairos, eternity broke into time, and God's providential "timing" revealed the meaning and purpose of human history. In this context Oscar Cullman dramatically refers to the appearance of kairos as "D-Day."[1] Tillich uses kairos in an inclusive sense as an insight into the dynamics of historical time. It becomes a fundamental interpretative category of history.[2]

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[1] Richard B. Onians, The Origin of European Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1951), pp. 343-48.

[2] Vol. III, p. 369. Also, see The Protestant Era, p. 27.

Although there was one unique kairos, the experience of a kairos is repeated many times in church history and world history. There are times of opportunity which are pregnant with possibilities, times when ideas are ripe for action, times when there is a feeling that something great can happen. The "Great Kairos" (center) is re-experienced in smaller kairoi in which the coming of the Kingdom of God is experienced in a particular way. But everything stands under the Great Kairos, and if it does not, it becomes demonic. Jesus as the Christ is the criterion for all historical development. The Great Kairos also points to the source of power of other kairoi. In Tillich's words,

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[1] Oscar Cullman, Christ and Time, The Primitive Christian Conception of Time and History (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1950), p. 39.

[2] See Tillich's brief but lucid account of kairos in volume III, pp. 369-372. Compare The Protestant Era, pp. xv, 32-51; The Kingdom of God and History, pp. 123-124; The Interpretation of History, pp. 123-175, 249-251; The Theology of Paul Tillich by Kegley and Bretall, pp. 345-346.

> The relation of the one kairos to the kairoi is the relation of the criterion to that which stands under the criterion and the relation of the source of power to that which is nourished by the source of power.[1]

Tillich's meaning can be illustrated here by his experience in Nazi Germany. When a theologian like Hirsh used the category of kairos to justify the coming of Hitler, Tillich wrote against this by referring to the destructive character of nationalism and racism viewed under the judgment of the cross, the great kairos. False prophets may arise, and against them stands the absolute criterion.

How is the experience of a kairos received? Tillich believes it is more a matter of intuitive vision than detached scientific observation. This is not to say that the social sciences are excluded, since they may well serve to make the situation clearer. But the feeling or vision of a kairos transcends scientific analysis. It is primarily a matter of "participation," an involved experience. For example, Tillich maintains that August 1, 1914 was experienced in Central Europe as the end of the nineteenth century. There was a climate of anticipation, a feeling that this was a time pregnant with possibilities. Tillich was a leader at this time of the Religious Socialist Movement which sought to apply Christian principles to social dimensions. This feeling was not empirically confirmed, at least in any full measure, because the Religious Socialist Movement was not able to root satisfactorily their principles in the power structures of the day. This raises the problem of freedom and destiny with reference to kairoi.

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[1] Vol. III, p. 370. Also see Wood, The Kingdom of God and History, p. 124.

Kairotic moments are not deterministic. There is contingency in history. There are trends in history, not absolute laws defining the direction of historical dynamics. Kairoi can be demonically distorted and they can fail as well as succeed. One is reminded here of Toynbee's categories of challenge and response. The kairos quality is not in error, but the judgement about how to execute it can be. Here technological know-how is important. It is one thing to criticize the demonic tendencies of nationalism, but it is quite another thing to be able to implement positive action in a definite program. But even here there is destiny as well as freedom operating. No plans are absolutely fool proof, and nothing can be foreseen completely. Today, we could point to a kairos-quality in the negro-white relations in the United States. There is a climate of opinion and feeling that it is time for something to be done now, but any concrete plan involves risk. The emphasis on "black power" by many in the Negro community, for example, could create a white back-lash and abort the pregant possibility by changing the climate of opinion. Although it is clear that Tillich describes various kairoi in nondeterministic categories, do the same categories apply to the great kairos?

Did Jesus have to become the Christ? Tillich attempts to answer this question with the same categories that he approaches lesser kairoi. On the one hand, Jesus is free. His temptations are real, just like any man's.[1]

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[1] Vol. II, p. 129.

Yet, on the other hand, the freedom of Jesus must be seen in connection with his destiny. Jesus "is not isolated; he is the central link in the chain of divine revelations."[1] The great _Kairos_ is a unity of freedom and destiny as are other _kairoi_. The history of the Christ is "determined in the same way as history is generally and as the history of every individual man."[2] Tillich formulates the relationship between human freedom (the part) and divine destiny (the whole) in the following manner:

> God's directing creativity in the case of man works through his freedom. Man's destiny is determined _by_ the divine creativity, but _through_ his finite freedom.[3]

It was maintained in Chapter Four that Tillich's does not satisfactorily describe the psychological process of human freedom, nor explain how a part can be really free in the whole. Tillich's formulation of the relation between freedom and destiny in the life of Jesus is an illustration of this criticism. He does not want to say that man's salvation is contingent on the mere decision of one man, nor does he want to say the one man had nothing to do with it. Yet Tillich fails to show his reader how the polar "unity" of freedom and destiny is anything but mere juxtaposition of two opposing answers. Jesus need not have been the Christ on the one hand, and yet he was destined to be on the other hand. The relationship here between freedom and destiny is obscure, if not contradictory. The next problem concerns the absence of _Kairoi_ in history.

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[1] _Ibid._, p. 130.

[2] _Ibid._

[3] _Ibid._

Are there periods of history in which no kairoi are experienced? Tillich believes there are.

> History does not move in an equal rhythm but is a dynamic force moving through cataracts and quiet stretches. History has its ups and downs, its periods of speed and of slowness, of extreme creativity and of conservative bondage to tradition.[1]

The Kingdom of God is always present in man's unconscious depths, but the "breaking-through" of kairoi are not. There are dark nights of the soul for mystics, and there are periods in the history of the church when there is a dearth of Spirit. "Kairoi are rare and the great kairos is unique, but together they determine the dynamics of history in its self-transcendence."[2] How does Tillich view the present situation?

What about the situation today in Europe and the United States? Tillich points out how there was a different experience after World War II than after World War I. After World War I there was a felt Kairos. But after World War II soldiers came back without enthusiasm, with no crusading spirit. Today there is anxiety, but no real sense of what theologians have called the "mighty acts" of God in history. There is a sense of void or, more paradoxically, a positive feeling of the lack of feeling. Now what conclusion can be drawn about Tillich's use of kairoi as an interpretative category of history?

What Tillich is really seeking with his doctrine of Kairos is a substitute for the progressive interpretation of history. There is no monistic line of historical progress. But there are relatively slow periods in which potentialities for solving particular problems mature, and then the ripe "moment" appears that calls for a decision by historical groups to act against what is wrong (demonic) and for solving a particular social problem. The solution of a problem is judged by the kairos, the unique manifestation of God in the Christ. These great moments of pregant possibilities are not inevitably fulfilled, in either the great Kairos or lesser kairoi, since they demand human response. Neither do they form a progressive line of fulfilled moments. Each problem is a particular one, and not necessarily connected with a past kairotic moment. Neither is any particular solution of the moment total and complete, since new destructive possibilities can arise through man's formal freedom. By thus keeping open and sensitive to particular problems, like the race problem for example, and responding in action, men can uncover the unconscious "meaning" in life. Since there is no guarantee of success nor utopian dream, cynicism and despair need not follow failure. There will be new possibilities or new problems which Toynbee calls "challenges," and new demands for "response." Tillich is thus seeking the basis for a theology of social change, calling for men to look for God's continuous action in the social ferment of our times, and to assume responsibility for directing the present revolutionary forces in light of incarnational norms.

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[1] Vol. III, p. 371.

[2] Vol. III, p. 372.

The difference between Tillich's view of history and the naturalistic views of men like Dewey and Fromm is primarily ontological. Neither Dewey or Fromm believe in an inevitable line of historical progress, and both call social action in humanitarian directions whenever possible. For Tillich, however, the problem is to "return" to or uncover a prior structure in man's unconscious depths. He does not believe with many existentialists that order is created. Order is rather discovered or uncovered. The structure of the parts is created by the whole from the beginning. Like Plato's theory of Reminiscence, they need only to be aroused from their dormancy. Moreover, God as the abysmal whole is supporting the goal of history, the achievement of free man in a community. But the order is not inevitable since God bestows freedom on the parts and accepts the "risk" that finite freedom implies.[1] The whole does not force men to be free (material freedom), but rather, as we shall develop later, "lures" men to maturity.[2]

Still further light on Tillich's theology of social change can be found by showing more concretely how his ontology supports his call for historical for historical action and how it ties in with the norm supplied by the incarnational center of history.

c) God Present as Creative Power

As the norms for evaluating the historical process are given in Jesus as the Christ, so the corresponding source of power to apply these norms are supplied by Tillich's ontology. An interpretation of Tillich's ontology was given in Chapter Three. The task here is to relate the conclusions of this chapter more specificially to the question of how God is manifested within history. Since man's essential (potential) nature was shown to be one with the divine whole, and since God was identified as the power of being that makes for the actualization of man's true nature, it follows that God can be identified with those qualitative or "depth" experiences of man that develop his essential manhood. A greater understanding of Tillich's systematic thought is possible by observing how these "fulfilling" experiences form a cleavage which corresponds to the incarnational norms which we have identified with the axioms of transcendence and harmony.[1] At this point we shall observe how God is present in terms of the axioms of transcendence, and then in the following section how God is present in light of the axiom of harmony.

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[1] Vol. I, p. 269.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 267. Tillich has the same problem Augustine had, namely, how to reconcile the belief in human freedom with divine providence. They affirm both, but the element of destiny takes precedence in both men. Augustine could not answer the problem satisfactorily because of his commitment to the belief in God's perfection. Tillich's axiom of transcendence is a restatement of the Augustinian view of God's completeness, and his part-whole ontological model adds further difficulties by not informing us how the whole can confer freedom on the parts.

Since the axiom of transcendence stands for God's abysmal and inexhaustible power, God can be seen in history in terms of the power within human consciousness that fulfills man's essential nature. The abysmal power that fulfills man is at the same time the fulfillment of the divine whole. The term "creative" therefore means the appearance of novelty within the divine life, and not the creation of beings who are wholly external to God. The doctrine of God's creation is not a supranaturalistic account of God creating a separate world in six days in the past, but represents an eternal ontological movement in which God is fulfilling his own divine nature. This is what Tillich means when he says that "God is eternally creative, that through himself he creates the world and through the world himself. There is no divine nature which could be abstracted from his eternal creativity."[1] The urge toward fulfillment within human self-consciousness is one with the divine fulfillment. God is the urge or eros in all life processes toward wholeness and fulfillment.

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[1] These axioms were shown to be the cognitive content of his doctrine of revelation in Chapter One.

This inner urge and power for fulfillment is more specifically described by Tillich as "faith." Faith is the subjective reception by finite centers (parts) of the objective creative power (new being) of God (whole). Faith is identified by Tillich with those kinds of human experiences that overcome non-being, that is, the negative and the destructive forces of demonization and profanization. Since this kind of power was normatively expressed in Christ as the "center of history," Tillich defines faith as "the state of being grasped by the New Being as it is manifested in Jesus as the Christ."[2] This kind of faith viewed in terms of the actualization of human potentialities is "the purpose of creation."[3] It is hence Tillich's "ultimate concern." Tillich's doctrine of faith is directly related to his view of providence.

God's providential role in history can be seen as the inner urge to go on "in spite of" obstacles. God is the originating, sustaining, and directing power of all life. The providence of God does not mean for Tillich that God works supranaturally in history in some magical way as an external cause. Neither does it mean that God is in control of historical events in a deterministic manner. Tillich intends that the freedom of the part to resist the whole be taken seriously. Rather Tillich's belief in providence is the confidence built on experiences of faith that man's "courage to be" has an ontological ground, that the forces of the universe are behind the realization of human potentialities. In Tillich's words,

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[1] Vol. II, p. 147.

[2] Vol. III, p. 131.

[3] Vol. I, p. 263.

> Providence is a quality of every constellation of conditions, a quality which "drives" or "lures" toward fulfillment. Providence is the "divine condition" which is present in every group of finite conditions and in the totality of finite condition. It is not an additional factor, a miraculous physical or mental interference in terms of supranaturalism. It is the quality of inner directness present in every situation.[1]

But it is not enough just to say that God works for human fulfillment. There are many ideas of what constitutes fulfillment. Hitler had one idea, and Marx another. It is not enough to experience divine power. The question arises, power for what? For Tillich, ontological power must be connected with ontological love. God would not be the God of worship without love. This leads to a consideration of God's manifestation in history as redeemer.

d) God Present as Redeeming Love

As the ontological movement "goes out" in creative power, it "returns" to itself as redeeming or reconciling love. It has been seen in Chapter Three that the divine power viewed from the "inside" is divine love. Divine love is the "reason" for divine creativity. God proceeds from an original unity toward individualization or variety to create a content to love. Since love is only possible, according to Tillich, when there is freedom to accept or reject love, the climax of God's creation is human self-consciousness with its capacity for formal freedom. The extent of God's love is seen at the "center of history" where "God reveals himself to us and reconciles us to him through the Mediator."[1] God as redeeming love points to an ontological source that corresponds to the second incarnational norm expressed by the axiom of harmony.

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[1] Vol. I, p. 267.

An analysis of Tillich's view of love has already been given, as well as the relation of agape-love to ethics. It is essential here only to point out first that Tillich provides an ontological source for his second incarnational norm, and second to identify love with the concept of polar unity. First, it should be observed that although there are two distinguishable cleavages of experience that indicate the presence of God in history, they are not separable. Being-itself is manifested as creative power, and love is its creation. God's power and love, it should be remembered, are the cognitive content of his doctrine of revelation and operate as presuppositions in his system. Tillich is saying more than the statement love is God, for this would only mean along with Eric Fromm that love in human relationships is of supreme importance and that we should commit ourselves to it. Tillich means that God is love, and this makes love a window to what lies beyond the human equation to its abysmal, more-than-human source. Since there is only one ontological source, being-itself is both abysmal power and agape-love. Love is received as a gift of grace. Hence faith and love are two aspects of the same thing. Tillich makes this clear in Volume Three.

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[1] Vol. II, p. 170.

> The receiving function of man in this experience is faith; the actualizing function is love. Health in the ultimate sense of the word, health as identical with salvation, is life in faith and love.[1]

The second point to be emphasized here, as a foundation for what comes next, is that love is identified with the power that makes for polar unity in man. God as the power making for polar unity was expressed earlier is the meaning of the axiom of harmony. It has been seen that all life processes are in a polar or dialictical tension between "going out" and "returning." The term "ambiguity" refers as we have seen to the difficulty encountered in both directions. A person, for example, may fail to go out of his shell of seclusion because of the "non-being" of hatred and hostility. Or, he may go out toward union with another person or group "too far" in terms of submergence, and not be able to return to his true identity and be himself.

God conceived in terms of divine power and love is the answer to this state of estrangement. God is life without ambiguity (unambiguous life) which means that God overcomes all obstacles involved in both going out in creative power and in returning to himself. In the divine life the three basic ontological polarities which provide Tillich with different ways of describing polar disruptions are perfectly balanced.[2] When the divine whole gives power to the estranged parts, it thus gives them power to overcome non-being (faith) which is at the same time power for polar harmony (love).

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[1] Vol. III, p. 280.

[2] Vol. III, pp. 401-402.

This identification of love with polar harmony can be illustrated by recalling the meaning of love as eros and agape. In man, for example, eros is the urge for relatedness with other people. But agape is both a forgiving love and a love which respects the individuality of the beloved. This view of agape follows from the model of God as seeking reunion with the estranged parts, but without amalgamating the part with the whole. Agape is the divine justice that protects individuality in the process of reunion. The stress here is thus on both poles, the pole of individualization and the pole of participation. Neither side is lost. This kind of love comes only from God[1] and is illustrated in, say, a parent-child relationship in which the parent fully seeks the development of the child but without domination and disrespect for the child's individuality. The parent, to be more specific, does not force the child into a vocation he does not want or mould him into the parent's image. The ideal of polar unity is thus achieved with full individuality, on the one hand, and companionship (communion) on the other hand. In light of these remarks concerning how God is manifested within the historical process, what can be said?

To sum up, God is manifested in history in certain qualities of human experience. The norms for identifying God's presence are found in the Christ considered as the "center of history" and expressed in what has been called the axioms of transcendence and harmony. The concept Kairos develops from the sense of timing or "fulness of time" in which the center of history was revealed. From this notion of a central *kairos* Tillich develops an interpretation of the dynamics of historical change in terms of lesser *kairoi*. *Kairoi* are great moments in history where the conditions are ripe to solve some particular social problem and thus direct the forces of history in light of the central *kairos*. Tillich supports his revealed norms by developing an ontology that corresponds as a source of power in the directions the norms indicate. Hence God is manifested in human consciousness as the creative power making for human fulfillment and as the redemptive love making for polar unity. Lack of fulfillment is due to delegated power of the parts to either disregard or usurp the divine power of the whole. The ontological source of power and love is correlated respectively with the incarnational norms expressed by the axioms of transcendence and harmony.

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[1] Vol. III, p. 137.

With an understanding of how God is manifested in history in general, we can now more adequately understand what Tillich means by the Kingdom of God as the answer to the three-fold ambiguities encountered in historical groups.

E. How the Kingdom of God is Manifested in the Ambiguities of Historical Groups

The Kingdom of God is Tillich's answer to the three-fold ambiguities encountered by historical groups. As each ambiguity and its corresponding answer is treated separately, it should be kept in mind that Tillich's *motif* is to indicate some basic principles by which God can be identified in social change. He wants to answer the question of how God is working for man now in a time of revolutionary upheaval.

He is attempting to avoid the Scylla of indiscriminately and fanatically identifying any social action with the Will of God, and the Charbydis of denouncing the historical process as devoid of any ontological significance.

1. The Kingdom of God and the Ambiguity of Political Power

The first ambiguity is the ambiguity of political power both among groups and within groups. In the first instance of the group to group relationship, say in international relations, ambiguity is expressed by the dialectical tension between the tendency of a power group called "nation" to expand and include other groups (empire), and the resistance offered by these other groups (particularization). Now power for Tillich "is the eternal possibility of resisting non-being," and as such is divine in its essential nature.[1] This means in terms of our previous analysis that power is identified with God as creative power expressed in the axiom of transcendence. This means that God is the source of the urge of group A to form a more inclusive unity or union with groups B and C. But this power of group A becomes ambiguous (estranged) when it exercises compulsion and tries to force groups B and C into its domain as in the case of Hitler. The Kingdom of God is present when the expanding tendency of group A (God as creator) forms a more inclusive unity that still protects the individual rights of groups B and C (God as redeeming love). The expanding power of group A must be in harmony with the agape-love that protects groups B and C from being used as mere means for group A's expansion. Thus when a sense of community is established among nations by a higher unity, or even a mutually agreed union, as in the case of Alaska and the United States, the Kingdom of God is present. When the kairotic moment comes for expanding political unity, in harmony with the justice of agape-love, men should put their efforts behind it. When union is sought by compulsion by aggressive nations, men should fight to oppose it. Compulsive power is needed to oppose ambiguous and unjust compulsive power. The Kingdom of God also opposes hate propaganda between nations and any tendencies that make for misunderstanding and distrust. Tillich expresses the kind of group to group relationships consonant with the Kingdom of God in the following manner:

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[1] Vol. III, p. 385.

> The ambiguity of empire-building is fragmentarily conquered when higher political unities are created which, although they are not without the compulsory element of power, are nonetheless brought about in such a way that community between the united groups can develop and none of them is transformed into a mere object of centered control.[1]

Tillich offers a practical implication of his position concerning political power by referring to the nature of nuclear war. He seeks a middle way between pacificism and militarism for solving the problem of world order. This is not to say that pacificism as a symbol of peace is wrong, or that some wars have not been just, although in the latter case it is extremely difficult to determine what constitutes a just war. In any case, today "The Kingdom of God can and must condemn a war which has only the appearance of a war but is in reality universal suicide."[2] An atomic war could never be constructed as a just war since it would destroy the unity sought by the Kingdom of God. The United States must have a nuclear stock pile, but only for the purpose of a threat to deter a nuclear holocaust.

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[1] Vol. III, p. 378.

[2] Vol. III, p. 387.

The other kind of relationship involving the first ambiguity of political power is that of the structure of power within a group. The answer here is similar in kind to the relation among groups. God as creator is the source of the power that holds a group together. God as redeeming love is the source of the justice that protects the individuality of the members of a group and works against submergence. The Kingdom of God is present in the internal power structure of a history-bearing group whenever attitudes and institutions are democratized and the tendency to make individual members into objects is overcome, if only fragmentarily. The Kingdom of God is manifested when justice conquers, and justice refers to the "protection of the individual as a potential personality in a community."[1]

The incarnational norm is expressed here as material freedom (love as polar harmony) within the structure power (power overcoming non-being). The norm, expressed differently, is the use of power that fulfills life in the context of freedom. Freedom within a necessary political power structure is what Tillich takes to be the moral meaning of democracy. Moral democracy can be achieved in political structures other than political democracy, such as a benevolent monarchy. The Kingdom of God is thus not connected with any particular political structure. Rather, Tillich finds ontological support for any political system that refrains from using individuals as mere cogs and tools of political and/or economic purposes and fulfills human potentialities. And since power is essentially divine, men should not pacifistically resist power but rather struggle to use power and even compulsion for the sake of justice needed to create and preserve relations of love both among and within groups. There is yet another kind of ambiguity in history to which the Kingdom of God is the answer.

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[1] Vol. III, p. 386.

2. The Kingdom of God and the Ambiguity of Social Growth

The function of life called self-production, or self-creativity, gives rise to the ambiguity between the dialectical forces of revolution and tradition involved in social growth. The principle of revolution is needed to provide change and growth. God as creative power is the source of new life. Yet without tradition the institutions involved in change would lose their identity. God as redeeming love seeks to protect the identity needed for continuity in change. There is always a tension between the conservative pull of the past and the revolutionary thrust toward the new. Where is the Kingdom of God manifested in such a tension? Tillich answers:

> A victory of the Kingdom of God creates a unity of tradition and revolution in which the unfairness of social growth and its destructive consequences, "lies and murder," are overcome.[1]

By identifying God with the revolutionary creator of new values as well as with the conservation of the values of the past, Tillich criticizes the Christian church, in Marxian fashion for usually identifying God with the pull of the past. Too often the church, and we might add the United States except in our own revolution, has failed to see God in the revolutionary forces of our age. An age of revolution demands a theology of revolution, a theology that puts new values on an equal basis with old ones and judges both kinds in terms of their ability to fulfill man's essential potentialities.

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[1] Vol. III, p. 388.

Does Tillich provide any concrete guidance concerning how to harmonize the old and the new? Tillich only offers general principles, not specific examples. He admits that it takes "daring faith" to apply principles to concrete situations, and that judgments are fallible. By failing to give concrete and more specific goals, he makes it difficult for one to know just where the Kingdom of God is providing the answer. Yet he does seek to qualify man's awareness of social change by pointing to the need for orderly and organic change, change that recognizes the need for some continuity in the midst of change. Without some continuity change would be chaos; without growth life would be static. He calls for groups to provide for change within their structures like, for example, constitutional amendments. The fact that the historical process never stops but is always changing leads to the third historical ambiguity.

3. The Kingdom of God and the Ambiguity of Self-Transcendence

The third ambiguity of the self-transcendent function of life is caused by the dialectical tension between hope for complete historical fulfillment and the acknowledgement of its impossibility. We have seen how Tillich's doctrine of *kairoi* is an attempt to avoid the despair of the unfulfilled hopes of progressivistic interpretations of history by pointing to the need for men to respond to particular social problems when the time is auspicious. There is hope for a solution, but it is not inevitable nor necessarily lasting. It is this same theme that arises in conjunction with this third ambiguity. There are utopian hopes for ultimate solutions from finite institutions, and failure leads to cynicism. When all hope is gone there is despair. The divine urge for self-transcendence becomes demonic. Both cynicism and despair are the demonic consequences of absolutizing either fragmentary or imaginary realizations of the Kingdom of God. The part is considered as the whole.

The answer to this ambiguity between self-transcending hope and existential despair is the Kingdom of God viewed as both present and yet to come, that is, only fragmentarily present in kairotic moments, but fully in Eternity. The answer here is the Kingdom of God conceived in terms of God as the creative power and source of hope in kairotic moments of history, and as redemptive love overcoming the estrangement of despair in failure by the lure of ultimate fulfillment in Eternal life (to be analyzed in the following chapter). Thus, "the fighting Kingdom of God scores a victory" whenever there is a union of "the consciousness of the presence and the not-yet-presence of the Kingdom of God in history."[1]

Our analysis of the Kingdom of God within history would be incomplete without giving sharper focus to a strand of thought that has been woven throughout this chapter. Tillich's purpose behind his philosophy of history is to provide both the criteria and account for the power necessary to execute change in the direction of human fulfillment. Since historical change comes primarily through historical groups, the group Tillich is calling to action as a Christian theologian is the

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[1] Vol. III, pp. 390-91.

Christian Church. Tillich's analysis of the church is one of the longest in his Systematic Theology. Without attempting any complete interpretation of his view of the church, a view high-lights can be drawn together which can serve both to confirm and complete our account of how Tillich views the Kingdom of God in history.

F. How the Kingdom of God is Actualized in History: The Church and the Call to Action

Tillich's understanding of the church and its place in his philosophy of history may be seen by considering briefly its meaning, its message, and its mission.

1. The Meaning of the Church as "Spiritual Community"

The "Spiritual Community" is Tillich's term for what has traditionally been called "the Church" (with a capital "C"), or "body of Christ" in the New Testament and "church invisible or Spiritual" by the Reformation.[1] The Spiritual Community does not designate visible historical groups existing beside other groups, but rather it refers to all groups who are grasped by the ontological power of New Being. Spiritual Community thus applies to any groups large or small, in which historical ambiguities are fragmentarily conquered and human fulfillment takes place. Tillich's quest for an expanding historical consciousness beyond the mere confessional group can be seen at work here. When man's essential nature is actualized outside the domain of Christianity in other historical groups, Tillich calls these groups the "latent" church. Conceivably even a nation could be a latent church if it possessed the spiritual qualities. When the Spiritual

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[1] Vol. III, p. 162.

Community is present within organized Christianity (called "the churches") the "manifest" church is present, that is, there is a direct historical connection with the Christ confessionally conceived as the center of history, the great kairos. The meaning of Spiritual Community cannot be understood fully, however, until consideration is given to what makes it "Spiritual."

A community is "Spiritual" for Tillich when it is an expression of faith and love as manifested in the New Being in Jesus as the Christ.[1] With reference to the incarnational norm as expressed by the axiom of transcendence, a community expresses faith when it manifests the creative power of being-itself to conquer non-being and thus fragmentarily conquers the tendencies toward demonization and profanization. With reference to the incarnational norm as expressed by the axiom of harmony, a community expresses love when the polar harmony of man's essential nature is fulfilled. The meaning of these formulations has already been considered. It can be observed here that our analysis of the twofold cleavage throughout Tillich's system in relating God to history as creator and redeemer comes into sharper focus in his doctrine of the church. Now with the meaning of the church in mind, we can turn to the problem of the task of the church. At this point Tillich's existential concern behind his whole philosophy of history becomes clear.

The task of the church can be viewed essentially as twofold. It has a message to proclaim and a mission to fulfill.

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[1] Vol. III, pp. 172-82.

2. The Message of the Church

We saw in Chapter Two, according to Tillich's doctrine of revelation, that the axioms of transcendence and harmony form the cognitive content. In Chapter Three we discovered that the ontological source of these axioms was conceived as the dynamic qualities of divine power and divine love. In Chapter Four it was found that man's nature is so estranged that only an ontological power beyond the subject-object split can effect a cure. The true nature from which man is estranged was expressed in terms of polar harmony achieved in *agape*-love. The present chapter contains an analysis of the relation of God and history expressed primarily in terms of creative power and redeeming love. In light of the axioms of transcendence and harmony which have thus emerged with different shades of meaning in different contexts throughout this study as a unifying theme, we can now see more clearly the message of the church. It is to herald the message (*kergyma*) contained in the axioms of transcendence and harmony, that is, the prophetic Protestant Principle and the priestly Catholic substance.[1]

Tillich's Protestant Principle should not be identified with Protestant churches since he grounds it through the axiom of transcendence in God's abysmal power and not in a historical group. Since the nature of reality is taken to be inexhaustible in creative power, no part of reality can be identified with the whole (demonization), and no part is complete without being related to the whole (profanization). The message of the manifest church is to affirm that within the historical process a "power which prevents profanization and demonization" is at work.[1] Or, in Tillich's more abstract formulation, it is the nature of being-itself to overcome non-being. This is the message of a liberating force that can overcome man's bondage to selfishness and social submergence. Freud's id and Marx's economic determinism are not the last word in shaping man's destiny. The forces of the universe are set in the direction of freeing man from his "shell of self-seclusion"[2] or inability to "go out" from himself to others, as well as to liberate him from his inability "to return" to himself, as seen in "the unconscious desire to return to the mother's womb"[3] expressed socially in terms of dissolving one's individuality through excessive conformism to and submergence in historical groups. The message of the churches, then, is to affirm a reality that is working against all that cripples and corrupts historical individuals and groups, as well as to exercise critical judgment in the name of the Kingdom of God against all demonic and profanized structures both within and without the life of the churches. But this primarily protesting prophetic message needs to be supplemented by the priestly or Catholic message. It is not enough merely to protest.

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[1] Vol. III, p. 245.

The message of "catholic substance" should not be identified with any organized churches since for Tillich it is ontologically grounded through the axiom of harmony in God's divine agape-love, and not in a historical group. Although Tillich frequently stresses the Protestant principle as the basis of the superiority of Christianity over other world religions, he also includes agape-love as a mark of Christianity's superiority and confesses that "the main criterion for me is agape."[1] The message of the churches is then to proclaim that God is at work in history not only freeing men from demonic possession but working positively toward material freedom, the actualization of man's essential potentialities.

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Vol. III, p. 262.

[3] Vol. III, p. 253.

Philosophically speaking, the axiological content of history is grounded normatively for Tillich in his ontology. Both the creative and redeeming forces of the universe are behind or one with the humanizing values that emerge within historical existence. Tillich succinctly states his two-fold message for the churches.

> Theologically speaking, Spirit, love, and grace are one and the same reality in different aspects. Spirit is the creative power; love is its creation; grace is the effective presence of love in man.[2]

Before proceeding to the second task of the church, it might be asked whether or not there is any advantage in the manifest church over the latent church. Since the incarnation is the revelation of norms, but God is the source of all power, Tillich finds the Spiritual Community effective to some degree in all historical groups. Historical fulfillment (salvation) is not dependent on a connection with the historical Jesus. What then is the advantage of being connected historically with Jesus as the Christ? Tillich's answer to this question is, in our terminology, that the manifest church has the advantage of being the bearer of the axioms of transcendence and harmony. Without the ultimate criteria of faith and love consciously adopted and applied to themselves as organized institutions, as well as to other groups, the manifest churches would have no clear defense or guard against becoming idolatrous (self-absolutized) or superficially secular (resisting the sustaining and directing power of the whole). Without the message of the incarnational norms or criteria of the faith and love of Christ

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[1] Brown, Ultimate Concern. . . , p. 219.

[2] Vol. III, p. 274.

> the Spiritual Community in its latency is open to profanization and demonization without an ultimate principle of resistance, whereas the Spiritual Community organized as a church has the principle of resistance in itself and is able to apply it self-critically, as in the movements of prophetism and Reformation.[1]

The twofold message of faith and love, however, is not merely something to affirm. In addition to having something to say, churches have something to be and to do. They have a mission to perform.

3. The Mission of the Church

The mission of the churches is basically twofold. They are to demonstrate the meaning of the Spiritual Community concretely, and they are to work actively within history against what destroys man, and for what fulfills him.

First, as a demonstration of the meaning of Spiritual Community, the relation of the churches to other groups is seen in terms of a silent interpretation into the structures of society. Churches as concrete communities of faith and love can pour their "priestly substance into the social structures of which the churches are a part."[1] Churches are to demonstrate to the world today the nature of God. There are to be, as it were, islands of hope in an ocean of estrangement and despair. They are to demonstrate a more inclusive community in which separation between the young and the old, the negro and the caucasian, the wealthy and the poor is essentially overcome.

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[1] Vol. III, p. 154.

Tillich is aware, however, of the record of church history and the paradoxical nature of the churches that both reveals and hides the Kingdom of God.[2] He speaks of the demonic tendencies of Roman Catholicism, and of Protestantism's susceptibility to profanization. Churches have produced splits without healing, the persecution of heretics, the fanticism of sects, and resistance to historical research and academic integrity. Tillich's response to these facts is simply that to the extent Christianity as an organized religion has demonstrated historical ambiguity the Spiritual Community had not been present. If Christianity is too demonic and profanized to demonstrate the nature of ontological reality, then this reality can break out somewhere else in history (as it does) and interpenetrate society through other historical groups. God is not confined to Christianity. When churches fail to demonstrate the meaning of faith and love, however, then at least they can still perform their other task of affirming the incarnational criteria that condemns both themselves as well as other historical groups.[3]

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[1] Vol. III, p. 213.

[2] Vol. III, p. 165.

[3] Vol. III, p. 381.

Secondly, in addition to having something to be as a community of faith and love, the churches have something to do. Here is Tillich's major emphasis. Churches are called to responsible historical action, that is, to apply the incarnational norms to historical processes. God appears as demand, as well as promise. The modification of human consciousness (Feuerbach) involves a modification of behavious (Marx). The church for Tillich is primarily a fighting church. In addition to the priestly and prophetic functions, Tillich adds a "royal" function.[1] That is to say, the churches must act politically. They have a responsibility to get involved in problems of political power. This means, in light of our discussion of kairoi, that the churches should be sensitive to social currents and look for God in particular social changes that, in the light of the incarnational norms, are making for human maturity and freedom. Since the consequences of human action are never fully known, there is risk or what Tillich calls "daring faith."

Tillich, unfortunately, does not apply his principles to any extent to current social problems. We take him to mean that the churches (leaders and followers) should support, for example, forces for slum clearance, better housing programs, and equal educational and economic opportunities for minority groups. The churches should oppose all forces that make for political indifference, defeatism, and cynicism. It is not the case that you "can't fight City Hall." This entire emphasis on the call to action to meet concrete social problems presupposes that history is a place in which man can freely mould the forces of history to authentically human ends. The demons of fate that make for social injustice, such as Freudian psychological pressures and Marxian economic forces, can be met and exorcised. New demons will arise, and old solutions give away. There will be no utopia. But particular problems can be solved and fragmentary victories in the Kingdom of God can be realized. But such victories are not the result of some inexorable plan of a God up in heaven, nor a Kantian plan of nature. They are the results of human decisions in light of _kairotic_ moments of possibilities. Man's supposedly free effort to fulfill his own nature is one with fulfillment of the divine life. What then can be said about the Spiritual Community in view of these considerations?

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[1] Vol. III, p. 214.

The Spiritual Community, in summary, is the ontological presence of being-itself within historical groups. What makes a community "spiritual" is the presence of faith and love. The qualities of faith and love are the incarnational norms expressed in terms of the axioms of transcendence and harmony. When a spiritual community is directly connected with Jesus as the Christ, the evaluative center of history, it is a _manifest_ church. Where a spiritual community is not connected with the normative Christ but still expresses essential human fulfillment, it is called the "latent" church. The task of the manifest church is two-fold: to proclaim the message involved in the axioms of transcendence and harmony; and the churches' mission is to demonstrate or reveal the meaning of the message by their inclusive community, and to work actively and concretely with the political power structures for human maturity and freedom, and to actively oppose the demonic and profanized structures that impair human responsibility and fulfillment. The nature of history is such that human action counts in directing the course history takes.

In conclusion, it should be recalled that while Freud stressed the sick individual and Feuerbach spoke in terms of curing estrangement by qualifying the individual's self-conscious awareness, Marx stressed the sick society and recommended social action somewhat to the neglect of the individual. In the last chapter Tillich was shown to emphasize the need for qualifying the individual's conscious awareness in terms of the axioms of transcendence and harmony. In this chapter the stress was on judging social change in terms of the axioms of transcendence and harmony. It appears that what Tillich is saying, in contrast to the previously mentioned thinkers, is that the estranged individual and the ambiguous society cannot be separated. This follows from his view of man's social nature. The interests of the individual and of society need not be antagonistic. The Kingdom of God is victorious when they are found to be or made compatible. The Kingdom of God operates in history to qualify the individuals or the groups awareness of reality as a means of effecting social change. The Kingdom of God also works in social change as a means of qualifying man's individual self-understanding. They are complementary. As it was indicated earlier, the Kingdom of God is both personal and social.

The analysis thus far has concentrated on how the Kingdom of God operates within historical existence to answer the problems of historical ambiguity. Tillich finds meaning within history, but only in a fragmentary and partial way. The final or ultimate meaning of history for Tillich, however, is not fragmentary and does not occur within history. The final goal of history is trans-historical, in eternity. Thus we turn to the conclusion of Tillich's philosophy of history--the relation between time and eternity.

G. Reflective Summary

The purpose of this chapter was to ascertain how Tillich views God as present within the historical process. Partial understanding is achieved by noting first his classification of views he opposes. He rejects the non-historical interpretations found in Greek thought, Eastern mysticism, and Western mechanical materialism. History is valuated negatively by all these views. He also dismisses more positive views of history such as infinite progressivism, utopianism, and transcendental utopianism. These positive views all share in being either realistically unaware of the nature of historical ambiguity (estrangement) and thus resulting in the despair of disappointed hopes, or are not sufficiently motivated for social change. In contrast to these interpretations of history, Tillich's evaluative response to history is expressed by the symbol "The Kingdom of God."

The chief characteristics of the Kingdom of God for Tillich are that it has political connotations expressed in the idea that history is a place where God is manifested; it is social in nature; it is personal; it is universal, that is, extends to all life processes; it is both immanent and transcendent.

The problem of history is ambiguity. With the basic three ontological polarities as developed in Volume One in mind, and expressed in all life processes in terms of self-integration, self-production, and self-transcendence, Tillich distinguishes three major ambiguities found in all historical groups. First, the historical ambiguity stemming from self-integration is between the empire tendency toward and expanding or more intensive unity, and particular centralization or separation. This ambiguity is found both between or among groups and within groups. In correlation with self-production, the second ambiguity of historical groups is between the urge for revolution (new) and reaction (old). The third ambiguity of historical self-transcendence concerns the tendency of groups or periods of history (parts) to claim historical ultimacy (to be the whole). The Kingdom of God is the answer to these three historical ambiguities.

Before considering how the Kingdom of God answers these particular historical ambiguities, an analysis of what Tillich does not mean for God to be manifested in history provides the basis for a fuller understanding of his view of the relation between God and history. God is not one cause among others in history, but is rather manifested within certain qualities of man's conscious and unconscious experience both distributively in individuals and collectively in groups. The norms for identifying the presence of God within human experience are provided by the manifestation (incarnation) of the nature of God (the whole) in Jesus as the Christ (a fulfilled part). The manifestation of the Christ is the evaluative center of history in two ways. First, by revealing the nature of God as abysmal power (axiom of transcendence) through a unity with God that overcomes demonization (the part tries to be the whole) and profanization (the part withdraws from the whole). Secondly, Christ is the center of history by revealing the nature of God as agape-love (the axiom of harmony).

The center of history appeared when the conditions were ripe and accordingly is called the great kairos. Tillich uses the notion of kairos as an interpretative category of historical process. Other periods of kairoi or great moments of historical possibility occur calling for human response. Tillich substitutes kairoi for the progressivistic interpretations of history that lead inevitably to existential disappointment. Kairoi refer to essentially unrelated moments of opportunity to solve particular problems in history in light of the norms provided by the great kairos.

In light of the two-fold incarnational norms, God can be seen to be related to history in essentially two ways. First, God is manifested in history (in human experience) in terms of the creative power to overcome the destructive forces of demonization and profanization (being overcoming non-being). Secondly, God is present in history as redeeming agape-love, as the power for fulfilling man's essential nature in terms of polar unity (being making for the harmony of being).

The relation of the Kingdom of God to historical ambiguities now can be seen in sharper focus. God is manifested in the ambiguity of empire and particularization as the drive toward more inclusive and intensive unity (creative power) which nevertheless protects the well-being of particular groups and individuals (redeeming love). In the second ambiguity of social growth God is the power of being driving toward the revolutionary new (creative power) which preserves continuity in change by conserving the abiding values of tradition (redeeming love). God is seen in the third ambiguity of historical self-transcendence by providing the creative possibilities for fulfilling present kairoi (creative power), at least fragmentarily, together with the hope of total future trans-historical fulfillment (redeeming love).

The motif in Tillich's philosophy of history is to give an account of the norms and ontological source necessary to guide the forces of social change in the direction of human fulfillment. Since historical change comes predominantly through historical groups, Tillich is concerned to relate his philosophy of history to a group for the purpose of historical action. As a Christian theologian Tillich writes for the Christian tradition, that is, the Christian church. He expands the concept of the Christian church, however, by reformulating the more traditional meaning of the Church in terms of "Spiritual Community." The Spiritual Community is identified with any groups in which God as creative power and redeeming love is actualized. When faith and love are found in groups confessionally connected with Christ as the center of history, or whose message is the Christ, these groups represent the "manifest" churches. When the Spiritual Community is present in groups not historically connected with the Christ-event, they are referred to as the "latent" church.

The task of the "manifest" churches in particular is twofold. First the churches are to proclaim the message (kerygma) of what we have called the axioms of transcendence and harmony. Secondly, the mission of the church is both to demonstrate the Kingdom of God by the agape quality of their community (which is never perfect nor complete), and to act in concrete problems in support of the social changes that measure up to the incarnational norms, and to oppose the prevalent demonic and profanized social forces. The churches are to be fighting agents, the vanguard of the Kingdom of God. The risk involved in misapplying the principles of incarnational norms to concrete social problems must be accepted. What can we conclude at this point concerning Tillich's philosophy of history?

The speculative problems in philosophy of history can be divided into two major questions. First, what is the goal and destiny of the values achieved within the historical process. This question is the problem of the next chapter. Second, what kind of reality can account for what is actually going on within the historical process? The content of this chapter has focused on this second question. The last chapter concluded that history, as seen in the nature of man, is a place of normative axiological content and teleological content, that is, man has an essential nature and is free to pursue ideal values and effect historical change. Some doubt was raised concerning the ambiguity of his system to account for the freedom he wants.

Tillich's account of the Kingdom of God is an attempt to give an ontological ground and aim to the axiological and teleological content of man's nature and to all life processes. Thus the reality that can account for the historical process is the Kingdom of God, conceived in terms of God as the whole with history as a part of the divine. God as creative power is the power that moves history, and God as redeeming _agape_-love is the ultimate goal of history. Within history, however, man has been delegated the formal freedom and power to resist the whole (profanization) or to identify some particular historical process in the present or in a utopian future with the whole of reality (demonization). This quality of formal freedom found now in historical groups as well as in individuals is the source of historical ambiguity. A victory of the Kingdom of God occurs when a particular historical group is drawn into unity with the ontological whole and hence fulfills the part fragmentarily. There is no progressive line of fulfillment in history that can be traced empirically, but specific victories can be seen whenever the incarnational norms are partially achieved.

We find here no difficulty with Tillich's descriptions of historical ambiguity. His use of the polar model in describing the various tensions within historical groups enables him to analyze skillfully many conflicting forces in man's nature and in history. Neither do we find fault with his goal of preserving both the values of the past and the well-being of particular groups respectively in the emergence of new values and expanding historical unities. The self-transcending quality of history is also granted. But at this point two problems emerge. One is how to execute such goals. Tillich clarifies goals, and this is helpful, but he provides little concrete direction. His counsel is to be "daring" and apply the principle of agape-love to concrete patterns of social change with risk. Now while there is always a risk involved in applying principles to concrete cases, the point here is that it is unfortunate that Tillich did not provide the "fighting church" with some mediating principles, or "middle axioms," that would at least reduce the element of risk involved in social action. Such a provision would have considerably strengthened and guided his call to historical action. It may have also aided in his abortive attempt to apply the principle of Religious Socialism during the rise of Nazism.

The second difficulty is with the nature of his ontological model as it pertains to social organization. Tillich tries to combine a monistic part-whole model with an emphasis on individual freedom and creativity. In terms of social organization this means, in effect, that he mixes monistic and pluralistic models. This mixture is a consequent of his axioms of transcendence and harmony. The axiom of transcendence describes his aristocratic proclivity for the whole which is more than the sum of its parts. The axiom of harmony is his democratic demand for the rights and dignity of the individual. The problem is how to synthesize and not merely juxtapose the tensions between these two models. Does Tillich achieve such a synthesis?

Tillich accepts the democratic principle as an element in the Spiritual Community. This principle means that the rulers are subject to law, and that the people have a voice in determining the laws.[1] His goal appears to be a democratic society, that is, a society in which the political (the problem of power, rule, authority) and economic (the production and distribution of goods and services) and other subsystems operate so as to contribute to the principle of voluntary group cooperation. He is opposed to political totalitarianism and economic capitalism for the same reason. They are both demonic because they represent the control of the whole society by the few. But what Tillich substitutes for them is not clear. His association with Religious Socialism is supposedly his positive program.

Tillich's emphasis on Religious Socialism, however, is more of a prophetic critique of capitalism as a form of self-sufficient finitude than a definite plan of social organization for the present. Religious Socialism was ineffective in the early 1920's because it failed to relate adequately its principles to the existing power structures. Could it be that Tillich's failure to construct a workable plan of social organization reflects the lack of any real synthesis between his organic

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[1] Vol. III, p. 264.

(monistic) and atomistic (pluralistic) models? And could it be that his juxtaposition of incompatible social models is a concrete example of his failure to reconcile two incongruous metaphysical models?

It would appear that as Tillich's preferences have been found to lie in the direction of destiny rather than freedom, and in Empire Building rather than Particularization (in the historical ambiguities), so his model for social organization leans more toward the organic than the pluralistic model. When Tillich mentions democratic systems of government, he is quick to observe that democratic systems can lead to dictatorship if there are too many atomistic splits, and that democracy as such cannot be identified with the Kingdom of God.[1] His penchant appears as a nostalgic longing for the disciplined Prussian bureaucracy which he describes as "a conscious subordination of the members of the organic whole . . ."[2] He has no concept of creating an organic pluralism based on the principle of voluntary group cooperation. For him there is only a return to the pre-existent whole. Although he repeatedly emphasizes the need for maintaining the dignity of the individual parts, his metaphysical model makes it difficult for him to sustain this emphasis. Moreover, if the whole is perfect and indefinable as his axiom of transcendence holds, then the whole does not need really the parts and they need not be preserved. The parts thus have no intrinsic worth and are only to be viewed in terms of their "significance for the Divine Life and its eternal glory and blessedness."[3]

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[1] Vol. III, p. 347, 385.

[2] Tillich, The Interpretation of History, p. 10.

[3] Vol. III, p. 423.

Such a conclusion provides no adequate metaphysical defense against the totalitarianism he ostensibly rejects. In other words, as a part-whole model in ontology tends to loose the centered part in the centered whole (the absolute), so his tendency to define a particular historical group as free (fulfilled) when it is in unity with a larger social unity tends toward totalitarianism. The ontological problem involved here becomes more sharply focused in the following chapter.

CHAPTER VI

THE KINGDOM OF GOD BEYOND HISTORY

A. Introduction of the Problem

The problem of this chapter is to answer the question, what is the ultimate goal and destiny of history (Hp)?[1] The answer to this problem is of vital concern to Tillich. It represents an existentialist motif underlying his entire interpretation of history. The world situation is tense. It is common knowledge that man has unleashed the forces of nature to such an extent that the final holocaust could come any day. Man's destiny is in his own hands. The conservative mystique tempts man to hold to the security of the past, while revolutionary forces strain toward the future. In light of the present world situation how can man understand himself today?

The world is divided between Communistic Totalitarianism and the democratic struggle for freedom.[2] A totalitarian structure seems better equipped to provide the social cement to give individuals a sense of social cohesion and solidarity. It feeds on the fear of isolation and loneliness, and offers a kind of discipline which most people want in some form or another. But this death urge manifested as a desire to return to the womb is opposed, according to Tillich, by the power of being working in man's unconscious depths as a natural urge for freedom and individuality. Totalitarianism is thus against the grain of reality. It is a demonic tendency for a part to affirm itself as the whole. The result is that the whole does not nourish it, and it cannot ultimately be sustained. Sooner or later the individual must stop fleeing from himself.

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[1] Since man is a multidimensional unity of all life processes, what is said about man can be said analogously about nature as well. Although nature and history can be distinguished, they are both teleological in nature and thus share the same destiny. The emphasis in this chapter is on man and history proper, and not on cosmology.

[2] The center of Communistic Totalitarianism has formerly been associated with Russia. It appears that Russia is modifying her militant totalitarianism. The focus of totalitarianism is slowly moving toward Communist China. In any case, the clash between totalitarianism and democracy is still the major political problem of our age.

The problem with democracy, in contrast with totalitarianism, is that it does not appear to motivate the verve necessary to counteract and heal the cuts and gashes of boredom, loneliness, and emptiness. What kind of faith can tap the spontaneous sources of community without suffocating the individual? Can a humanistic democracy generate the emotional energies needed for community? Can it become a passionate belief? Can it be transformed into a public religion, and that without losing its emphasis on the dignity and freedom of the individual? So far the answer seems to be negative.[1]

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[1] Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., does not believe that democracy as a formal political structure can stimulate the moral energy required for our age, but he does believe that democracy conceived as a way of life for the entire society may. He calls, in Whitman's terms, for a resolute breed of men who can fight for freedom. Out of this struggle alone "can come the high courage and faith which will preserve freedom." See his The Vital Center (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1949), p. 254. In Contrast with Schlesinger, Tillich believes that the degree of historical

Tillich's solution to the cosmic significance and ultimate destiny of the values realized in historical time can be approached by outlining first the basic characteristics of historical time, most of which have been developed previously in this study in different contexts, and then by analyzing the meaning of Eternal Life in relation to time. After considering the nature and relation between time and eternity in general, Tillich's answer concerning the ontological destiny of the historical agent (problem of immortality) will be treated in particular.

B. The Nature of Historical Time

Nine essential characteristics of historical time can be distinguished in Tillich's account of temporality.

1. Time as the Central Category of Finitude

First, time is the "central category of finitude."[1] Tillich offers, in Husserl's terms, a "regional ontology" of time in the various dimensions of life, that is, the inorganic, the organic, the psychological (animal), and the historical. Time as "central" means that in the evolutionary process time increasingly predominates, say, over space. For example, in the inorganic realm each moment of time in a physical process is exclusive or cut off from what was before or what comes after. But in the organic realm there is more overlapping, such as seen in a tree which contains the effects of its past and anticipates its future

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sacrifice and struggle demanded today requires a faith that the values realized in history will ultimately be preserved in the whole. He questions whether an all-out naturalism can probe the depth of the historical agent and motivate the all-inclusive sacrifice needed in our time of troubles.

[1] Vol. I, p. 193.

in its present potentiality. Then in the psychological realm there is more continuity in change in the animal's consciousness which includes memory and anticipation. The growing predominance of time in the evolutionary process does not mean for Tillich that time can be separated from other categories like space, since the doctrine of the multidimensional unity of all life processes requires that all categories are present either potentially or actually in all realms. Yet man's reflective capacity enables him to transcend the limitations of space by controlling nature by means of his intentionality. The fact that Tillich makes an increasing "unity" of relatively dissected moments of change the criterion for calling time the "central" category of finitude anticipates the second observation about historical time.

2. Time as Duration

Time is duration. Historical time is more than the clock time of physical processes. There is in human experience "the unity of remembered past and anticipated future in an experienced present."[1] Man is spirit, and this means a "unity" of vitality (power) and intentionality (meaning). Although Tillich does not stress the word "duration," the meaning of "unity" in his definition of spirit can best be understood in terms of duration. He accepts Bergson's combination of duration,(self-conservation in Tillich's terminology) and the *élan vital* (called self-transcendence by Tillich), and is critical of any process philosophy which sacrifices the "persisting identity" of that which is process.[1] Time thus is more than change for Tillich. Without duration (self-conservation) there would be no awareness of change (self-transcendence). Time is a union of change and permanence—duration. Duration, however, can be seen to have a certain order about it.

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[1] Vol. I, p. 275.

3. Time as Chronological Order

The third characteristic of time is its "after-each-other-ness."[2] This chronological order of time is unique. The order of past, present, and future is not a logical order of deduction, nor can it be reduced to the "beside-each-other-ness" of space. Chronological order has yet a still further characteristic.

4. Time as Irreversible

Fourthly, chronological order has the quality of "irreversibility."[3] Time goes only from past, to present, to future. The past can never become present again, and the future is not until it occurs. But when the future arrives, another quality of time is descernible.

5. Time as the Emergence of Novelty

The fifth quality of historical time is the emergence of novelty. No two moments are identical, only similar. "Time, so to speak, runs ahead toward the new, the unique, the novel, even in repetitions."[4] Time is thus creative, but not blind creativity without direction.

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 181.

[2] Vol. III, p. 313.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 319.

[4] Vol. III, p. 319.

6. Time as Purposive

Sixthly, the creatively new in time is purposive. "Every creative act aims at something."[1] This follows from Tillich's teleological account of nature, and his insistence noted in Chapter Two that historical events cannot be reduced to the explanatory methods of the natural sciences which ignore motives and goals. Tillich holds that all being has an aim, a telos toward fulfillment. This was especially noticed in Chapter Four in the axiological content of history as seen in man's striving toward ideal values. But in history, values are not automatically realized. There is still another element of time.

7. Time as Free

The seventh ingredient of time is contingency or freedom. As there is an element of spontaneity in nature that makes for novelty, it should be added that historical time is free.[2] Man is not bound to the situation in which he finds himself. His capacity for self-transcendency "is the first and basic quality of freedom."[3] No present completely determines the future. In human history this means, as indicated in Chapter Four, that psychical causality is effective in modifying the future. Our analysis of time, however, is not yet complete.

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Ibid., p. 303.

[3] Ibid.

8. Time as Relative

The eighth attribute of time for Tillich is relativity. Time can be measured by different systems of relativities. This is particularly stressed by Tillich in human history. The relativity of time is seen in Tillich's emphasis, observed in Chapter Two, that man understands the meaning of history in different frames of reference, that is, from different theological circles. No one understands time "outside" of time.

9. Time as Ambiguous

Finally, time is ambiguous. This means that time is both positive and negative.[1] By "positive" Tillich means that time is creative, that is, it has order and novelty. By "negative" he indicates the transitory quality of time. There is destruction or death (nonbeing) as well as creativity and life (being). In man the transitory quality of time becomes self-conscious and he thus becomes anxious about having to die. The ambiguous quality of time has already been indicated in Tillich's doctrine of human estrangement, and in his account of the ambiguities in all life processes including those of historical groups.

These nine characteristics of temporal existence, that is, of the events and happenings in the life of nature and man in time, constitute the facts about temporality for which a speculative philosophy of history seeks to give an illuminating account. Tillich's doctrine of "Eternal Life," to which we now turn, is his attempt to elucidate and coherently account for the historical process. It would appear that if eternal life is to explain or account for the characteristics of historical time, it must someway "include" time and yet, as explanatory, be more than "identical" with it. Our approach to Tillich's doctrine of eternal life will accordingly proceed with the previous analysis of temporal existence in mind.[1]

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[1] Vol. I, p. 193.

C. The Nature of Eternal Life

How does the symbol "Eternal Life" explain or account for temporality? The events in man's temporal existence have to do with individual life processes, with variety. The explanatory function of Eternal Life or eternity consists in providing some kind of "unity" in which the occurrences in the course of history can be understood. "Eternity is the transcendent unity of the dissected moments of existential time."[2] Moreover, the relation between Eternal Life and God the "Eternal One" is that "Eternal Life is life in the eternal, life in God."[3] This means that the unity of the dissected and differentiated moments of the temporal parts is one with the unity of the whole. Our task, then, is to analyze Tillich's description of the nature of the whole's unity as ultimate Reality and ascertain how it might be said to account for the temporal facts of history.

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[1] Whitehead's statement concerning the purpose of thought adequately describes what is taken here to be the relationship between speculative philosophy of history and the historical, temporal process. "The elucidation of immediate experience is the sole justification for any thought; and the starting point for any thought is the analytic observation of components of experience." Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1929), p. 6.

[2] Vol. I, p. 274. In the terminology of this study, the whole is responsible for "dissecting" the moments of time in its loving drive toward individualization and freedom.

[3] Vol. III, p. 420.

It is important to remember throughout this chapter that Tillich's account of the nature of Eternal Life and its relation to history and especially to the part's transhistorical fulfillment is "of the highest poetic symbolism."[1] The whole of this chapter is a personalized symbolism concerning the relationoof the divine and the human. The axiom of transcendence requires that the whole cannot be exhaustively analyzed and described in subject-object categories.[2] What then can be said symbolically concerning the nature of the unity implied in Eternal Life?

1) Eternal Life as a Living Unity

Tillich believes with process and some forms of personalistic philosophy that eternal life is not a static, immovable perfection. Tillich rejects, on the one hand, the refusal to characterize eternal life because of its transcendent mystery, as is frequently found in the writings of mystics, and, on the other hand, he rejects the tendency in popular imagination to identify eternal life as an "idealized reduplication of life" or "endless time."[3] Eternal Life is not "timelessness," but is rather analogous to human duration.[1] A "timeless" eternity could not explain a timeful world. As it was seen in Chapter Three, God as the whole includes the nonbeing of finitude with its categories (including time) within it as a part. Both time and change are within the divine unity.[2] God as Spirit represents a living unity which may be viewed as timeful duration including memory and anticipation. In Tillich's words, God "is 'living,' which means that he has in himself the unity of identity and alteration which characterizes life . . ."[3] God's living unity is also implied in Tillich's "bold metaphor" of God's "eternal memory" viewed as a "living retention of the remembered thing. It is together past, present, and future in atranscendent unity of the three modes of time."[4] But if duration in God is not to be a reduplication of human duration, how is it different?

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[1] Vol. III, p. 421.

[2] Tillich does not want to violate "the mystery of the divine 'abyss'." Vol. III, p. 422.

[3] Vol. III, p. 397.

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[1] Vol. I, p. 275.

[2] Vol. III, p. 418.

[3] Vol. III, p. 420. The observation that Tillich symbolically applies duration to the divine life raises the question whether or not God might be conceived as a "Person." Tillich has no objection in calling God a person if the term "person" is used to extend beyond the limits of finitude by including absolute participation. This means, we take it, that the whole could be called symbolically an absolute person. See Vol. I, pp. 243-44).

[4] Vol. III, p. 399.

2) Eternal Life as a Unique Complex Unity

The complex unity of God is not the total simultaneity of Augustine in which the past, present, and future are all contained in one eternal intuition. As we have seen, there is a lack in the divine that drives toward the future in the evolutionary process. "The eternal present is moving from past to future but without ceasing to be present."[1] Tillich agrees with Bergson that there must be an "open" future, but not to the extent that "God would himself be subject to the anxiety of the unknown."[2] There is rather a "relative" openness to the future in the sense that God can anticipate every possible future.[3] This means that openness requires that God does not necessarily know every event that is to take place, yet he does know every possible event and is never surprised by something totally unknown or unexpected.[4]

Not only does God know all future possibilities, but his "eternal memory" encompasses all past events in time. This means that God's perspective as the whole is different from the parts in that it is not relative. God sees the whole, and thus all the historical past is grounded in the mind of God. God's view is not limited by the necessity of selecting facts like historians since in his unity all facts are retained as they really were. This is the goal of truth for which Tillich's implicit quest for a universal historical consciousness is directed, although admittedly never achieved.

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[1] Vol. I, p. 275.

[2] Ibid., p. 276.

[3] Ibid., p. 274.

[4] There is a tension here between Tillich's axioms of transcendence and harmony. The axiom of transcendence pushes his thought in the direction of absolutists who would claim that ultimate Reality somehow includes the process of time and change, but remains non-temporal and unchanging. The axiom of harmony leads him to believe that the whole is enriched and thus modified by history. His emphasis on the "Openness" of the past and future in Eternity is in the direction of the axiom of harmony. But even here it is far from clear how the novelty and freedom of temporal existence can be taken seriously if God is never subjected to the unknown. It is difficult to see how this line of thought can stop short of Augustine's simultaneity.

Although God knows all the past and all possible futures, and although time is irreversible for God as well as man, the past is not fully closed. The past provides the destiny or limits by which God creates the future, and "in creating the future, he re-creates the past."[1] This means that the past provides the potentialities for historical change, and the realization of some potentialities rather than others adds new significance to the past because of their realization. The past is viewed differently because of the new that comes from it. For example, the fact that an assassin could easily purchase a rifle through a mail-order catalogue and murder President Kennedy with it placed the relative ease of obtaining fire arms in a new perspective. The significance of the past not only changes for historians, but in some measure for the whole as well. Thus, "from the point of view of eternity, both past and future are open."[2]

In this context of God's complete knowledge of past and present, as well as the progressive grasping of the past as history continues, Tillich's enigmatic statements about the "elevation" of the positive and the "exposure" of the negative in Eternal Life take on meaning. In the transition from time to eternity that is going on all the time the "negative is negated."[1] This means, for example, that a lie that may be undetected in time, but the fact that it is a lie "is present in Eternal memory." Every minute is judgment. A lie is not excluded from the divine memory, nor forgotten. Rather when such negative things as lies, sickness, death, and all forms of evil are seen from the perspective of the whole, they are "exposed" for all time. By the same token, whatever is positive in history, that is, all creativity and historical actualization of essentiality, is seen and retained as such in the divine mind. Since everything positive is a part of the divine whole, "God cannot deny himself."[2] Thus in the divine life the obscurity between good and evil is removed. God fully knows the difference. He is never deceived.

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[1] Vol. I, p. 276.

[2] *Ibid.*,

Tillich also discusses the problem of whether the moment of death in all processes is the last word for their eternal destiny. Does one advance someway in eternal life? Since Tillich does not equate Eternal Life with "endless life," such a discussion is puzzling. However, it becomes meaningful if it is seen in light of the "elevation" of temporal processes into the inclusive divine mind. When fragmentary parts are seen in the light of the whole they may appear in a better light (or the reverse) than they did in the partial perspectives of time. Moreover, as new facts emerge a different evaluative response to the past is possible so that in the divine mind the last may be first and the first may be last. But not only is God's unity uniquely complex and whole, it is also unbegun and unending.

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[1] Vol. III, p. 400.

[2] Vol. III, p. 399.

3) Eternal Life as Unbegun and Unending Unity

Tillich refrains from speaking about the beginning of even physical time.[1] His position is that God eternally "creates himself."[2] Something cannot come from nothing conceived as absolute negation (*ouk on*). *Ex nihil*, *nihil fit*. There always has been being, or as we saw in Chapter Three, at least an undifferentiated unity. Finite individuals in their duration are not self-caused.[3] But being-itself possesses "aseity."[4] God is unbegun. Moreover, since being-itself is inexhaustible power, by definition God is unending. There is no reason to believe that God's eternal creativity will ever be completed. But this anticipates the next quality of God's enduring unity.

4) Eternal Life as Creative Unity

The concept of God as creator "of himself" has been stressed through this study. It has been maintained that Tillich's view of God as beyond essence and existence means that God creates the realm of essences, that is, "he has the power of determining the structure of everything that has being."[1] Yet in his freedom God is not subject to nor identified with the totality of this possible world. God created the structures of finitude. But beyond this it has been held that God is also the power of being that "drives toward actualization," that is, from essence to existence.[2]

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[1] Vol. III, p. 320.

[2] Vol. II, p. 252.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 196.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 236.

Tillich's doctrine of creation was touched upon in Chapter Three. A brief statement of his view in relation to the doctrine of creation ex nihilo (out of nothing) is helpful at this point. Although Tillich would not accept a literal interpretation of ex nihilo, he does see some positive value in it. First, it is a "protection against any type of ultimate dualism."[3] God does not create from something outside himself (the whole). There is only one ultimate Reality.

Second, ex nihilo is a protection against a rational deduction of existence from essence as in the emanation theory, for example, of Plotinus. Although Tillich does not make such a connection with the doctrine of ex nihilo as such, he does agree with the import of the association. For him the transition from essence to existence is "a leap and not of structural necessity."[4] Yet as it has been shown, creation is not without order since it is a requirement of love rather than logic.

Third, Tillich also re-interprets ex nihilo to describe a fact about the creature, namely, that he possesses nonbeing and must die.

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[1] Vol. I, p. 239.

[2] Vol. III, p. 422.

[3] Vol. I, p. 253.

[4] Vol. II, p. 44.

But while man possesses nonbeing, he also possesses being. Since in God being and nonbeing are harmoniously balanced, man's unity with the whole can produce a unity between life and death that overcomes the tragic quality of historical existence. This aspect of Tillich's thought was developed in detail in Chapter Four.

Fourth, it should be clear from this study that for Tillich creatio ex nihilo does not mean that God creates something that stands ontologically outside of the whole in terms of a subject-object relationship. Created objects are always parts of the whole.[1]

Fifth and finally, if God does not create by employing something outside himself, he is left with the option of either creating the world out of himself (itself) or holding that creation is sheer mystery. Tillich does not make such a distinction. Whichever direction he would take, however, since he does not provide us with any technique by which God brings existence into being, it must be concluded that creation is still a mystery.[2]

It follows from Tillich's doctrine of creation in conjunction with his view of God's complete knowledge that God is the originating and sustaining sufficient reason for grounding the historical past and providing the order and continuity needed to make history possible. But what is the purpose of the temporal process?

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[1] Tillich affirms that if the world were only "external" to God, it would be "a divine play of no essential concern for God." Vol. III, p. 422. Does this mean that God is essentially selfish? Is it not a greater display of agape-love to love someone completely other, than it is to love some part of one's self?

[2] The writer is indebted for some of the distinctions made in this analysis of Tillich's doctrine of creation to Dr. Peter A. Bertocci's article entitled "In Defense of Metaphysical Creation" The Philosophical Forum, XIX, 1961-62, pp. 3-15.

5) Eternal Life as a Unity of Divine Love

It was observed in Chapter Three that the motive and aim of creation is divine *agape*-love. The unity of the divine life consists in the single aim of providing a content to love. This involves for Tillich the creation of finite centers of freedom that can resist love. God is not only the efficient cause or ground of history, God is also the final cause of history. God's eternal creativity aims at the fulfillment of all life processes which in turn are one with his own divine self-fulfillment. This implies a futuristic mode to Eternal Life, one that aims at a goal that is unconditioned by any actual world. God's love is unchanging "universal and perfect love."[1]

As love, Eternal Life is the lure in every situation toward wholeness and fulfillment.[2] Since God knows every possibility, it follows that God is the power of being in every determinate situation giving "man the power of transforming himself and his world."[3] The end of creation is the "creature itself and the actualization of its potentialities."[4] God seeks to make relevant every possibility for fulfillment in man's concrete situation. Nothing can separate man from the unswerving love of God. In a word, the divine unity is teleological and provides the *telos* of all nature and history. But divine love requires another quality in the divine unity.

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[1] Vol. III. p. 402.

[2] Vol. I, p. 267.

[3] Vol. I, p. 256.

[4] *Ibid*. p. 263.

6) Eternal Life as a Fully Differentiated Unity

That Eternal Life is not an undifferentiated unity follows from what has already been said about God's knowledge as well as from God's love. Yet since this aspect of Eternal Life is essential to the problem of immortality, it is stated separately. It was shown in Chapter Three that divine love both drives toward individualization and preserves it. Distinctions in both nature and history are still preserved in eternal life. "Eternal Life is still life, and the universal centeredness does not dissolve the individual centers."[1] In contrast to Eastern religions there is no Nirvana in which individual distinctions are lost in a divine ooze. There is yet one other important quality of Eternal Life.

7) Eternal Life as a State of Blessed Unity

Tillich insists that in Eternal Life nonbeing is completely overcome. Yet he holds that the struggle of being-itself over nonbeing is not to be taken lightly. In Tillich's words, "the Divine Life is blessedness through fight and victory."[2] The problem here is to ascertain how the risk and uncertainty of real struggle is compatible with the notion of God's blessedness. What is blessedness?

Tillich means by blessedness "a state of Mind in which Spiritual Presence produces a feeling of fulfillment which cannot be disturbed by negativities in other dimensions."[1] Tillich is here indicating that it is possible to find an inner sense of joy and well-being that is not dependent on one's external circumstances. There is a kind of "transcendent happiness" possible to individuals in the midst of opposition. It is possible to struggle and fight without getting "shook up." He uses this particular quality of consciousness, which each person must identify for himself according to his own awareness of such an experience, as what might be called an existential pointer to the divine life. More concretely he alludes to the Biblical account of Jesus who was severely tempted and yet possessed an unbroken awareness of his unity with God.[2]

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[1] Vol. III, p. 401.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 405.

It is also in this context that one must understand how Tillich conceives the polar elements to be perfectly balanced in the divine life. Polar balance results from both the qualities of love and blessedness. God struggles with nonbeing in both "going out" in his self-transcendence, and in "returning" to his original identity. But God is always victorious. His blessedness endures. God is thus "unambiguous" life. God's individualization (identity) participates universally without excluding anything. God's dynamics (power) is always at one with his essential nature of love (form). God's freedom (self-transcendence) is always at one with his own destiny (unique capacities). In other words, it is God's nature to create freely without external limitations (other than self-chosen limitations in the creation of supposedly finite centers of freedom). Thus, in God's blessedness there is struggle. The qualitative pattern of Eternal Life varies with the content that emerges from historical novelty. Yet God's blessedness is not altered by any changes in the temporal world. A possible analogy to this kind of blessedness would be in the fight of an individual against some evil situation in history with the inner confidence that he is in the right and is doing all that it is possible for him to do. Only God's blessedness, unlike man's, would not be clouded with the prospect that he might be wrong or that other possible courses of action would be better. God knows all the possibilities and his nature as agape-love, in Tillich's system at least, is the norm of what is good. What then can be said about the relation of time and Eternal Life in light of this analysis? More precisely, does Tillich's view of Eternal Life "account" for the analytic elements of temporality?

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[1] Vol. III, p. 403.

[2] Vol. III, p. 405. See Vol. II, pp. 127-131.

8) Conclusions Concerning Tillich's View of Time and Eternal Life

Four conclusions can be drawn from our analysis of Tillich's view of time and Eternal Life. First, on the positive side, God can be shown to affect history. Tillich's doctrine of Eternal Life can be said to give a reasonable account of time in the following respects. Eternal Life includes the basic elements of temporality, although it transcends them in an explanatory way. Eternal Life is an unbegun and unending duration that includes the order of time as past, present, and future, as well as the elements of irreversibility, novelty, and purposiveness. God's perfect knowledge of all possibilities, of all the past and the present in their fullness, coupled with his doctrine of God's inexhaustible power, provides a sufficient reason or ground for an orderly historical process. Eternal Life grounds the past and provides possibilities in an orderly manner for the future. God as Eternal Life thus operates as an efficient cause or ground of history.

Eternal Life can also be said to be the absolute perspective that grounds and is the goal of all finite perspectives of history. Moreover, Eternal Life conceived in terms of agape-love is offered as an account of the aim of history. God drives toward the actualization and fulfillment of all life. God is thus the source of the axiological norms found in history, as well as the eros toward wholeness. God is thus the source of human courage and blessedness. In a word, Eternal Life is directly related to temporality as ground and aim. God affects history as its efficient ground and final aim.

Secondly, on the negative side, it is doubtful that Tillich provides an adequate account of his description of temporal freedom of self-transcendence. It is true that God is also taken to be free, but if God is the whole, how can it be said that the parts are free? Tillich's account of the multidimensional unity of all life processes presupposes a part-whole relationship. At this point his metaphysics does not inform his phenomenological descriptions of freedom. How can a part be free when its freedom consists in resting in the divine unity? As the depth dimension of history God knows fully all the feelings and thoughts of the parts. There is no privacy, since the divine thou "includes the ego and is nearer to the ego than the ego to itself."[1] God is the parts, and the parts are God. It is beyond question that Tillich "intends" the parts to be really free, but he provides no model to explain how freedom is possible within his system.

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[1] Vol. I, p. 271.

Tillich's failure to account for human freedom in history has serious consequences for the problem of evil. He tries to account for estrangement and ambiguity by attributing formal freedom to the parts. In a rather pan-psychistic manner he even analogously associates the fact of contingency and spontaneity in nature with human freedom. But if freedom does not follow from his part-whole relationship, then evil must be attributed to the whole. Tillich wants to avoid treating evil as the mere short-sightedness of finite perspectives in the fashion of some forms of absolute idealism. It is true that God seeks to bring good out of evil by providing some possibilities for good in virtually every situation through his providential guidance. But just because some good can come from evil does not render evil as good. But if evil is really evil, and without human freedom must thus be attributed to the whole, then the presence of evil is either a contradiction of the perfect love of God or suggests a limitation of his power. Hence if Tillich's system does not account satisfactorily for the freedom he finds in system history, neither does it explain the presence of evil.[1]

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[1] There is still a further failure to account for evil in Tillich's system even if freedom were someway found possible within his system. The question still remains why there is so much evil in nature (cancer, etc.) and man. Why is formal freedom used so decidedly against material freedom? Tillich's only response is that the act of self-estrangement is "irrational." Vol. III, p. 284. Since this may be the only answer possible to why freedom is used so negatively, it is not included in the text as a crucial argument. It does point parenthetically, however, to an inexplicable fact in Tillich's thought.

The third conclusion concerns the relation of history to God. Does history affect God in any way? Our analysis has provided us with distinctions by which God can be said to be both not affected and affected by history. God is not affected by history in at least four ways. First, God as being-itself does not depend on history for his being. As potentiality would be only bare nothingness without prior actuality (Aristotle), so there must first be something real of which potentialities are a function. Potentialities cannot arise from nothing (total nonbeing). The potentialities and possibilities involved in the realization of history presuppose at least some kind of prior actuality. Tillich, as was shown in Chapter Three makes God the ground or source of potentialities. Potentialities are a result of what God can do. Thus, history is, for Tillich, because God is. History does not affect God's *aseity*. Secondly, history does not affect God's grasp of the realm of possibilities. God is never surprised by the events of history. God is the creative source and knower of all possibilities. Thirdly, history does not affect the quality of God's blessedness. Fourthly, God's aim of *agape*-love is unconditional. It is not modified by history. But how does history affect God?

Tillich's account of Eternal Life makes it possible to say that history affects God in at least two ways. First, history provides God with "new" content in the process of actualization, that is, in the transition from essence to existence.[1] If existence cannot be deduced from essence and it is a transition in which the new appears, then the quality of the whole must be affected by this transition. Even if God's knowledge of the future were complete in every detail, it would still follow that in the whole there would be recognition of a change from mere potentiality to actualized life. Since change implies time, then time would invade the divine whole. But beyond this possible kind of change in God, Tillich holds that both the future and past are "open" for God as well as man. This means, as we have seen, that God's evaluative response can be modified according to the emergence of new facts in the historical process.

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[1] Tillich acknowledges that the content of history "enriches" the realm of essence in the process of essentialization. Vol. III, pp. 402, 405. Since "essentialization" has not been analyzed in this chapter yet,

The second way in which history can be seen to affect God follows from the axiom of harmony conceived as God's love-motivated drive toward individualization. Since God's nature can be viewed symbolically as a love which "lacks" a content to love, the drive to create ("go out") eternally means that God is never perfectly complete. It is true, as it was previously indicated, that God does not create anything completely "external" to himself. The whole is all there is. But still the inner dynamics of lack, comparable to the driving power of negation in Hegel's notion of antithesis, keeps Tillich's God from being the completed and static perfection of Aristotle's unmoved mover. This observation that history does affect God in at least two ways leads to our fourth consideration.

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we can only observe here that his doctrine of essentialization confirms the position defended above.

Fourthly, what can be concluded about the axiom of transcendence in Tillich's system. Tillich's axiom of transcendence makes "any structural dependence of God on something contingent impossible for me to accept."[1] Although Tillich places nonbeing within Eternal Life and rejects what he takes to be the lifeless Aristotlian-Thomistic doctrine of God as pure actuality, he does not appear to be willing to give up or modify in any way the notion of God's complete perfection. When he says being-itself "transcends" actuality and potentiality, he means that God includes both in terms of an Hegelian "aufgehoben." Yet if this means that God actualizes his potentialities at all time to the fullest possible extent, it seems that perfectibility is a better descriptive term for this process than the notion of complete perfection. The idea of complete perfection suggests that God has no need for or is independent from history. The problem is not that Tillich should be criticized for saying that he does not fully know what God's experience is like. No one claims this. The problem is that he does seem to know that God is perfect in all ways. This is an axiom and as such he does not try to prove it within his system. Neither, however, does he ever question it in terms of its ability to order experience in the most comprehensively systematic manner. As we saw in Chapter Two, the axiom of transcendence is an immediate deliverance of revelation ascertained in terms of epistemological monism. It would seem that his particular formulation of the analogical knowledge of God in which all religious terms are taken as symbols, and not literally, rests upon the unacknowledged literal statement that being-itself is perfect. If this is the case, then two basic criticisms must be made against Tillich's axiom of transcendence.

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[1] Kegley and Bretall, The Theology of Paul Tillich, p. 340.

First of all, Tillich's axiom of transcendence makes him susceptible to many of the charges he himself makes against supranaturalism. One of his major criticisms of supranaturalism is that it does not make God essentially related to history. God becomes a stranger "up there" somewhere. Now if Tillich's God is so perfect that the metaphysical categories of his system do not apply, then an appeal to the mystery of God becomes _ad_ _hoc_ explanation. If God is exempted from the requirements of Tillich's system, then the notion of God is not elucidating any experience and is hence philosophically irrelevant. The concept of God does not thus explain any of the nine characteristics of historical time previously mentioned. Mysteries become "solved" by appealing to a _Deus_ _ex_ _machina_ who rises infinitely above the system. Although it might be justifiably said that God is ultimately mysterious in that no reason can be given for his nature as he truly is, yet man's belief in what constitutes God's nature can be called "rational" only if it is based on what occurs in the given temporal world. Tillich's axiom of transcendence has no such essential connection with time and is hence philosophically superfluous. In different words, Tillich's axiom of transdendence does not ontologically inform or elucidate his phenomenological descriptions.

The second basic charge that must be made against Tillich's axiom of transcendence is that it is fundamentally inconsistent with his axiom of harmony. The axiom of harmony is the other half of the cognitive content of revelation. It means that God is *agape*-love, and is frequently expressed in terms of polar balance between God's "going-out" and "returning", between *eros* and *agape*. The motive behind the transition from essence to existence is seen in the axiom of harmony as divine love seeking to fulfill itself through a process of individualization which culminates in the formal freedom of human self-consciousness. The emphasis on the dynamics of being-itself viewed in terms of divine life and love has been taken as the major thrust of Tillich's speculative philosophy of history. But the assumption in the axiom of harmony, however, is that God is fulfilled or completed *only through* the historical process. This line of argument forces the conclusion that a major inconsistency runs throughout Tillich's system. The axiom of transcendence assumes that God is self-sufficient and not fundamentally altered by history, and the axiom of harmony assumes that God lacks and needs history for fulfillment and enrichment. Since only either one or the other can be true, to affirm both is contradictory.

There is a certain expansiveness in Tillich's system. It provides an affinity for both those who prefer classical theology and those attracted by process philosophy. The reason for his expansiveness is now perhaps clear. Tillich does not provide a synthesis of both by "standing at the border." He inconsistently tries to adopt both. And as logicians tell us, if contradictory statements are found within a system, anything can be proved. But if anything can be proved in a system, then in effect nothing is proved. The axioms of transcendence and harmony which have been woven throughout Tillich's system appear to be such contradictory statements.

To sum up: time has been found to be the central category of finitude, and consists of duration, chronological order, irreversibility, novelty, purposiveness, freedom, relativity, and ambiguity. These characteristics provide the date of man's existence in history of which Eternal Life is taken to be the answer. Eternal Life is the content of the divine life and includes a living unity, a unique complex unity, an unbegun and unending unity, creative unity, a unity of divine love, a fully differentiated unity, and a state of blessed unity.

Four conclusions are drawn from this analysis of time and Eternal Life. First, God affects history as its efficient ground and final aim. Secondly, Tillich accounts for all but formal freedom in his account of Eternal Life, and this makes his explanation of evil in history untenable. Thirdly, history is related to God as well as the converse. History does not affect God's *aseity*, his grasp of the realm of all possibilities, his blessedness, nor his aim of *agape*-love. But history does affect the content of Eternal Life through creation (and essentialization) so that God is not completely independent of history, and history does through eternal creativity supply the content for God's love (lack) which means that God is never fully complete. The fourth conclusion arises from the third. Tillich's axiom of transcendence does not support his descriptions of how history affects God. The axiom of transcendence is philosophically unenlightening and essentially unrelated to history much like the God of supranaturalism. It also contradicts his axiom of harmony. The axiom of transcendence seems to claim that God is perfect and complete apart from history. The axiom of harmony maintains that God as love is not complete apart from history. Tillich does not therefore synthesize the classical ontology of perfection with the process ontologies of perfectability.

The preceding analysis of time and eternity and their relations provide a background from which to view the problem of immortality. What is true in general should hold for this particular problem. How does Tillich view the nature of man's eternal destiny?[1]

D. The Nature of Man's Eternal Destiny

The lack of clarity and the demand for negative statements only in determining the status of the human individual in Eternity in Tillich's system appears almost like a deliberate plot to keep the uninitiated from his real meaning. But what is he saying to his inner circle? Again it will be helpful to narrow the possibilities of interpretation by noting first what Tillich rejects, and then by turning to what he seems to mean positively.

1. What the Eternal Destiny of Man does not Mean

Tillich makes two statements concerning what the future of man in Eternal Life is not. First, in Eternal Life the individual does not pass into oblivion. The individual, as well as well as historical groups, does not become lost in an undifferentiated unity, but rather in some way must be fulfilled. We have shown a fully differentiated unity to be a requirement of the Divine Life conceived as *agape*-love. Hence, Tillich says, "the dimension of the spirit [man] which in all its functions presupposes self-consciousness cannot be denied eternal fulfillment . . ."[1] In other words, to recall a footnote in the introduction to this chapter, Tillich wants to say "more" than does Schlesinger who calls for social change without promise of ultimate fulfillment. Tillich believes, as we have indicated, that the promise of fulfillment is needed to supply adequate motivation to social action.

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[1] Although our treatment of the problem of immortality concentrates on the individual historical agent, it should not be concluded that for

The second denial that Tillich makes is that Eternal Life means "endless life hereafter" as a kind of idealized reduplication of life as know it now. He calls a theology "bad" which thinks of Eternal Life as endless continuation of the "after-each-otherness" of temporality.[2] It should be recalled, however, that the "after-each-otherness" refers to the chronological order of time as past, present, and future, and is defined by Tillich as the common meaning of time in all the dimensions of life. He is thus searching for a meaning of man's eternal destiny that is considerably "different" from everything we know as temporal. Tillich expresses his second denial by affirming that "the self-conscious self in Eternal Life is not what it is in temporal life . . ."[3] It is in connection with this second denial that the

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Tillich history is merely a matter of what happens to the individual. Mere individuals have no historical significance for Tillich. Since "history is the history of groups" and the individual is inextricably connected with various groups, what is said about the destiny of individuals must also be applied to history-bearing groups. Vol. III, p. 312.

[1] Vol. III, 414. [2] Vol. III, p. 316. [3] Vol. III, p. 414.

comment of Nels F. S. Ferré is relevant.

> In Tillich's view, whatever is ultimately personal in man lasts because it belongs to Being-itself. The personal, however, is effectively buried in the grave of the undifferentiated itself. The personal never remains beyond death as persistence of persons. The impersonal has therefore won. If Tillich were not explicit on the nature of his transpersonal ultimate, we could interpret his position to be that the persistence of the personal, though not persisting as individuality, is mostly an affirmation that our kind of personal existence, now, in this life, will be fulfilled in some new kind of being where the separations and estrangements of our finite existence are transcendended, even while the kernel of self-being exists in such fulfillment.[1]

Part of Ferré's statement stands in opposition to the first denial we have just seen Tillich make. Tillich would deny that the human individual is "effectively buried in the grave of the undifferentiated itself." God's agape-love, as was shown, requires something more than this. But Ferré is probably right when he says that Tillich rejects "even the kernel of self-being" in the eternal destiny of man. Why does Tillich reject the continuation of the living self-consciousness of the individual after death?

It is not clear why Tillich rejects the notion of personal immortality. On the suffface he offers some rather shallow reasons. He says the belief in personal immortality takes away the seriousness of death. But this only begs the question of how serious death is. Or, he says the belief in immortality as a natural quality of the soul eliminates the need for God's grace and for the Christ. But this seems inconsequential since it also either begs the qestion of whether or not God's grace is needed, or neglects the obvious possibility that within Christian theology God could easily be said to create man and "endow" him with immortal life. Man is thus ultimately dependent on God in this rather usual interpretation. Again, he calls the belief in immortality a popular superstition.[1] This is little more than name-calling. He also interprets Plato as well as the Bible (I Timothy 6:16) to mean that immortality is a certain quality of life now, and not a "continuation of temporal life after death."[2] But whether his interpretation of Plato and the Bible be right or wrong, there is yet no philosophical argument to show why he rejects personal immortality. An appeal to Plato or the Bible is not identical with a philosophical appeal to truth.

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[1] Nels F. S. Ferré, Searchlights on Contemporary Theology (New York: Harper & Bros. Publishers, 1961), p. 128.

What is the "real" reason for Tillich's rejection of personal immortality? This question cannot be answered with certainty. We can only hazard the critical observation that Tillich's rejection of personal immortality is a consequence of his failure really to account for human freedom by providing for man's ontological "separation" from God. Ultimately in Tillich's system it is not the part that counts, but the whole. This critical remark is either the reason for his rejection of immortality or in someway God's power is limited to such an extent within his own nature that he cannot overcome death. To limit God's majestic power and self-sufficiency, is contrary to Tillich's axiom of transcendence. Yet this may be just another instance of how the axiom of harmony is incompatible with the axiom of transcendence. Now that the two positions that Tillich opposes have been observed, and some reasons for his rejection of them suggested, what can be said about Tillich's positive meaning?

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[1] Vol. III, p. 409-10.

[2] Vol. III, p. 409-10.

2. What the Eternal Destiny of Man Does Mean

In the light of our previous analysis of the relation between time and eternity, Tillich appears to mean that when a person dies he is "elevated" into the "eternal memory" of the whole. He does not continue as a subjectively living human being. This follows from the idea that if temporality as we know it is taken away from man's self-conscious life there doesn't appear to be anything left. But this is not to say that a person passes into oblivion or an undifferentiated unity. The requirement of *agape*-love requires that he be fully remembered as an integral part of the whole. It is in this light that Tillich's doctrine of essentialization can be understood.

a) The Essentialized Individual

What does Tillich mean by "essentialization?" Essentialization should not be confused with actualization (transition from essence to existence). To employ a spatial metaphor, as actualization is the "downward" movement of the whole toward the individualization of the parts, essentialization is the "upward" movements of the parts back to the whole. Tillich speaks of these movements as a rhythm "from essence through existential estrangement to essentialization."[1] The problem is to ascertain the precise nature of what it is of the part that is essentialized.

Tillich illustrates his meaning of essentialization in terms of portrait painting. An authentic portrait for Tillich expresses what an individual really is. It is not a flattering idealized account of a person, nor a distorted emphasis on the weaknesses or estrangement of an individual isolated from his positive qualities. This consideration means that Tillich rejects both the Supranaturalist's view of heaven as an idealized form of historical life and of hell as a completely bad place. A portrait is an epitome of what an individual has really become up to the present moment. In Tillich's estimate:

> It is not one particular moment in the life process of an individual that they [authentic works of art] reproduce but a condensation of all these moments in an image of what this individual essentially has become on the basis of his potentialities and through the experiences and decisions of his life process.[2]

This illustration of an "essentialized" work of art suggests that in the mind of God, the individual is fully understood and remembered. Since there is no ontological privacy in the part, God as the whole fully knows in terms of identity the individual's feelings, motivations, and thoughts. At each moment the experiences of the individual are "elevated" into the whole, and at death what the individual has become is fully registered and retained.

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[1] Vol. III, p. 421.

[2] Vol. III, p. 413.

The fact that God remembers completely what an individual (or group of individuals) has made of his life in history appears to be what Tillich means by the symbolic phrase "the resurrection of the body." God does not remember a mere "naked" soul in isolation from the body. In compliance with the dimensional unity of all life processes, Tillich insists that one aspect of man's life cannot be separated from another. "The whole personality participates in Eternal Life."[1] This means that God remembers everything about the person including his physical make-up. But there is still another meaning involved in the symbol "resurrection of the body."

In addition to remembering the "whole" person, the resurrection of the body also "includes a strong affirmation of the eternal significance of the individual's uniqueness."[2] This means that each part of the whole is unique and its uniqueness will not be forgotten in the universe. Note that Tillich said the "eternal significance" of the individual, and not the continued survival of unique individuals as such. What could this mean?

What then is really essentialized in a mind-body? Tillich answers negatively that it is not man's living self-consciousness that is essentialized.[3] He says that "the self-conscious self in Eternal

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Ibid.

[3] In a lecture in his course entitled "History and the Kingdom of God" Tillich clearly stated that "participation in Eternity cannot be described in terms of self-consciousness." (From the writer's notes at Harvard in 1961).

Life is not what it is in temporal life . . ."[1] Essentialization, then, is not the continuation of the subjectivity of man's conscious life beyond death. It rather refers to the contribution individuals make to the "memory" of the whole. The precise nature of this memory cannot be determined since the whole matter of essentialization is highly symbolic.[2] But our analysis of Tillich's account of human destiny would be incomplete without considering the reason for his concern with essentialization. This becomes clear in his comments about God's judgment of the individual.

b) The Divinely Judged Individual

Since the part is never separated from the whole, how can the threat of "eternal death" away from God be taken seriously? The answer to this question follows from the previous treatment of the meaning of essentialization. Every moment is judgment. The end of history is ever present.[3] The events of human history are "elevated" or retained in the divine mind for just what they are from the point of view of the whole. Thus, the threat of hell or eternal death as everlasting separation from

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[1] Vol. III, p. 414. One might ask how the *essential* of a mind-body can be preserved in a reality beyond mind-body. If a living mind and body are not included as such in Eternal Life, the term "essentialization" appears to be misleading since what would *normally* be called the "essence" of mind-body is no longer present.

[2] Tillich ended his course on the Kingdom of God and History with an agnostic note. "If this lecture disappoints us, and we want more to be said, go to the Christian hymns. They say more rightly." By this statement he meant that myth and symbols provide concreteness, but the abstractions of the theologian cannot characterize adequately the content of Eternal Life.

[3] Vol. III, p. 398.

God must be rejected, as well as the universalistic tenet that all will be fully "saved."[1] No part is ever separated from the whole, and to the degree that a person actualizes his essential nature he will be remembered in the living duration of the divine unity. And by the same token, to the degree that a person has failed actually to realize his destiny or potentialities and has submitted to nonbeing, his failure will also be acknowledged as such from the perspective of the whole. Thus, whatever creative or destructive thing a person does will not pass by unnoticed in ultimate Reality. His deeds live on in the whole after the immediacy of his own subjective life evaporates.

Tillich's concern here is to provide history with a sense of seriousness. If everything about a person perished in history, then history has no ultimate seriousness. But if everything man does in history is eternally preserved and recorded, then every decision has the weight of eternity. Thus, in this manner, Tillich substitutes for the traditional doctrines of everlasting complete bliss or everlasting hell-fire the notion of "degrees" of salvation in terms of "some kind" of living retention and clarity in the mind of God. But how can this interpretation of Tillich's view of judgment and reward be seen to harmonize with his enigmatic interest in the possibilities of the development of a person after death as seen in his consideration of the ideas of reincarnation, intermediary state, and purgatory?[2]

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[1] Vol. III, p. 416.

[2] Ibid.

The possibility of an answer to this question has already been provided in the previous general account of time and eternity. The content of God's experience possesses time and change within duration,[1] and as new events take place the past is "open" to a fuller interpretation. Although God knows all the possibilities provided by the destiny of the past, it follows from Tillich's descriptions that God does not necessarily know which possibility is going to be actualized by a person. (Tillich is reticent to say this clearly because of his axiom of transcendence, but neither does he deny it). But after a possibility has been actualized, God knows what has thus followed from the past and hence has new light on the past. Now this means concretely for the individual, that after a person's life is past, consequences of his actions continue to make an impact on the lives of others. Hence, the possibilities for "good" or "bad" of a deceased person continue to live on. Thus, in the mind of God it is possible for either more "positive" or "negative" evaluation to continue to take place. In other words, the degree of one's essentialization is not stopped at death, at least not its significance. The life of the late President John F. Kennedy (or anyone), for example, cannot fully be evaluated by historians or God as long as the historical process bears his influence. In this context the practice of Roman Catholics to pray and make sacrifices for the deceased can be seen as "a powerful expression of belief in the unity of individual and universal destiny in Eternal Life."[2] As long as one prays for a deceased person, the influence of the deceased has not yet stopped, and since the positive qualities of a loved one are usually remembered more than the negative ones, his influence will probably be constructive. In light of the remarks in this chapter on time and eternity, what kind of a picture has emerged?

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[1] Vol. III, p. 418.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 148.

3. An Interpretative Summary of the Relation Between Time and Eternity

Tillich's account of the relation between Eternity and the movement of time can be viewed as an attempt to synthesize the Greek circular view of history, the Augustinian emphasis on time as moving forward, and the supranaturalist's belief in eternity as "above" history. How does Tillich proceed to effect such a synthesis?

First, Tillich discards the Pythagorean (Greek) notion of time as a circular movement, as time going out and coming back to itself in eternal return because this view negates the reality of time. It also provides no motivation for social action. Fate controls the historical process. Plato may be saved from these defects, according to Tillich, since he possibly attributed some kind of temporality to the eternal in his view of time as "the moving image of eternity." Plato also appeared to indicate a dialectical movement in the realm of Ideas in his later dialogues.

Next, Tillich rejects St. Augustine's view of time as a straight line starting with creation and ending with a consummation in which eternity takes over. This comes closer to the Christian understanding of the time as having a goal or purpose, as running ahead giving the possibility of eternity. The goal contributes something to Eternal Life.

But the idea of a straight line does not indicate the existential now, the constant invasion and transformation of time within the Divine mind. For Tillich time constantly comes from and returns to the eternal. The Kingdom of God is present as well as future. This lack in Augustine's view made it possible for modern theories of progressivism, whether naturalistic or idealistic, to extend the temporal line indefinitely in both directions until both a beginning and an end are denied and time is radically severed from eternity.

In his lectures at Harvard in 1961 Tillich mentioned another inadequate view of the relation of eternity to time. Eternity is viewed as a vertical line coming from eternity in every moment of time, giving time an "eternal now." This provides the existential relation to eternity that Augustine's idea of a straight line does not convey, but it degrades the importance of history. The eternal is so contrasted to time because only the presence of the Eternal is important. Historically everything is the same. This view could be illustrated in the Supranaturalism of the German Lutheran Church after World War I. The church thought that nothing could save society, and that salvation is only for the individual. So the church yielded to the state permitting it to do whatever it wanted to do as a power group. Tillich's estimate of the inadequate views relating time and eternity can be summarized with the aid of three diagrams.



Greek
"Coming from"



St. Augustine
"Going ahead"



"Rising to"

As a philosopher-theologian of synthesis, Tillich seeks a view of the relation of the movement of time and eternity that brings together aspects of all of the three inadequate views. From the Greek understanding he accepts the view of time as coming from and returning to the eternal. With Augustine he believes that time goes ahead. The view of time as rising to eternity in present "nows" must also be included. Tillich offers the following view:

> I would suggest a curve which comes from above, moves down as well as ahead, reaches the deepest point which is the nunc existentiale, the "existential now," and returns in an analogous way to that from which it came, going ahead as well as going up. This curve can be drawn in every moment of experienced time, and it can also be seen as the diagram for temporality as a whole. It implies the creation of the temporal, the beginning of time, and the return of the temporal to the eternal, the end of time. But the end of time is not conceived in terms of a definite moment either in the past or in the future. Beginning from and ending in the eternal are not matters of determinable moment in physical time but rather a process going on in every moment, as does the divine creation. There is always creation and consummation, beginning and end.[1]

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[1] Vol. III, p. 420.

This position can be seen in the following spatial image:



This formulation expresses Tillich's view that time (actuality) enriches eternity, with its creative existence since what is done in time is elevated to eternity as new content in the divine mind. It also gives eternal meaning to what is going on in time, since nothing that has being is forgotten by God. The content of time as "going ahead" includes our cultural creations. Everything we do in time and space has eternal significance for the whole. The fact that man gives content to the eternal gives weight and seriousness to what he does. His creative efforts will never be unnoticed or unappreciated. None of our decisions is meaningless and transitory. History is charged with meaning and responsibility. There is also a progressive aspect to time, but not utopian, since the fulfillment of history is in eternity and not time. This concept of the relation of time and eternity also illustrates his view of New Being as that which breaks into time in ecstatic moments of revelation and salvation. It also substantiates the interpretation in this study of the two major ways in which God operates within history, namely, as the creative power "coming from" God overcoming nonbeing, and as redeemer or "rising to" what which makes for harmony of being (polar balance). It combines the ways in which the Kingdom of God is related to history both from within and at the end of history, since it stands for every moment of experienced time as well as for time as a whole. It reflects an eschatology that is both realized now fragmentarily and is still futuristic. Paradoxically, the Kingdom of God is both now and not yet, horizontal and vertical. It designates the universal principle of unity and clarity in the perspective of the whole.

As we conclude our analysis of Tillich's understanding of Eternal Life is should be recalled that the purpose behind Tillich's philosophy of history is to provide both guidance and motivation to social action. Tillich does not believe that man is capable of giving himself fully to social transformation short of the promise of the eternal significance of his efforts. History is ultimately meaningful only if what arises in history does not perish in history. He does not find such promise of historical transcendence in the purely naturalistic forms of self-understanding as seen in men like Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. Neither does he believe that eternal meaning in history requires the everlasting continuation of individual historical agents in their specific historical being. Tillich's answer emerges as one in which the historical process is important because it is one with God and hence is retained in the all-inclusive mind of God. The values that emerge within the historical process are conserved in the living retention of conceptual experience of the divine whole. To borrow an expression from Whitehead, Tillich's view of Eternal Life may be viewed as that of a "tender care that nothing be lost."[1] Tillich concludes his monumental systematic work in a way that lends support to our interpretation of man's destiny as a memory within the divine whole by saying that in eschatology our interest must turn "from man to God, thereby considering man in his significance for the Divine Life and its eternal glory and blessedness.[2]

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[1] Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 525. For those familiar with Whitehead's terminology Tillich's view of Eternal Life could be expressed as the elevation of actual entities into Objective Immortality (without subjective immediacy) within the consequent nature of God.

[2] Vol. III, p. 423.

E. Reflective Summary

Tillich approaches the problem of eternity and the end of history with an existential concern to find motivation for social transformation, to ground human effort even when it fails in an ultimate meaning. Accordingly, the problem of this chapter is to ascertain Tillich's view of the ultimate goal and destiny of the human historical process.

An answer to this question was provided by analyzing first the salient characteristics of historical time, and then by considering the characteristics of Eternal Life in terms of how they could be said to account for or explain the nature of historical time. A summary of the characteristics of both time and Eternal Life are provided within the chapter.

The following conclusion can be drawn from this chapter. (1) Eternal Life is the content of the Divine Life and provides both the creative ground and eschatological aim of history. (2) Tillich's view of Eternal Life in terms of the axiom of harmony is directly related to the elements of time and can be said to be a hypothesis that is relevant to the data of temporality. (3) Freedom as an attribute of time is the primary element of time that does not find elucidation in the part-whole nature of his metaphysical ontology. This means that Tillich does not reveal how the whole can be said to give freedom to the parts. This results with the failure of his ontology to reconcile the fact of estrangement and evil in history with the inexhaustible power and divine love of the whole. Thus, although his hypothesis is relevant, it is incomplete as well as inconsistent. Evil is a negative instance in his speculative hypothesis. (4) Tillich's axiom of transcendence does not support his phenomenological descriptions of history to the extent that his view of God's perfection precludes any modification of God by history. (5) The axioms of transcendence and harmony are not internally consistent and consequently his attempt to harmonize classical ontology and process ontology is unconvincing. His hypothesis is thus inconsistent. (6) The ultimate destiny of man as a part does not include any kind of individual personal life after death, but rather each unique person is fully remembered and distinguished in the differentiated unity of the divine mind or whole.

Since this chapter brought a number of critical issues in Tillich's philosophy to a focal point the content of the chapter is relatively more critical in extent than the previous chapters. It is therefore unnecessary to reduplicate the critical response to any greater extent than what has appeared already in the conclusions. One question can be raised, however, that has not yet been critically treated. Does Tillich succeed in providing adequate motivation for social change in the direction of human fulfillment. A "yes" or "no" answer would be arbitrary and relative. Some alternatives, however, can be pointed out.

On the one hand, Tillich's metaphysics is unnecessary for those who believe with psychoanalysts like Erich Fromm that love which works selflessly for the fulfillment of the beloved is the best way of obtaining personal fulfillment for the lover. If man's nature is really social, then his natural drive for self-affirmation and self-fulfillment can only rationally be met by seeking the fulfillment of others. "He who loses his life shall find it." On the other hand, for those who need some promise of "ultimate" meaning for their sacrificial action, then it appears that Tillich's solution conceived as a retention of what is done in history in the memory of God is not as highly motivating as the belief in personal immortality. To believe that a person really endures beyond death, and that his status in eternity depends to some extent to the quality of life he lives in time, offers both more hope and greater seriousness to one's historical actions.

Moreover, Tillich's adamant rejection of personal immortality as "superstition" does not necessarily follow from his system. In fact, his rejection adds some serious difficulties. If the motive behind God's creation is his need to express his divine love by providing formally free centers of self-consciousness to love, then would not God's love be more completely fulfilled by preserving in some way at least the kernel of man's personal existence as an object of love? Still further, could it not be said that if God as agape-love does not preserve man's personal existence, then his power must be limited in such a way that he cannot conquer death? But if his power is not limited, then God's nature as agape-love is questionable since man's intrinsic value appears to be merely used instrumentally as a means for God's own perfection. If this is the case, then God is not really the God that inspires worship and motivates human action. He is rather only a selfishly inclined cosmic power.

CHAPTER VII

SUMMARY OF INTERPRETATION AND EVALUATIONS

Since reflective summaries have been provided at the end of each chapter, the purpose of this final chapter is (A) to draw together the unifying themes that have emerged from this study of Tillich's philosophy of history, (B) to evaluate his distinctive contributions, (C) to assess the difficulties in his approach, and (D) finally to indicate briefly some areas in Tillich's thought that require further analysis.

Philosophy of history is a study of both critical problems dealing with the nature of history and historical knowledge, and of speculative issues concerning the ontological ground and ultimate aim and destiny of the historical process.

Tillich's philosophy of history is an application of his theory of ultimate reality to the dimension of historical existence. It is necessary, therefore, to embrace and interpret his theory of knowledge and reality, as well as his view of man, as a basis for a more adequate understanding of Tillich's approach to the critical and speculative problems of philosophy of history. What unifying themes have emerged from this approach to Tillich's view of history?

A. The Emerging Picture

Essentially two unifying themes dominate Tillich's systematic thought; namely, the axioms of transcendence and harmony, and the part-whole model.

1. The Axioms of Transcendence and Harmony

There is a cognitive or propositional core presupposed in Tillich's doctrine of revelation, and this cognitive content is here expressed in terms of two "axioms" because they are fundamental assumptions of his entire systematic thought. These two axioms are, for Tillich, virtually self-evident truths or autonomous knowledge born of religious (ecstatic) experience, and operate as metaphysical statements about the kind of Reality that can account for the ground and aim of all realms of being. Tillich believes that all speculative approaches to history rest on certain presuppositions or criteria of significance provided by the unavoidable influence of some tradition. Since Tillich's axioms operate in many contexts as hidden premises in his argument, a clear formulation of these axioms aids in both understanding and evaluating Tillich's philosophy of history. The two axioms, in fact, form a twofold cleavage of thought that runs throughout Tillich's entire system. How may these axioms be defined?

In the axiom of transcendence Tillich is urging that Ultimate Reality is abysmal and inexhaustible in both power and meaning. In light of his view of knowledge, with its requirement of certainty to avoid skepticism, Tillich held that the belief in the inexhaustible power of being-itself is an immediate deliverance of man's awareness of the holy. Theoretically, the axiom of transcendence provides the basis for Tillich's rejection of the view of God as one subject or object, even the highest, among others. God's inexhaustible nature cannot be described fully in terms of the subject-object relationship. On the practical side, the axiom of transcendence is the reason behind his Protestant Principle; namely, the protest against worshipping anything in history as ultimate or unconditional, be it material success, a person, race, institution or nation.

The axiom of harmony expresses Tillich's belief in the polar (dialectical) unity of being and nonbeing, or life and death. This axiom expresses Tillich's conviction that the revelatory awareness of God has a healing quality. The abysmal power of Reality is the source of polar unity between the basic self-world structure, and the three ontological polarities of individualization and participation, dynamics and form, and freedom and destiny. Theoretically, the axiom of harmony provides metaphysical support for the belief that Reality is on the side of the historical groups working toward human freedom and individuality. Practically, the axiom of harmony means there is hope that all humanitarian efforts will be preserved in the on-going life of the cosmos, and that _agape_-love is a dependable moral principle by which to distinguish in thought and action between the destructive and healing forces in all historical processes.

Both axioms express Tillich's "confessional" stance or ontological vision from which he views the meaning of history. With them he seeks to avoid coherently the intellectual _hubris_ of knowing too much about

God, institutional provincialism and bibliolatry, and the lack of social concern of various forms of supranaturalism. And yet within a monistic framework, his axioms represent an attempt to avoid both the lack of moral resolve and the lack of a sense of gratitude born of an awareness of the holy that is found in various forms of naturalism. Further characterization can be given to Tillich's ultimate frame of reference by considering the part-whole model he employs.

2. The Part-Whole Model

Although Tillich does not explicitly use the part-whole model, it can be ascribed to him as an assumption. Being-itself is the divine whole, and nature and history (man) are the parts. The parts are individualized, but not ontologically distinct from, or other than, the whole.

Tillich does not consider language about the whole as meaningless, and neither is his view of the whole a static one. Although the absymal nature of the whole (God) precludes any univocal description, as expressed in the axiom of transcendence, the whole can still be characterized analogically or symbolically. "God-talk" has several kinds of meaning in Tillich's thought. Religious language functions as an expression of the moral resolve of an individual or group both to act and feel in a certain way as for example, with *agape*-love and gratitude. Talk about God also is used to indicate ways in which men experience and overcome basic human anxieties such as death, guilt, and meaninglessness. But beyond these moral and existentialist ways of using religious language, Tillich acknowledges in part the Thomistic use of the analogy of proportion. The whole is thus more like a man than a stone because a man has more realized potentialities. The theory of analogical predication attempts to provide a basis for both continuity and discontinuity between God and the world. Our language has some meaning when applied to God, yet no description of God is really adequate to the inexhaustible whole. Religious language is in part univocal and in part equivocal.

But there is a problem at this point. If the doctrine of analogy preserves a healthy agnosticism about the propriety of our language, and thus avoids attributing the imperfections of finitude to the whole, what univocal meaning remains to such a quality as "*agape*-love" when applied to the whole? If there is one univocal or identical meaning between God's love and man's, why should not all the objections to univocity apply with equal force to this minimum identity assumed in the theory of analogy?

Tillich is aware of this difficulty in the theory of analogy of proportion. His answer appears to be that no descriptive analogy provides any identity of meaning between the whole and the part. His view of *analogia entis* is slanted more in the direction of *via negativa*. Discursive language cannot adequately express objective knowledge about the mystery of the whole. Language operates "symbolically," that is, language can point to the nature of the whole. Although no symbols completely describe the whole, they function as existential "pointers." This means that man's immediate apprehension of the divine reality in the depth of reason enables him to select some symbols over others to indicate (not univocally describe) the nature of the whole. Tillich, thus, "intends" that his symbols have positive meaning, although not exhaustively so. Thus, his approach might better be called "symbolic predication" than analogical predication. What positive symbolic meaning emerges from Tillich's vision of ultimate Reality?

The model that confers meaning on the whole is that of a primordial, undifferentiated unity drive by agape-love to "pour out" its life creatively toward individualization and differentiation among the parts (the variety in nature and man), and returning ultimately to itself enriched by the historical process (Hf).

Tillich's account of the whole is then, not only meaningful, it is also dynamic rather than static. The whole "goes out" creatively toward individualization. Tillich thinks of the whole in dynamic terms as the creative source of the structures of a possible world (essential finitude "in the mind of God"), as well as the power of being actualizing the realm of potentiality. This dialectical model of the whole conceived as "going out" and "returning to itself" is also used by Tillich to describe the nature of both life and love. In what specific ways do the axioms dominate Tillich's account of the whole?

The axioms of transcendence and harmony may be viewed as the essential attributes of the whole. The axiom of transcendence accounts for the creative power needed for the whole to "go out" in an evolutionary manner from its primal unity toward variety. The "return" movement of the divine whole to its identity is characterized by the axiom of harmony. The axiom of harmony is Tillich's explanation of why the whole goes out, as well as describes the nature of its return. This axiom describes Tillich's vision of the whole as going out toward individuality (variety) because of the need to have a content to love. Moreover, the axiom illuminates Tillich's belief that the return movement of the whole preserves the individuality of the parts in a fully differentiated unity. Hence, the axioms express Tillich's understanding of the source of power, as well as the sufficient reason for the existence and continuation of both nature and history.

In Tillich's abstract language, the axiom of transcendence symbolically describes being-itself as the power of being overcoming nonbeing. This means that the whole can overcome the dissatisfaction among the limited parts by relating them essentially to the whole. If the parts seek to separate from the whole, they die. The axiom of harmony is the power of being making for harmony of being. This means that the whole fulfills the parts by giving them individuality, that is, self-consciousness and freedom. In this context, the axioms operate as empirical generalization of being as a whole.

From these considerations it is clear that for Tillich history must be viewed in terms of a monistic pattern or model, one which suggests that the history of man is a place in which ontologically grounded values are found. Moreover, human history (and nature too, for Tillich) has a plan or goal which promises ultimate fulfillment in the transhistorical return movement of the historically enriched divine whole.

3. The Unifying Themes in Tillich's View of the Human Condition

Since history proper is fundamentally concerned with the events of man, Tillich's ontological model for understanding history becomes concrete in his view of man. Man is viewed by Tillich as a multidimensional unity of biological and non-biological needs such as the need to reason, to express himself aesthetically, to love with agape-love, and to worship or have an ultimate concern. Man is a social being by nature, and is related to ontologically grounded values such as truth, justice, and humanity, although estranged from his true nature (material freedom) because of his capacity to contradict freely his true nature (formal freedom).

It is particularly in connection with Tillich's doctrine of freedom that both the part-whole model and the axioms come to the fore. Tillich believes that the aim of the whole is to produce individuality and freedom. The development of, and respect for, freedom is the intent of his axiom of harmony. But individualization of the parts involves nonbeing, that is, both the possibility of fulfillment and of death. Only the whole, or being-itself, does not die. Being-itself eternally conquers nonbeing, that is to say, being always Is.

Tillich is indebted to Freud's description of man's estrangement, especially Freud's view of the death urge. The death urge in Tillich's thought represents two primary ways in which the parts become diseased by resisting their role as individualized parts. The first way this disease of human self-consciousness expresses itself is in the refusal of the part to "go out" toward responsible individuality (narcissistic fixation) in mature relationships with other parts and with the whole. Tillich calls this difficulty in going out "profanization" and describes it in many provocative ways.

The second description of the diseased death-urge is called "demonization," and indicates the difficulty of the part in "returning" to its own identity. The part either tries to make itself the whole (possessiveness, aggression), or tries to lose its own identity by submerging itself in another part that is mistaken for the whole (idolatry). The part goes out, but not toward the whole which nourishes it. It goes out to another part which then saps its life and keeps it from "returning" to its own identity or centered individuality. The submergence of the individual in totalitarian groups as a means of escaping from his own freedom is a graphic illustration of this expression of the death urge. Is there any source of healing for the diseased death urge in history?

Although Tillich draws heavily from Freud's description of the human condition, his chief criticism of Freud is that he is too pessimistic. Freud offers no theoretical provision for curing man, although in practice he attempts such a cure. Tillich posits a polar (dialectical) unity between life and death (being and nonbeing) in place of Freud's apparent ontological dualism. Although man is formally free to resist the whole and turn toward itself or another part, his material freedom consists in accepting and not repressing his finitude. For man to accept his finitude means that he accepts his divine destiny or essential nature as a free person in community with other parts and the whole.

Hence, salvation is tantamount to making conscious man's unconscious ("depth") unity between life and death that is ontologically grounded in the divine whole. Revelation, accordingly, becomes identified by Tillich with moments of healing of man's consciousness in which the abysmal power of the whole (the intent of axiom of transcendence) enables him to accept his largely unconscious need for individuality and freedom (the intent of the axiom of harmony). Further clarification of Tillich's doctrine of man's estranged condition is provided by comparing his thought with that of Karl Marx.

While Tillich believed Freud was too pessimistic in his doctrine of man, he considered Marx too optimistic. Tillich's estimate of the human condition has much in common with Marx's critique of capitalism, his emphasis on action rather than contemplative thought, his view of man's social nature, and his account of the socio-cultural conditioning of human thought. Yet, according to Tillich, Marx did not possess Freud's insight into the depth of man's estrangement from himself, from others, and from nature. Marx gave little or no emphasis to the estrangement of individual human consciousness that Freud described in terms of the death urge, and thus Marx located the source of man's estrangement from man solely in society. Hence, for Marx, estrangement (alienation) could be overcome by human effort alone. Because of his superficial view of man's estrangement, Marx paved the way for the inability of communism as a plan for social organization to be sufficiently self-critical, and to protect the individual from submergence or returning to the womb of authoritarian repression.

Tillich believed not only that man is estranged individually and socially, he also believed that the primal unity between life and death is estranged in nature as well. When the ontological polarities are tipped in disequilibrium on one side, both sides are affected. The result of this view of "total" estrangement is that resources for healing man's estrangement cannot be found in either nature or in man. Tillich is consequently driven to place the source of healing beyond the subject-object split of finitude in the abysmally transcendent whole, that is, in being-itself. This means that the solution of human problems encountered in history, either individually or in groups, is ultimately a matter of grace or help given freely by the whole, and not from human actions alone.

Several aspects of Tillich's philosophy of history begin to take shape in his theory of the human condition. First, history cannot be reduced to the mechanical causality of natural science. Man's capacity to pursue normative values expresses Tillich's belief in teleological causality. There are not only purposeful processes within the historical dimension. A naturalist could claim as much. History as a whole has a plan. The historical process is the gradual unfolding of a dependable structure or primal unity which lures rather than mechanically pushes the direction of history. The plan is an ideal or normative one, however, and not one conceived in terms of empirical generalizations. Tillich's view of a plan for history is one which intends to give history meaning and significance by pointing to what ought to be in terms of human fulfillment, rather than describing what empirically is.

Second, in Tillich's view of man there is an attempt to give importance to human freedom. Although freedom is in polar relation with destiny, Tillich intends that man is free within limits prescribed by destiny to alter his own situation and direct the course of historical change. Psychical causation is efficacious in human history.

Third, in Tillich's account of the human condition there is a concrete embodiment of his metaphysical model for the whole. The ontological nature of the whole was viewed symbolically as "going out" and "returning" to itself in perfect dialectical unity and harmony. This dialectical process, in effect, has an analogue in all life processes, including man. Such a dialectical model is the plan or design for all history. But man is estranged, that is, the unity between life and death is not fully conscious in most men (although it was fully conscious and actualized in Jesus as the Christ as a fulfilled part). Since the plan for history is not fully conscious in most men, the energy of history can be described in terms of man's restless urge to become something other than he is, although he knows not clearly what. The plan of history is the gradual process of making all men conscious of their unconscious or depth need for, and realization of, the unity between life and death. Such a unity may be expressed, as we have shown, in terms of man's need for individuality and responsible freedom within an inclusive community.

Fourth, the goal of human freedom and individuality within a community in history has ontological support. Although man is estranged from his true dialectical unity, Tillich's model for the whole represents the unity of the whole as providing the power (axiom of transcendence) to restore the hidden polar unity (axiom of harmony). The death urge is so prominent in man, however, that healing is always fragmentary and points as an earnest to a final "return" in terms of an eschatological fulfillment beyond history in the divine whole. The goal of history is thus one with the cosmic goal, and history is fulfilled only beyond history. Utopia is not possible in history. The historical process in nature and man thus means something to God (the whole) an the content of the divine life, and God means something to history as the power qualifying human consciousness and behavior in the direction of the goal.

4. The Unifying Themes as Seen in God's Immanence in History

Since history for Tillich involves the history of groups, Chapter Five is an application of the axioms of transcendence and harmony together with his theory of human estrangement to the dynamics of historical groups. Tillich's account of the threefold ambiguities of historical groups is an application of his interpretation of Freud's death urge to problems encountered within and among groups.. The fragmentary solution of these problems marks the presence of the Kingdom of God (the whole).

The crucial problems are to know just what it means to say that God is manifested in historical groups, and how to identify the presence of the Kingdom of God in social change. The manifestation of God in human history is not that of one cause among others. God is not a cosmic companion with whom one cooperates. God, conceived as the whole, is not one historical agent among others working miraculously to achieve a goal. Rather, God works as the more than human power arising within human consciousness to overcome fragmentarily the anxieties and ambiguities of historical existence. In what particular normative ways does God modify human consciousness?

The norms for identifying the presence of God within human experience are provided for Tillich by the manifestation (incarnation) of the nature of God (the whole) in Jesus as the Christ (a fulfilled part). At this juncture the axioms of transcendence and harmony are brought to bear on his Christology. Tillich believed that the New Testament contains portraits of a more than imaginary reality which happened, the historical details of which we do not know with certainty. The portrait Tillich finds in the Biblical accounts of Jesus as the Christ is one in which there is absolutely no trace of human estrangement, that is, Jesus both reveals the nature of the whole in its meaning as well as exemplifies the whole in his historical life. This means that both axioms are clearly personified in an actual person.

The axiom of transcendence is seen in the account of Jesus as revealing the nature of God as the abysmal power that enables him completely to overcome demonization (a part tries to be the whole) and profanization (a part withdraws from the whole). Although Tillich's historical skepticism leads him to neglect the citing of specific Biblical passages to support his interpretation of Jesus, he does say that such symbols as "Christ" or "the Anointed One," "the Son of Man" passages, and the "throne of God" symbol suggest "the unique relation ship of undisturbed unity."[1]

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[1] Brown, Ultimate Concern . . . , p. 214.

Here Jesus is the bringer of a new aeon. As a bringer of a new age, Jesus does not identify himself with God (the whole). Rather, the story of the Temptations, the struggle at Gethesemane, and the acceptance of the cross, all attest Jesus' submission in utter humility to God and his refusal to assert himself demonically as the whole.[1]

The axiom of harmony is personified in Jesus, or some historical agent, in terms of revealing the nature of the whole as agape-love. One could cite here the emphasis of Jesus on forgiveness, the story of the Good Samaritan, his accepting attitude toward outcasts, and his own demonstration of forgiveness while on the cross, as revelatory of God's forgiving nature. Here the heart of the whole, agape-love, appeared in Jesus as the Christ.

Although Jesus tends to be absorbed by Tillich's axioms, so that one might well think that Tillich's system too obviously forces the Biblical account of Jesus into his own interpretative categories, still "selected" passages from the Bible can be found to ground Tillich's portrait of Jesus. Jesus as the Christ thus becomes the "center of history" by both bearing and demonstrating the norms for an evaluative response to history. The concept of Jesus as the Christ as the "center of history" suggests Tillich's doctrine of kairos.

The "center of history" appeared when the conditions were ripe and is called, accordingly, the great kairos. Tillich uses the concept of *kairos* as an interpretative category of the historical process. Other periods of *kairoi* or great moments of historical possibility occur calling for human response. Tillich substitutes the concept of *kairoi* for progressivistic interpretations of history. *Kairoi* refer essentially to unrelated historical moments of opportunity to solve particular human problems within and among historical groups in light of the twofold norms provided by the great *kairos*. As the great *kairos* was a combination of freedom and destiny, and hence not inevitable, so other pregnant moments of history represent a challenge demanding human response.

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[1] See Jesus' claim to do nothing on his how authority in John 5:19-47. Tillich did not believe Jesus of Nazareth could have spoken in the exact words of the Fourth Gospel, but the image of Jesus reflected there shows the kind of impact Jesus had on early Christian witnesses.

As seen in terms of the twofold incarnational norms, the whole is related to the parts primarily in two ways. First, God is manifested in history (individuals and groups) in terms of the *creative power* to overcome the destructive forces of demonization and profanization—being overcoming nonbeing. Secondly, God is present in history qualifying human consciousness in terms of redeeming *agape*-love, that is, as the power for the fulfillment of man's essential nature conceived as a dialectical harmony between life and death—being making for the harmony of being. In both of these kinds of manifestation the whole is not to be conceived in terms of a supernatural being who works along with ontologically distinct men toward purposeful goals. Neither is the whole to be viewed in terms of a naturalistic humanism, since the whole is always more, according to the axiom of transcendence, than the sum total of all finite objects and processes.

The relation of the Kingdom of God to historical ambiguities in groups can now be understood. As the whole is manifested in individual persons by overcoming fragmentarily the effects of human estrangement, so the whole is manifested in group relations in (but is always more than) the processes that overcome historical ambiguity. The term "ambiguity" depicts analogously in groups what "estrangement" does in individuals. In both cases the model used is that of a lack of polar or dialectical unity among the basic threefold ontological elements developed in Volume One.

God is manifested in the first ambiguity of empire and particularization, which ambiguity corresponds with the first ontological element of participation and individualization, as the drive toward more inclusive and intensive unity (creative power—axiom of transcendence) which nevertheless protects the well-being of particular groups and individuals (redeeming love—axiom of harmony). This tendency could be illustrated, for example, in the formation of the "United" States of America, or the work of the United Nations.

The second ambiguity of social growth is an elaboration of the second ontological element of dynamics and form. In this ambiguity God is manifested as the power of being in groups driving toward the revolutionary new (creative power) which still preserves continuity in change by conserving the abiding values and structures of tradition (redeeming love). This tendency is evidenced in orderly democratic changes in society in contrast to chaotic revolutionary changes, or even in revolutionary changes in which some identity of social and cultural values is preserved, as in the case, for example of the

American Revolutionary War.

The third historical ambiguity is an application of the third ontological element of freedom (self-transcendence) and destiny. God is seen in the third ambiguity of historical self-transcendence as providing a living tension between the present realization of moments of *Kairoi* (creative power), and non-utopian hope for the future (redeeming love). The Negro's present achievement and expectation for greater social and economic equality offers a likely illustration of the presence of the Kingdom of God in the third historical ambiguity. In each case the "drive" of God conceived as the whole arises from man's depth (the unconscious as a lure or *nisus* in keeping with Tillich's insistence on the whole's respect for the conferred freedom of the parts.

The *motif* in Tillich's philosophy of history is to give an account of the norms and ontological source necessary to guide the forces of social change normatively in the direction of human fulfillment. Since historical change comes predominantly through historical groups, Tillich is concerned to relate his interpretation of history to a group that can effect historical action. The modification of human consciousness by the whole implies a change of behavior, that is, a call to action.

As a Christian theologian, Tillich writes in and for the Christian tradition. He expands the meaning of the Christian Church in terms of the "Spiritual Community." The Spiritual Community is identified with any groups, secular or ostensibly religious, in which the axioms of transcendence and harmony are actualized as creative power and redemptive love. "Latent" churches have no historical connection with Jesus as the Christ. "Manifest" churches represent confessional Christian groups in which the Spiritual Community is present. The manifestation of the whole is thus not restricted to any one historical tradition, nor does it depend on the continuance of any particular historical tradition. As other persons can conceivably achieve the same unity with the whole as did Jesus, at least in the highest stages of sainthood, so non-Christian groups can achieve the same degree of unity with the whole, and even more than some manifest churches. In any case, the Spiritual Community is a struggling community, one that struggles as a vanguard or creative minority to actualize the Kingdom of God.

Tillich's view of the relation of the Kingdom of God to the historical process (nature and history) is an attempt to point to the kind of ultimate power that could account for man's historical existence. God (the whole) conceived as the inexhaustible creative power (axiom of transcendence) and redeeming agape-love (axiom of harmony) working toward the individualization and fulfillment of relatively free parts is his explanation of the sufficient reason for the origin, the sustaining source, and the final goal of history. But what is the nature of the final goal of history?

5. The Unifying Themes as seen in Transhistorical Fulfillment

The final goal of history is life in the eternal whole. Tillich's account of eternal life is an attempt to give meaning to history beyond history. He thus speaks of transhistorical fulfillment rather than non-historical fulfillment, since the latter term tends to connote a negative evaluation of the temporal process. What are the basic characteristics of historical time for Tillich, and how does his account of eternal life function to elucidate and explain the nature of historical time?

The chief qualities of historical time are described by Tillich in terms of duration, chronological order, irreversibility, novelty, purposiveness, freedom, relativity, and ambiguity. If Tillich's theory of eternal life is to explain or account for the characteristics of historical time, it would appear that it must both include time and yet, as an explanation, be more than identical with it. The explanatory function of Eternal Life or eternity consists in providing some kind of unity in which the occurrences in the temporal course of history can be understood.

Tillich's symbolic account of eternal life can be viewed as the content of the divine life, and includes the concept of a living unity, a unique and complex unity, and unbegun and unending unity, creative unity, a unity of divine love, a fully differentiated unity, and a state of blessed unity. Eternal life as unbegun and unending duration includes the order of time as past, present, and future, as well as the elements of irreversibility, novelty, and purposiveness. God's perfect knowledge of all possibilities, of all the past and the present in their fulness, in conjunction with God's inexhaustible power, provides a sufficient reason or ground for an orderly historical process. Eternal Life grounds the past and provides possibilities in an orderly manner for the future. God as Eternal Life thus operates as an efficient cause or ground of history. Thus, Tillich's approach to Eternal Life is relevant to his description of the temporal process. The adequacy of his account will be considered critically later in this chapter.

Tillich's theory of Eternal Life not only indicates the absolute perspective that grounds the historical process; it is also taken as the goal toward which history moves. Eternal Life conceived in terms of *agape*-love is offered as an account of the aim of history. God drives toward the actualization and fulfillment of all life processes. God is thus conceived as the source of the axiological norms discovered in history, as well as the *eros* toward wholeness. God is thus the source of human courage and blessedness. In brief, Tillich's view of Eternal Life is directly related to temporality as ground and aim. God affects history as its efficient ground and final aim.

The transhistorical aim of history takes sharper focus in Tillich's theory of essentialization, that is, his account of the nature of the transition from history back to eternity. The doctrine of essentialization is employed by Tillich to oppose the Eastern view of Nirvana, or any view that loses the historical agent and cultural creations of groups in a final undifferentiated unity. Neither is essentialization to be identified with the supranaturalist's position that the living subjectivity or self-consciousness of individuals is preserved as such in personal immortality. Rather, essentialization means symbolically that the divine whole "remembers" with perfect clarity the degree of actualization and cultural creativity achieved by individuals and groups in history. Nothing that arises in history perishes completely in history. Human deeds live on in the divine memory after the immediacy of man's subjective life evaporates. In this way Tillich seeks to bring a sense of ultimate seriousness to the decisions made in historical events, and thus to provide motivation to historical change in the direction of ontologically grounded goals as depicted in the axiom of harmony. The axiom of transcendence operates as the ground of power and courage needed for man to direct and shape the occurrences of history in the direction of human fulfillment.

Now that the unifying themes of our interpretation of Tillich's theory of history have been drawn together, what can be said concerning the strengths of his system?

B. Some Distinctive Contributions in Tillich's Philosophy of History

Tillich's philosophy of history represents a life-long attempt of a creative thinker to understand the meaning and significance of history. Some of the strengths of his achievement can be listed briefly in order of the development of the chapters of this study.

1. Tillich's Epistemology

We find no difficulty with Tillich's insistence that history proceeds inevitably by interpretation of evidence. Interpretation is inevitable because of the inescapable influences of a person's historical consciousness derived from a particular tradition. There are no remembered events that are not remembered by a person in a particular tradition from his perspective. History is thus always understood by an interpretation from the point of view of some value orientation. Tillich skillfully seeks to make explicit the criteria of significance found in the Christian tradition.

Tillich is to be commended for his effort to combine the objectivity associated with the accepted procedures of historical research with the creative insight and intuition that comes from the ability to understand a person or period of history from the "inside." His emphasis on understanding the depth level of religious motivation or ultimate concern of a period of history adds an important ingredient to historical explanation.

2. Tillich's Ontology

Tillich's metaphysical world-view is relevant to the problems he intends to solve, namely, what can account for the structures of essential finitude, and what answer can be given to the actual estrangement found in the historical process. His description of the polar nature of finitude (the parts) and of estrangement in terms of polar disequilibrium is highly suggestive and provocative, and enables him to integrate descriptively broad areas of natural and social phenomena.

3. Tillich's View of the Human Condition

Tillich avoids a narrow interpretation of man's essential needs. Man is more than a biological animal. Beyond Freud's emphasis on man as a desiring animal, and Marx's stress on man as an economic animal, Tillich's approach to man as a multidimensional unity of physiological and non-psysiological needs, such as the need to know, to love and be loved as a person, enabled him to avoid a reduction of man's reflective and moral qualities to a mere physical basis. He also quite clearly stresses the need for the whole man to be healed, and that man's biological needs cannot be isolated completely from his non-biological needs. Tillich's view of man is compatible with the current emphasis on psychosomatic therapy.

Tillich's description of man's total estrangement is an impressive as his view of man's essential needs. His use of the model of polarity enabled him to describe man's estrangement both as an individual and as a participant in many provocative ways. Man's estrangement from himself, society, nature, and God is viewed as more than a subjective lack in man's consciousness. It is a reflection of estrangement in real-life situations.

If Tillich's descriptions of estrangement are fully accepted, they serve as a critique of any naturalism that seeks a solution to human problems from sources that are themselves estranged. Tillich's reference to a power beyond the subject-object split of finitude follows consistently from his phenomenological descriptions of total estrangement. Moreover, since both the subject and object poles are estranged, he consistently stressed the need for both a qualitative change within human consciousness as well as action by historical groups directed toward objective situations.

4. Tillich's View of God in History

Tillich succeeds to some degree in providing an option to the classical other-worldly orientation of Supranaturalism as evidenced in the Middle Ages. He clearly describes what he means by the manifestation of God in history. God is not one cause among others, but is rather manifested as a secondary cause within the consciousness of historical agents. The norms for identifying the presence of God in social change are supplied by the axioms of transcendence and harmony. The axiom of transcendence refers clearly to God as the creative power working to overcome the destructive forces of demonization and profanization. The axiom of harmony depicts God as redeeming agape-love, as the power available for fulfilling man's true nature.

Moreover, his doctrine of kairos supports his this-worldly emphasis on solving particular social problems in light of his norms without the despair that follows from disappointed utopian dreams of complete historical fulfillment.

Tillich also recognizes that history is a history of groups. He thus seeks to relate his philosophy of social change to the Christian church, or any other creative and redemptive groups. His reformulation of the doctrine of the church as an historical group avoids exclusiveness by acknowledging the presence of God in any group that manifests the creative power to overcome estrangement and exemplifies the redeeming qualities of agape-love.

5. Tillich's View of Transhistorical Fulfillment

Tillich does not believe that man is capable of giving himself fully to social transformation without the belief that his efforts have eternal significance. His symbolic account of Eternal Life succeeds in at least providing a possible answer to the eternal significance of historical change, and thus the importance of history. His answer in substance is that every decision in history has the weight of eternity on it because it is retained with fully differentiated clarity in the divine whole. If such a belief is accepted, then history could be viewed as eternally important and full of meaning for the divine whole, and for the part to the degree it identifies itself with the whole. Hence he succeeds in describing a possible way in which God is not only important to history as its ground and aim, but in which history is important to God as the means by which the whole fulfills itself. But along with Tillich's contributions there are also some important problematics.

C. Some Difficulties in Tillich's Philosophy of History

If Tillich is understood in the manner described in this study, then several crucial inadequacies can be focused around the unifying themes of his account of history. The first set of difficulties lies in the monistic part-whole model presupposed throughout his system. The second area of problematics appears in the axioms of transcendence and harmony.

1. Difficulties with the Part-Whole Model

Seven difficulties have emerged in this study concerning the monistic part-whole model presupposed in Tillich's system.

First, Tillich does not adequately relate how variety (nature and history) emerges from the primal undifferentiated unity. He does not make clear what he means by creation or how to distinguish it from mere change. Although Tillich refers to divine "creativity," he does not sufficiently explain what he means by creation. He does say what creation is not. Creation is not the result of some primordial power that creates the world from something outside outside itself (dualism). Neither is creation a rational deduction of existence from essence (emanation). Moreover, creation is not the result of some transcendent or supranatural being who is ontologically distinct from nature or history (traditional theism). Created objects are always parts of the whole. Tillich uses the term "creation" but gives no criteria by which it can be clearly identified or distinguished, for example, from mere transformation or change of pre-existing material.[1] This difficulty means that Tillich's stress on God as the creative ground of history is far from being clearly stated.

Second, Tillich does not explain how the creativity of the whole is compatible with his belief that the whole (being-itself) is self-sufficient and essentially unaffected by the created parts. Even if some criterion of creativity could be established to permit an understanding of what it means to say that the whole creates its parts, there would still be the problem of how the whole is not dependent in some way on the functioning of the parts. The whole notion of creation or creativity seems to imply a limiting function. The creating power appears to be modified, or made finite in some ways, by what is created. The creating power is affected by its relationship with what has come into being. Yet Tillich describes the whole in terms suggesting the self-sufficiency of Spinoza's Substance, or even the perfect, completely unconditioned God of supranaturalism he ostensibly rejects. It is not clear in Tillich's systematic thought how the whole could bring anything creatively new into being, and not be substantially affected by it. This difficulty means for philosophy of history that in addition to Tillich's failure to make clear what it means to say that the whole creates the historical process, he does not indicate sufficiently by the axiom of transcendence, how history affect the whole.

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[1] Tillich distinguishes between human creation as "really transformation" of given material, and God's absolute creation of the material man transforms. But he does not offer a criterion to distinguish the two kinds. Vol. I, p. 256.

Third, Tillich's doctrine of essentialization does not explain sufficiently how variety is preserved after creation in the Eternal Life of the whole. Although both the creation and preservation of variety is a requirement of love conceived in terms of _eros_ and _agape_, he offers no clear statement concerning what it means to preserve the _essentials_ of a mind-body in a reality that transcends both mind and body. Tillich admits as much. His basic statements are negative at this point. He is sure that preservation in Eternal Life does not involve the stream of consciousness in time as we know it now. It is sufficient here to note that philosophically, Tillich's doctrine of essentialization is a kind of non-answering answer. What purports to be an answer to how historical fulfillment is preserved in the eternal whole ends with a postulation of an unknown X which prohibits any positive answer. Hence, the nature of the aim of history in terms of transhistorical fulfillment is answered only in negative terms, and as such, hardly supplies the degree of motivation for social change and historical sacrifice Tillich felt to be necessary.

Fourth, a primary criticism of Tillich's thought in this study is that he does not explain theoretically how a part can be significantly free and still not be ontologically distinct from the whole. That is to say, in terms of the One-Many problems, Tillich does not say the Whole is One or Many. Rather, the whole is both. But he does not explain sufficiently how the Whole can be both One and Many at the same time. It is not clear, for example, how a part can be anything but a mechanical function of the whole or a logical inference. Moreover, his polar account of freedom and destiny appears only to justapose two possible answers with regards to human freedom rather than synthesize them. Such a justaposition is evident in his unsatisfactory account of the "fall" as both free and unavoidable; in his description of the great Kairos as both free and destined; and in his belief that lesser or other kairoi in history and both free and determined. His description of the freedom side of the polarity is also somewhat lacking in sufficient distinctions between desiring and willing, and between willing and the performance of what is willed. Thus, Tillich's phenomenological description of historical freedom is not sufficiently illuminated by his speculative model.

Fifth, Tillich's account of human estrangement is implied by his total system. His theory conditions his descriptions. His polar model requires that if the "self" is estranged, for example, the "world" pole is also estranged. In such a view estrangement is overcome only by a power beyond the subject-object split. Although Tillich does not intend that his account of estrangement should weaken the importance of human action in overcoming problems encountered in history, utter reliance on the grace of being-itself could weaken the importance of human effort and cooperation in solving social problems. Moreover, his position is unduly pessimistic if there are areas of nature or society that are not estranged. This would mean that areas of life within the subject-object split could provide the model for a unity between life and death, as well as possibly point to a source of power within nature that could heal estrangement. Naturalism is still a live option. Only if all parts of life processes are estranged is it necessary to look for help beyond the self-world polarity.

Sixth, as the preceding five criticisms depict a decidedly monistic *motif* in Tillich's thought, his model for social organization provides a concrete example of this tendency. His penchant is for more inclusive unities, that is, a return toward an organic whole. Although he mixes a pluralistic model with his monistic tendency as evidenced by his democratic concern for the protection of the rights of lesser parts within the whole, still he provides no adequate metaphysical safeguard against totalitarianism. Since the importance of history lies in its significance for the glory and blessedness of the divine whole, it would be easy to shift this attitude toward the state and say that the individual exists only to bring glory to the state. Thus, as the part-whole model in ontology tends to lose the centered part in the centered whole, so his tendency to define a particular historical group as free and fulfilled only when it is in unity with a larger social unity tends toward totalitarianism. Moreover, if the ontological whole is as self-sufficient as the axiom of transcendence suggests, then the whole does not really need the parts nor does it need to preserve them. By analogy, the state does not need to maintain the dignity of its individual members since their worth consists only in their contribution to the state.

The seventh problem lies with his monistic conception of love. Tillich's account of love provides the dynamics behind his entire systematic thought. It has been shown that love is essentially for him a drive (eros) toward unity with that from which one is estranged, a unity which respects the individuality and freedom of that which is estranged (agape). The whole drives toward individualization to provide content to love. Tillich insists that agape-love requires the creation of formally free centers of self-consciousness who can say "yes" or "no" to the love of the whole. But, as has been suggested, Tillich does not explain how man can be formally free and still be a part of the divine whole. The love of the whole for the part is always the love of the whole for itself.

Tillich seems to imply that the reason for loving is that the beloved is always a part of the lover. On the human plane, the reason one person should love another person is that essentially both belong to each other as parts of the one whole, and hence fulfill themselves by loving each other. Similarly, the whole loves the estranged parts because essentially they are parts of the whole, and the whole fulfills itself by loving its own parts. Since Tillich holds that the greater the love, the greater the need for free response, it would seem that his own view of love would suggest that the climax of agape-love entails the creation of ontologically distinct and separate selves capable of loving someone completely distinct. Hence, his monistic model does not permit the full expression of his own concept of love. This difficulty means that Tillich's speculative part-whole model does not elucidate or adequately account for the view of love that lies at the heart of his explanation of the sufficient reason for historical existence.

2. Difficulties with the Axioms of Transcendence and Harmony

The term "axiom" has been applied to two assumptions in Tillich's thought because they operate, for him, as virtually self-evident truths born of an immediate awareness of the holy. The axiom of transcendence operates as a metaphysical statement about the kind of power that could give intelligibility to the creative or self-transcendent ("going out") qualities of all life processes. The axiom of harmony operates as a metaphysical statement concerning the aim of all life processes to achieve and preserve their identity and individuality ("returning"). Hence, the two axioms describe Tillich's understanding of the ground and aim of all realms of being. The axioms have been formulated in this study for the purposes of exposition and critical evaluation.

Two critical areas arise concerning the nature of the axioms of transcendence and harmony. The first difficulty has to do with their justification, and the second weakness deals with their incompatibility.

With reference to the first inadequacy, the goal of knowledge for Tillich is certainty. Revelation, the knowledge of God, is for him immediate and certain rather than inferential and probable. It is, however, one thing to have immediate ecstatic experiences of the numinous, but quite another thing to interpret their meaning for specific situations. Tillich tends to slip in the interpretative elements expressed in the two axioms without clearly acknowledging them as such. Although one may phenomenologically describe numinous moments of power and healing in human experience, it is highly interpretative to affirm that the source of this power is beyond man in terms of an ontological reservoir of inexhaustible power and meaning, and that this source is working for individuality and freedom (polar harmony). With interpretation comes the possibility of error. Hence, Tillich promises certainty in revelation, but does not deliver it. It would seem more adequate epistemologically to acknowledge the interpretative and thus hypothetical nature of the axioms of transcendence and harmony than to claim a tenuous certainty. Had Tillich acknowledged sufficiently the tentative or pragmatic nature of his basic assumptions, the term "postulate" would have been used in this study to convey this psychological attitude.

The second basic weakness in justifying the axioms of transcendence and harmony follows from the first. Since Tillich does not clearly acknowledge their interpretative and hypothetical nature, he does not ostensibly seek to justify rationally either his axioms or his resultant confessional approach to historical interpretation. Now while we find no difficulty with his contention that history is inevitably interpreted from limited points of view, it does seem that the presuppositions of a given point of view can be evaluated by their ability to relate coherently the phenomenologically describable facts of the historical process. It would appear that some axioms enable one to view history more comprehensively than others.

The presuppositions of the Biblical literalist, for example, who would contend that God created the world in six twenty-four days some six thousand years ago do not enable him to integrate the relatively objective scientific facts concerning evolution and the age of the earth. In other words, although every system of thought and interpretation has some presuppositions (a theological circle), these axioms or presuppositions may also have a history. Through dialogue with other points of view, some presuppositions are found lacking comprehensiveness and even consistency. Although Tillich does in fact imply or act according to empirical coherence when he enters into dialogue with other points of view and tries to show how his approach is better, he does not make explicit the criterion of coherence he employs in his search for a universal historical consciousness. His strong emphasis on the inevitability of having some "theological circle" virtually contradicts his quest for universality. Thus, Tillich is not fully conscious of the tension between the apparent relativism of his confessional stance and his quest for a more comprehensive perspective.

The second important criticism of Tillich's twofold axioms is that they appear to be inconsistent. The axiom of transcendence reflects the classical Augustinian-Thomistic view of God as self-sufficient, perfect or complete. God, or The Whole, for Tillich, is apparently viewed as a wholly necessary reality without any unrealized or potential qualities. God "transcends" all actuality and potentiality. God's perfection thus precludes any essential modification by the historical process.

The axiom of harmony, however, describes God or The Whole in terms of lack or potentiality, that is, in terms of a need to create free parts as a content to love. According to the axiom of harmony, God is not self-sufficient, and all of his essential qualities are not necessary. Hence God is fulfilled, and some of his potentialities are realized, only through the historical process. God creates himself through his creation and is thus affected considerably by history.

Tillich's two axioms appear to be two incompatible ontologies--classical and process. Tillich stands at the border between these two views, but he does not adequately synthesize them. They seem to be only juxtaposed in his system (as he does with the poles of freedom and destiny). Either God has some contingent qualities or all of his qualities are necessary. Either human history makes a difference to God, or it does not.

Tillich's doctrine of symbols tends to hide this basic metaphysical incongruity. Tillich oscillates, on the one hand, between viewing the whole gnostically as indescribable and yet, on the other hand, claiming that some symbols significantly point to the true nature of the whole. In parts of Chapters Five and Six we took seriously much of his personalistic symbolism concerning God's memory, knowledge, and love. Tillich insists that being-itself is at least personal, although more. But if the dynamic and personal assertions of his theological statements contradict his religious assertions concerning the perfection and transcendent meaning of the depth of being, this inconsistency needs to be uncovered. Incompatible assertions cannot be ignored philosophically under the guise of mystery, mysticism, or symbolic predication. Tillich cannot have his cake and eat it too. If, for example, his theological assertions affirm that human history makes a difference to the whole, then it either makes a real difference (literally) or it does not.

We have maintained that the predominant thrust of Tillich's ontological understanding of history must be seen in terms of the dynamic categories used in the axiom of harmony. Tillich stood in the classical tradition making his philosophical pilgrimage toward process ontology. Volume Three is more process oriented than Volume One. But he never completely left the womb of classical thought.

His critique of supranaturalism, and the axiom of transcendence upon which it rests, was not radical enough. He rejected the supranaturalist's lack of historical concern, but inconsistently held on to the classical ontology that underlies the supranaturalist's reason for not taking history seriously.

It remains now to suggest some areas of thought that have arisen from this study which merit further analysis.

D. Areas of Further Study

At least six areas pointing to the need for further inquiry are suggested by this study. First, it has been maintained that Tillich's implicit use of the part-whole metaphor does not support his emphasis and phenomenological descriptions of freedom within the historical process. This is not to say, however, that the part-whole model *per se* cannot elucidate either spontaneity in nature or freedom in human history. Further study of this metaphor might possibly make clear some formulation of the part-whole model that would be compatible with the belief in finite freedom.

Second, it was suggested that Tillich's thought employs two incompatible ontologies. Since this study does not purport to be a complete metaphysical analysis of Tillich's thought, further sustained analysis is needed in distinguishing the classical and process ontologies in his thought. Tillich's system could conceivably be made consistent by modifying his axiom of transcendence and including clear distinctions of ways in which God might be conceived as perfect or complete, even in terms of process ontology, and of ways in which he is not complete. Some suggestions in this direction appeared in Chapter Six. The whole, for example may be viewed even in process categories as complete in its capacity for encompassing all possibilities, as well as retaining all the past and present in their fulness; and in its enexhaustible capacity for creativity and *agape*-love. Much more analysis is needed in this area.

Third, Tillich insisted that God cannot be discussed in terms of the subject-object relationship. But even his part-whole metaphor appears to employ necessarily a subject-object dualism. Distinctions need to be made between making God into an object, and making the concept of God into an object. Moreover, it would seem that when Tillich writes about "transcending" the subject-object split, he really means a kind of Hegelian synthesis in which each pole is transcended by "someway" being included in the other rather than totally eliminated. The whole, for example, could be said to transcend the subject-object relationship by being the only unity in which all the parts are included, or the only subject that includes all other objects. It remains to be seen how, if at all, the ultimately Real can be characterized meaningfully in terms other than the subject-object relationship.

Fourth, in Chapter Four, Tillich's view of the human condition was compared and contrasted with the thought of Sigmund Freud and Karl Marx. Tillich's own interpretation of these men was assumed as a background for a fuller grasp of Tillich's own position. A critical estimate of Tillich's interpretation of Freud and Marx would provide a stimulating area of study.

Fifth, Tillich's estimate of the human condition is inclined toward pessimism concerning the prospects of historical fulfillment. Man is estranged or separated from nature, from his fellow men, and from the whole. Tillich believes that estrangement and anxiety accompany finitude. Anxiety is the awareness of finitude. Further study is needed on the question of whether anxiety is inextricably connected with human existence, or whether it is culturally determined and hence possible to eliminate by technology and social reconstruction.

Sixth, it was seen that Tillich sought to make clear the principles or norms by which God might be identified in social change. Tillich's philosophy of history, however, does not attempt to translate these norms into concreta plans of action for the present. Tillich is a theorist, not a social engineer. It remains for those who accept his formulation of the incarnational norms of creative power and redeeming love to focus these ideals into workable solutions to current social problems.

In this exposition of Tillich's philosophy of history the writer has exercised the prerogative of a student to criticize his teacher. We cannot conclude, however, without expressing profound appreciation for the provocative insights and intellectual stimulation of this uncommon teacher and scholar.

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ABSTRACT

This study is an exposition and evaluation of Paul Tillich's epistemology, ontology, and theory of man as they bear on some critical and speculative issues in philosophy of history.

For Tillich, history proper is lived history, that is, the experience of human beings in the past. Historical consciousness is symbolic interpretation of significant meanings in lived history which are carried by tradition through time. Dependable historical interpretation requires objectivity of historical research, as well as empathy with and insight into a culture's ultimate concern. Tillich's conception of historical knowledge eventuates in a tension between involvement in a partial historical perspective and the search for a more universal historical consciousness.

Tillich's ontological perspective stems from his doctrine of revelation and presupposes two not explicitly stated axioms. The axiom of transcendence is the principle that reality is inexhaustible in power and meaning. The axiom of harmony is the principle that reality works for polar harmony. Uniting the two axioms, Tillich views Being-itself, on the one hand, symbolically as an abysmal, undifferentiated Whole driven creatively by agape-love toward individualization among its parts. On the other hand, he views Being-itself as the dynamic power of being which grounds all finite potentiality and actuality. Being-itself is both the source and aim of the historical process. The

purpose of history for man is to produce free individuals in community.

Tillich argues that Freud's view of man neglects man as a multidimensional unity, as social, as related to ideal values, and as free. In contrast to Marx, Tillich locates the source of man's estrangement within individual consciousness, not merely within society. Historical fulfillment, therefore, must come from beyond the finite condition with its subject-object dichotomy. Historical fulfillment is identical with divine fulfillment. Thus, while the Divine Whole affects history as its ground and aim, history affects the Divine Whole affects history as its ground and aim, history affects the Divine Whole insofar as it enriches its content.

The Kingdom of God is present within and among historical groups as threefold polar harmony: (a) between more inclusive political unity and democratic determination within and among various sub-groups, (b) between the revolutionary new and the reactionary old, and (c) between present fulfillment and future hope. God is not one cause among others working miraculously; he is manifested in nature and in certain modes of human consciousness and behavior. The incarnational norm for identifying God in social change is Jesus as the Christ, the center of history, conceived as the great Kairos. Christ is the embodiment of the creative power that overcomes demonization and profanization (axiom of transcendence), and of the redeeming love that produces freedom (axiom of harmony). The Spiritual Community exists to proclaim the message contained in the axiom, and to demonstrate faith and love in being and acting.

An analysis of both time and Eternal Life shows that Eternal Life is the transhistorical content of the Divine Whole. Eternal Life functions as the sufficient reason for the being, order, and aim of history, and constitutes the absolute perspective toward which finite perspectives aim. Eternal Life is not personal immortality, but rather refers symbolically to the retention of individuals and groups within the memory of the Divine Whole.

Six criticisms are suggested: First, Tillich provides no criterion by which to distinguish between historical creativity and mere change. Second, he does not show how being-itself can be creative without being limited by what is created. Third, Tillich's metaphorical language does not quality sufficiently the meaning of the transhistorical aim of history, and is thus unconvincing in his attempt to provide motivation for social transformation and ultimate hope in face of the tragic lack of fulfillment in historical existence. Four, Tillich does not explain how a part of the whole can be significantly free. Five, he does not recognize adequately the highly interpretative and hypothetical nature of the twofold axioms presupposed in his philosophy of history. Six, Tillich's use of the two axioms appears to express two incompatible ontologies—classical and process. On the one hand, the axiom of transcendence describes God as self-sufficient and necessary. On the other hand, the axiom of harmony represents the fundamental thrust of Tillich's thought, and describes God in terms of growth and enrichment through history. Hence, Tillich's philosophy of history rests on two conflicting principles.

AUTOBIOGRAPHY

M. Francis Reeves was born on October 15, 1927, in Columbus, Ohio, the only child of Marion W. Reeves and Virginia (Jones) Reeves. His father was self-employed in the shoe repairing business, and in 1941 became an employee of the Timkens Roller Bearing Company.

He was graduated from Olivet Nazarene College in 1949 with a Bachelor of Arts degree. In 1950 he obtained a Master of Arts degree from The Ohio State University. The Bachelor of Divinity degree was received from Nazarene Theological Seminary in 1953, at which time he was ordained into the Christian ministry.

In 1950 he married the former Gloria M. Holstein of Logan, West Virginia. Their family consists of three daughters: Deborah Gail (thirteen), Marilyn Francine (ten), and Kyra Lynne (four).

The Reverend Mr. Reeves accepted an offer to teach philosophy at Northwest Nazarene College in Nampa, Idaho, and remained there as Head of the Philosophy Department from 1953 to 1960. Upon receiving a Danforth Teacher's Grant he began a doctoral program at Boston University. He was a Teaching Fellow in 1961, and also taught in 1962.

In 1961 he was appointed pastor of the First Methodist Church in Marlboro, Massachusetts, transferred his ministerial credentials to the Methodist Church, and remained at Marlboro for three years.

Since 1963 he has taught philosophy at Bentley College in Boston, and is presently Chairman of the Philosophy Department.